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Abstract 
Essays on Foreign Bank Penetration in Emerging Economies 
Ji Wu 
Bang Nam Jeon Ph.D. (Co-chair supervisor) 
Alina Luca Ph.D. (Co-chair supervisor) 
 
 
Foreign bank penetration in emerging economies has been rising rapidly since 
the 1990s. This thesis examines its effects on host macroeconomic stability, the 
transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel, and its effects on 
the output in the host countries. 
The first essay develops a general equilibrium model to address the propagation 
of external and internal shocks and the effectiveness of monetary policy in two 
alternative scenarios: an economy dominated by domestic banks and an economy 
dominated by foreign banks. By applying numerical simulation methods, we find that 
an economy with the foreign bank-dominant banking sector is associated with lower 
loan interest rates, more credit, and higher output, wage and employment, compared 
to a domestic bank-dominant economy. Moreover, the foreign bank-dominant 
economy is shown to be less responsive to changes in domestic monetary policy. 
Overall we conclude that foreign banks play the role of a stabilizing force in the host 
economies, but the effectiveness of monetary policy is reduced due to the presence of 
foreign banks in these foreign bank-dominant economies. 
The second essay examines empirical evidence of the bank lending channel of 
the monetary policy by comparing the responses of domestic and foreign banks to 
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domestic monetary policy shocks at the individual bank level. We find evidence for 
the existence of an active bank lending channel across domestic and foreign banks. 
Foreign banks are shown to be less responsive to domestic monetary policy shocks. 
This lower sensitivity to domestic monetary policy by foreign banks can be explained 
by foreign banks’ access to the internal capital market of their parent banks. The 
evidence from aggregated data also shows that the effects of monetary policy tend to 
be buffered in economies with higher foreign bank penetration level. 
The third essay examines the implications of foreign bank penetration on 
economic growth though resource allocation in host countries. It finds some evidence 
that foreign banks tend to have capital better allocated to more productive sectors. The 
effect of capital growth on output is higher in economies with more pronounced 
foreign bank penetration level.    
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Chapter 1: Foreign Bank Penetration, Shock Propagation and Monetary 
Policy in Emerging Economies 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this essay is to assess the implications of foreign bank 
penetration in developing countries, in terms of the response of the economic 
variables of concern to internal and external shocks. Foreign bank penetration has 
been rising since the late 1980s, and experienced drastic increase in late 1990s in 
emerging and transition economies. Although extensive empirical work has been 
devoted to study its effects on domestic economy, the theoretical work is scarce. 
This paper develops a simple general equilibrium optimizing model to illustrate 
the effect of foreign bank penetration in a small economy which is perfectly integrated 
with the rest of world in both goods and capital markets. Although having access to 
international bond markets, economic agents depend on domestically operating banks 
(either domestically or foreign owned) for their consumption and production. 
Households have to hold deposits to finance a part of their consumption, and firms 
have to use loans to finance their payment for production factors. Banks are costly in 
producing deposits and loans, and the interest rates work as the mechanism to transfer 
internal and external monetary shocks into the real side of the economy. 
Existing literature has extensively argued that financial penetration from foreign 
banks can improve the conditions in financial sector. Foreign banks differ from 
domestic banks in that they are more efficient in producing deposits and loans, which 
may enable them to provide higher deposit rate and lower loan rate.1 With the 
                                                        
1 Foreign banks may also differ from domestic banks in terms of their access to external funding and product 
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presence of foreign banks, the domestic banking market is usually observed to be 
more competitive. A possible danger of foreign bank penetration is the transmission of 
foreign shocks to domestic agents through the credit channel by foreign banks. In the 
economy where foreign banks dominate, this is suspected to bring more fluctuation 
than when the financial sector is not open. In addition, central bankers may worry 
about the effectiveness of monetary policy in the case of dominant foreign bank 
penetration. Monetary policy is one of the most important policies in government’s 
arsenal used to reduce the short-term fluctuation and stabilize the economy. No 
government wants to lose the effectiveness of monetary instruments. The transmission 
of monetary policy to the real sector depends on several channels, out of which the 
most controversial one may be the lending channel. 2  Under a contractionary 
monetary policy, banks cannot completely offset a policy-induced drop in domestic 
deposits with alternative forms of liabilities, so they may cut down the supply of 
credit, hence affecting the liquidity position of bank-dependent firms. It is ambiguous 
how foreign banks respond to the domestic monetary policy, compared to the 
domestic banks, since they are presumably less costly in producing deposits and loans 
and hence may be affected less by the drop in deposits. A possible outcome is that, 
when foreign banks dominate in the domestic banking market, the transmission of 
                                                                                                                                                               
differentiation. In our model, we highlight their difference in the efficiency to produce financial products. 
2 The other channels include interest rate channel, exchange rate channel, firm balance sheet channel and asset 
price channel. Interest rate channel is described in the traditional Keynesian theory: monetary policy influences 
short-term real interest rate given that prices are sticky, altering the cost of capital for firms and thus investment. 
The exchange rate channel emphasizes the effect of monetary policy on exchange rate and then on the net exports 
and aggregate output. The firm balance sheet channel is when the creditworthiness of firms is affected by monetary 
policy and lending depends on borrowers’ net wealth, therefore the supply of credit and investment will by affected 
by their balance sheet. Asset price channel focuses the mechanism that involves Tobin’s q on investment spending 
and wealth effect on consumption. The former argues that a contractionary monetary policy will lower equity price 
that leads to a lower Tobin’s q, and thus lower investment spending and output. The latter pays attention to the 
lower equity price leads to lower household financial wealth and then lower consumption and output. 
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monetary policy may lose its effectiveness since the lending channel is more or less 
blocked.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The second section will 
introduce the main picture of foreign bank penetration in developing countries. 
Section three reviews the related literature concerning our topic. The forth section 
presents the theoretical model, and the fifth section analyzes the response of the 
economy in domestic bank dominance and foreign bank dominance using numerical 
simulation. Section six concludes the paper and presents the direction for future work. 
 
1.2 Background 
Foreign bank penetration, as the main stream of financial sector foreign direct 
investment in developing countries, started in the 1980s and surged in the late 1990s. 
Most of the penetration has taken place via cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A), which rose up form 320 cases during the 1978-1989 period to more than 
2000 during the 1990-2001 period (Claessens and Lee, 2002). The share of M&A 
deals targeting financial institutions in emerging markets increased from 18% in 
1990-1996 to 30% in 1997-2000. The value of cross-border M&A in emerging market 
banks, lingering around $1 billion from 1990 to 1995, increased quickly since then to 
around $ 17 billions in 2000. Year 2001 witnessed a peak value of $21 billions in 
M&A, followed by a sharp decline to $5 billions. However, in 2003, the M&A of 
banks in emerging markets has stabilized around $6 billions (BIS, 2004). 
The degree of foreign bank penetration has differed tremendously across regions. 
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In terms of the total assets of the foreign-owned banks relative to total banking assets, 
as shown in Table 1.1, foreign bank presence has been very stark in many Central and 
Eastern European countries such as Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 
and some Latin American countries such as Mexico, Uruguay and Peru. Central 
European countries received rapidly-growing amount of investment in banking sector 
since the second half of the 1990s. The M&A deals from foreign banks made up to 
24% of all cross-border deals. The two countries that absorbed the largest inflows 
were Poland and the Czech Republic. In terms of the total assets of banks, Poland and 
Hungary observed the largest ownership by foreign banks, followed by Croatia, the 
Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic. In these countries’ financial sector, foreign 
banks control nearly 100% of the banking assets. In Latin America, Mexico became 
the largest recipient of approximately 50% of the total financial direct investment in 
the region, which results in the fact that about two-thirds of bank assets are owned by 
foreign banks. In some other countries, such as Peru, the ownership by foreign banks 
has exceeded 60% by 2003.  
In Asia, the participation of foreign banks is still modest, except in Hong Kong 
SAR, Malaysia and Macau SAR. However, this region has been recently one of the 
fastest growing targets for M&A of banks, particularly Korea and Thailand. In the 
other low-income countries, most of which are on the African continent, foreign bank 
penetration has also increased in the past decade, but these countries are far from 
being the main destinations of foreign bank penetration.3  
                                                        
3 The number of the foreign banks has grown to 18% of the total number of banks in those low-income countries 
by 2000, up from only 5% in 1995. In terms of assets, the foreign banks account for 7% up from 3% in 1995. The 
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< Table 1.1 > 
< Figure 1.1> < Figure 1.2> <Figure 1.3> 
The direct establishment of affiliates by foreign banks in domestic markets has 
increasingly replaced their traditional cross-border claims and liabilities. In Table 1.2 
and Table 1.3, by using the data provided by BIS, we see the ratio of local claims 
(from foreign banks operating locally) to international claims (from abroad 
headquarters of the foreign banks) has been steadily increasing in many countries 
during the observed period. Although the value of international claims has been rising, 
the importance of cross-border lending and borrowing has been obviously weakened 
by the lending and borrowing through domestic institutions of foreign banks. 
Considering the fact that the BIS data on local claims only include the lending in 
domestic currency and that many of local operations in these developing countries are 
conducted in foreign currencies, our table would most likely understate the direct 
participation of foreign banks in these markets.   
< Table 1.2> <Table 1.3> 
There are several potential determinants of foreign bank penetration, in which 
the main driving force is the financial liberalization and the implementation of 
market-oriented reforms in the emerging countries. The governments in these nations 
tried to allow for more competition and then enable a free play of market force in the 
                                                                                                                                                               
increase has been very sharp in some countries. For example, there were no foreign bank in Tanzania in 1995, but 
the number increased to 6 in 2000 and controlled 69% of the total bank assets. In Zambia, the number of foreign 
banks rose to 8 in 2000 from only 2 in 1995, which own nearly 60% of the bank assets in the country. In some 
countries, foreign banks have been dominant in the banking sector. The penetration rate is 100% in Solomon 
Islands, 95% in Burkina Faso, 94% in Ivory Coast, 85% in Congo Democratic Republic, and more than 70% in 
many others (Claessens and Lee, 2002). It is a common fact that there are only a few, in some cases only 1 or 2, 
banks in these small economies, and therefore the rate of foreign bank penetration may look excessively high. The 
bank penetration also differs across these low-income countries. In 15 of them, such as, Angola, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Cambodia, and others, there was no foreign bank presence by 2000.   
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banking sector. New business opportunities appeared with the liberalization in these 
markets, since the demand for new banking products could give the foreign banks 
higher returns, especially for those “early birds” who entered the markets first.4 The 
governments also improved their legal and regulatory infrastructure, and these 
decreased the risk of operation in those countries and induced more foreign bank 
participation.5 In Europe, the proceeding integration in the EU also facilitates the 
foreign bank penetration in the Central and Eastern European countries. The single 
European currency, the deepening Single European Market and the enlargement of 
European Union by the Central European and Baltic countries accession, encouraged 
a fresh wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in recent years.  
The second possible reason of foreign bank entry in domestic markets is the 
“follow the customer hypothesis”, 6 supported by the observed fact that the foreign 
bank penetration increases with the increase of non-bank FDI.7  
Intense competition in home markets is the third reason to prompt international 
banks to open new business in developing countries. In Europe, financial integration 
induced considerable consolidation among banks and resulted in increasingly 
saturated banking markets. The European countries like Spain, Germany, Italy and 
                                                        
4 Claessens et al. (2001) has found that foreign bank penetration was highest during the period when foreign bank 
profitability was the highest, taxes were lowest and income per capita was highest. Brealey and Kaplanis (1996), 
Yamori (1998) and Buch (2000) also found the higher GDP per capita in the host markets, which can be the proxy 
of the expected gains, was positively related with the extent of foreign bank presence. 
5 There are many papers that have found that the favorable regulatory environment affects the entry of foreign 
banks positively. Foreign banks are more likely to enter a market which has fewer restrictions on their business 
activities. See Golberg and Grosse (1994), Buch and DeLong (2001) and Barth et al (2001). 
6 See Aliber (1984), Caves (1979) and some others. 
7 However, the studies testing the “follow your customers” hypothesis provided mixed results. Some supporting 
evidence were found between developed countries, but the relationship between foreign bank entry and non-bank 
FDI was found ambiguous between developed home and developing host countries. Further research testing the 
foreign bank entry and non-bank FDI are therefore required. Soussa (2004) provides an excellent review on the 
past literature on this hypothesis. 
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France experienced this kind of consolidation and subsequent market saturation in the 
1990s.8 In the U.S., the relaxation of the restrictions on interstate banking activity and 
the permission of universal banking entry in the late 1980s and 1990s also triggered a 
wave of domestic consolidation, which intensified the competition among banks and 
preceded the expansion of American banks abroad.  
Finally, foreign bank penetration was catalyzed by financial crises or economic 
difficulties in the host countries. After the 1994 Mexican “tequila crisis”, the 
governments in Latin American countries recapitalized the local banks with the help 
of foreign investors, and accelerated the process of liberalization.9 In Central and 
East European countries, governments were also heavily dependent on foreign 
investment to recapitalize their mostly insolvent domestic banks, in the short 
recession after the end of communism system. Asian governments expanded the scope 
of foreign ownership in domestic banks after the 1997 Southeastern Asian financial 
crisis. Foreign bank penetration grew in the victim countries of the crisis. However, 
reliance on foreign banks has been much less in Asian countries,10 and the restrictions 
more or less remain on the presence of foreign capital in local banks.  
 
 
 
                                                        
8 That foreign penetration has started partially because of home saturated banking market has been supported by 
some studies. For example, Guillen and Tschoegl (1999) argued that a main reason for Spanish banks to enter 
Latin American markets was the saturation in home market. Also, see Soussa (2004). 
9 The 1994 Mexican “tequila crisis” induced a rapid foreign bank penetration as the local investors refused to 
inject needed resources to domestic banks. Mexican government had to change its strategy of gradual opening of 
the banking sector, and allowed foreign acquisition of virtually all major domestic banks.  
10 The possible explanations may include the high domestic saving rate and large government-financed bailout. 
See Moreno and Villar (2005) 
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1.3 Literature Review 
Most economists believe that the domestic banking sector (and in general the 
domestic economy) tends to be better off in the presence of foreign bank penetration, 
since the entry of foreign banks may enhance the competition in the markets, provide 
better resource allocation, boost domestic banks’ efficiency and improve domestic 
financial infrastructure. Many empirical papers have found that foreign bank 
penetration reduces the interest rate spreads, which is regarded as evidence of 
increased competition and higher efficiency in domestic banking market (Claessens et 
al. (2001), Gelos et al. (2004), Crystal et al. (2002), Martinez-Peria et al. (2004) and 
others).11 Another benefit from foreign bank penetration is the improved access to 
international capital markets (Levine (1996), Euh and Baker (1990), Campbell Report 
(1983), Bhattacharaya (1993)). One policy objective to ease the restrictions on foreign 
bank entry is to increase the host countries’ contact with international financial 
community and thereby promote capital inflows. Foreign banks are less financially 
constrained than their domestic counterparts, or say, less dependent on deposit-based 
funding. They can either resort to external funding from their parent institution, or 
they have an easier access to international capital market (Crystal et al (2002)). As 
McFadden (1994) noted, “foreign banks were expected to bring new capital … 
through access to parent capital and from international markets.” Bhattacharaya (1993) 
reported that in some countries foreign banks helped to make international funds 
accessible to finance domestic projects.  
                                                        
11 Levy Yeyati and Micco (2004) finds that foreign bank penetration appears to have led to less competitive 
environment in banking sector. However, as far as we know, this is the only paper which finds evidence that 
foreign penetration leads to a decrease in competition. 
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Some papers argue that foreign banks are more cost efficient (for example, 
Bonin et al (2005)). Foreign banks can reduce their operation costs by using more 
advanced technology, and thereby force the domestic banks to upgrade their hardware 
to maintain competence. For example, in Spain, foreign banks generated a boom of 
credit cards and ATMs. In Turkey, foreign banks preceded the domestic banks in 
computerizing most of their operations, adopting modern budgeting technologies and 
taking SWIFT payment system network. Domestic banks had to follow foreign banks 
to improve their facilities to maintain their competence. It is very interesting to find 
that the ratio of employees with university education in the banking sector increased 
from 10 % to 20 % after greater foreign bank presence was allowed in Turkey (Levine 
(1996)). It implies that foreign banks not only reduced their operation costs by taking 
modern technologies and attracting more human capital, but also induced their 
domestic counterparts to do so. Based on these facts, in our model, we have assumed 
that foreign banks differ from domestic banks in terms of the efficiency and hence the 
cost to produce deposits and loans.  
Several papers found that foreign banks not only provide services denominated 
in domestic currency, but also they operate more in foreign currencies (Cihák and 
Podpiera (2005), Barajas et al. (2006), Farnoux et al. (2004)). This fact is illustrated 
by the higher proportion of foreign currency liabilities (assets) to total liabilities 
(assets) within foreign banks. BIS (2004) published its finding that foreign-owned 
banks are prominent in the rapid expansion of foreign currency lending in some 
markets. In reality, foreign bank penetration is closely associated with dollarization in 
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developing and transition countries. Dollarization is characterized by the increasingly 
holding by households and firms of a significant share of bank deposits and loans in 
foreign currencies. In our model, we follow Luca (2002) to take into account the loans 
denominated in both domestic and foreign currencies.  
The question is still open whether foreign banks will be a stabilizing force when 
the domestic market encounters shocks or crises. Some empirical studies have tried to 
address it, but they provide mixed answers (Martinez Peria et al (2002), Crystal et al 
(2002), Goldberg et al (2000), Goldberg (2001), De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2003), 
Martinez Peria et al (2005), Morgan and Strahan (2003), Galindo et al (2004) ). De 
Haas and Van Lelyveld (2003) found that in crisis periods foreign banks contracted 
their deposits and loans by less than domestic banks. Martinez Peria et al (2002, 2005) 
found that, although external shocks are initially spilled over via foreign banks from 
home country into their host countries, foreign banks become over time less sensitive 
to external shocks, more responsive to host country shocks over long-term, and their 
changes in lending are associated more with positive shocks than negative shocks. 
The loans from foreign banks are found not significantly reduced during crisis times. 
Therefore the foreign bank presence in domestic markets seems to be a stabilizing 
force and to lessen the probability of crises. Crystal et al (2002) noted that, loan 
growth is consistently higher for foreign banks than domestic banks. The earlier 
established foreign banks are providing stronger and more stable loans than both 
recently acquired foreign banks and domestic banks. Recently acquired foreign banks 
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behave differently in that they expand loans more slowly.12 Goldberg et al (2000) also 
noted that lending from foreign banks in Mexico and Argentina increased more 
quickly than lending from their domestic counterparts during the 1995 crisis. This 
evidence suggests that the foreign banks can be more stable in providing loans in host 
countries during crisis period. Goldberg (2001) shows that U.S. banks are steady 
credit provider in emerging markets, but the lending of the U.S. banks to Latin 
American countries is more related to U.S. rather than the host countries’ economic 
conditions. Her findings reflect both the stabilizing role that foreign banks can play in 
host countries, as well as the possibility that these countries may incur a lending 
cut-down due to economic fluctuations outside their frontier. Morgan and Strahan 
(2003), however, found that foreign bank entry may intensify rather than dampen 
economic volatility in host countries. Galindo et al (2004) found evidence that foreign 
banks’ response depends on the nature of the shocks. Foreign banks will be more 
sensitive to expected return shocks, but less sensitive to funding cost shocks.  
It is surprising that only scant literature tried to address the question of whether 
foreign and domestic banks respond differently under monetary policy shocks of the 
host country. In practice, a common worry among central bankers in developing 
countries with regards to foreign bank penetration is whether it would lead to less 
effective domestic monetary policy. The effectiveness of monetary policy depends on 
whether banks will behave as expected. A contractionary monetary policy may work 
                                                        
12 Another related question is whether foreign bank entry may adversely affect firms’ (especially small and 
medium-sized firms’) access to credit. Clarke et al (2001) concluded that foreign bank penetration overall 
improves firms’ access to credit. Although large firms get more benefits, the small firms are also better off. 
Nevertheless, Clarke et al (2002), when using the data for Latin American countries, found that foreign banks do 
lend less to small enterprises. It is obvious that more tests will be needed to reach a conclusive answer. 
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well only when banks respond “appropriately” by raising the interest rate and cutting 
down loans. Otherwise, the monetary policy loses by some extent its effectiveness. It 
is still ambiguous among central bankers whether foreign banks will respond the same 
as the domestic banks to monetary policy shocks.13 
Banks’ response to monetary policy shocks is related to the lending channel of 
monetary transmission. Starting with the seminal paper of Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988), the lending-channel theory argues that the banking system may play a 
non-trivial role in the transmission of monetary policy to real economic sector. When 
monetary policy is tightened, banks will cut back their lending to borrowers in 
response to a fall in deposits,14 so that the firms which depend on bank loans to 
finance production will have limited access to credit, which in turn affects the 
investment and output in the economy.15 Only a few papers studied the lending 
channel in the scenario of foreign bank penetration. Arena et al (2004) empirically 
compared the response of loans, deposits, and bank-specific lending and deposit rates, 
to various monetary conditions across domestic and foreign banks in twenty emerging 
market economies.16  They found that foreign banks display lower interest rate 
sensitivity to changes in monetary conditions, although there were no significant 
                                                        
13 One reason that central bankers worry about the effectiveness of monetary policy in the scenario of foreign 
bank penetration is that foreign banks may have easier access to international funds, which might be less affected 
by the host central banks. “On one hand, more competitive financial system and deeper financial markets would 
reinforce the transmission of interest rate signals, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policies. On the 
other hand, strong lending by foreign banks in foreign currency would be difficult to control as it is driven by 
funding conditions in international markets.” (CGGS of BIS (2005)) 
14 Deposits will be reduced because the contractionary monetary policy will reduce the bank reserves and hence 
reduce the “created” deposits. 
15 A lot of papers can be found discussing bank lending channel of monetary policy, such as Bernanke (1993), 
Kashyap et al. (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), and Kashyap and Stein (1995).  
16 They studied the effect of changes in monetary conditions on the credit market, regardless of whether the 
changes in monetary conditions are induced, or not, by monetary policies. The monetary conditions included not 
only money market rates and reserve requirement, but also international interest rate and the change of the foreign 
exchange rate. 
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differences in the response of volume of loans and deposits. Mora (2005), using 
Mexico data from 1995 to 2002, discussed the effectiveness of the lending channel 
given that banks have deposits and loans in both domestic and foreign currencies, and 
found that the deposits and loans of banks that have a larger share of foreign deposits 
are less sensitive to domestic monetary shocks but more sensitive to foreign monetary 
shocks.17 
 
1.4 Model 
The model is an extension of Edwards and Végh (1997) and Luca (2002). The 
model provides a framework upon which we will study the response of the economy 
to monetary shocks. We examine two scenarios, one in which the banking market is 
dominated by domestic banks, and one in which it is foreign bank dominated. We are 
interested in finding whether the shocks’ effects are qualitatively and quantitatively 
different in the two scenarios. 
 
1.4.1 The Economy 
Four agents exist in our economy: households, firms, banks and the government. 
Firms are owned by households. Firms and banks are perfectly competitive in their 
industries. The economy is assumed perfectly integrated with the rest of the world in 
goods and capital market. All agents have access to the international bond markets at 
the nominal international interest rate *ti . We assume that the banking market is 
                                                        
17 Some other related works include Chang and Velasco (2001). 
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composed either of only domestic banks (domestic bank dominance) or only foreign 
banks (foreign bank dominance). We distinguish domestic and foreign banks not only 
by their ownership, but more importantly, by their efficiency to produce demanded 
deposits and loans.  
One non-storable good is produced and consumed. The good is internationally 
traded at the international price *tP . The domestic price of the good is tP , where by 
the law of one price *t t tP E P= ⋅ . tE is the nominal exchange rate in terms of 
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. Hereinafter, we will denote the 
domestic currency by “peso” and the foreign currency by “dollar”. Bonds are 
denominated in dollar. Real variables will be expressed in the terms of the good.  
There is no uncertainty in our model. All agents have perfect foresight. The rate 
of devaluation of the exchange rate, /t t tE Eε =  , is assumed predetermined. Based on 
the law of one price, domestic inflation rate tπ  is equal to the international inflation 
rate *tπ  plus the rate of devaluation of peso tε , that is, *t t tπ π ε= + . *tπ  is assumed 
exogenous and constant. We assume perfect capital mobility and Fisher equation 
holds so that * *t tr i π= − , where r is the real interest rate and the same across the 
world. 
This is an inside money economy. We assume agents in the economy do not hold 
cash. We introduce the role for deposits and loans through deposit-in-advance and 
credit-in-advance constraints. Households are assumed to use bank deposits to finance 
a part of their consumption, and firms to use bank loans to pay production costs. 
Firms produce the good using a CES technology, and labor and foreign imported 
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inputs as production factors. Firms need to use peso loans to pay for the wages, and 
dollar loans for a part of the foreign imported inputs. Banks produce the demanded 
deposits and loans. We assume banks finance their loans using domestic peso deposits 
and external funds (international bonds) in the international markets. Banks can not 
lend in the international bond markets. At every period, the asset-liability identity 
holds. 
The government, which combines both monetary and fiscal authorities, conducts 
monetary policy by changing the reserve requirement ratio of deposits. A raise in the 
reserve ratio will lead to a contraction in the money supply, while a drop in the ratio 
will cause an expansion in the money supply. The government also chooses the rate of 
devaluation. 
There are no dynamics in our model. The economy is always in steady state 
equilibrium. When a shock hits the economy, the agents can make instantaneous 
adjustment and the economy jumps from one steady state equilibrium to a new one. 
 
1.4.2 Household 
In our model, households consume the final good and supply labor in the labor 
market. The lifetime utility function is composed of consumption and leisure (which 
is defined as the total endowed time 1 minus the labor): 
0
[log( ) log(1 )] tt tU c l e dt
β∞ −= + −∫                 (1) 
where tc  is the consumption in real term, tl  is the labor provided by households, 
and ( 0)β > is the subjective discount rate.  
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Households hold two assets: domestic peso deposits and internationally traded 
bonds. The households’ financial wealth in real terms (denoted by hta ) is thus: 
h h
t t ta d b= +                          (2) 
where td  represents the real stocks of deposits and 
h
tb  international bonds. 
Household’s flow constraint is given by:18 
*( )h h d ft t t t t t t t t t ta ra i i d w l cε τ= − + − +Ω + + −
i
            (3) 
where dti  is the nominal interest rate for peso deposits. 
f
tΩ  denotes the profits of 
firms which appears in the flow constraint since firms are owned by households. tw  
is the real wage of labor, and tτ  is the transfer payment from government. The 
appendix provides more details on the derivation of the flow constraint. 
Households must hold td  to finance a fraction φ  of their consumption, so 
t td cφ=                               (4) 
We obtain households lifetime budget constraint by integrating (3) and taking 
appropriate transversality condition:  
*
0 0 0
( )  [ ( ) ]fh rt d rtt t t t t t t tta w l e dt c i i d e dtτ ε∞ ∞− −+ Ω + + = + + −∫ ∫        (5) 
where 0
ha  is the initial wealth of the households. The lifetime budget constraint tells 
us that, the present discounted value of “total expenditure” (given by the RHS, which 
includes the lifetime consumption and the additional cost of holding peso deposits) 
must be equal to households’ wealth that comprises his initial real financial assets and 
the present discounted value of the income and government transfer payments. The 
                                                        
18 Here we do not include the profit of banks in households flow constraint. If the banks are domestically owned, 
the profits of banks can be assumed to be owned by households. However, when banks are owned by foreigners, it 
does not make sense that these profits will belong to households. This exclusion of bank profits from households 
flow constraint will not affect the first order conditions of households obtained by maximize their lifetime utility. 
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additional cost is stemmed from the constraints that households have to hold peso 
deposits to finance a part of their consumption. 
The households’ optimization problem consists in choosing consumption tc  
and labor tl , for all [0, )t∈ ∞  to maximize lifetime utility Eq.(1), subject to the 
deposits-in-advance constraint Eq.(4) and lifetime budget constraint Eq.(5), given the 
initial financial wealth 0
ha  and the time path of *,  ,  ,  ,  fdt t t t tw i iε Ω  and tτ . 
0,
    [log( ) log(1 )]
t t
t
t t
c l
Max U c l e dtβ∞ −= + −∫               (6) 
s.t. *0 0 0( )  [ ( ) ]
fh rt d rt
t t t t t t t tta w l e dt c i i d e dtτ ε∞ ∞− −+ Ω + + = + + −∫ ∫  
t td cφ=  
and * *t tr iβ π= = −  19 
The first order conditions are: 
*1 [1 ( )]dt t t
t
i i
c
λ φ ε= + + −                      (7) 
1
1 tt
w
l
λ=−                            (8) 
where λ  is the marginal utility of wealth. Households maximize their utility by 
equalizing the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal utility of wealth times 
the effective price of consumption. The effective price of consumption is the direct 
cost of one more unit of consumption plus the additional cost for households to hold 
peso instead of international bonds. At the optimum, the marginal utility of leisure is 
equal to the marginal utility of wealth times the real wage. Households supply more 
labor and give up more leisure when the real wage is higher. Given the optimal choice 
                                                        
19 As usual, here we assume rβ=  to avoid unnecessary dynamics.  
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of consumption, Eq.(4) determines the optimal path of peso deposits. 
 
1.4.3 Firms 
The representative firm produces goods following a CES production function. 
Two production factors are inputted, one of which is domestic labor, and the other is 
imported foreign inputs.20 The CES production function is: 
 
1 1
1( )t t ty n l
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
− −
−= +                         (9) 
where tn  is the foreign inputs, and σ  is the elasticity of substitution and 0σ > . The 
firm has to use peso loans tz  from banks to pay the wage to workers, and dollar loans 
*
tz  to pay a part α  of the imports of foreign inputs.21 Both tz  and *tz  are in real 
terms.  
 t t tz w l=                           (10) 
*
t t tz p nα=                          (11) 
where tp  is the relative price of imported foreign inputs to the international price of 
exported final goods, and thus 1tp < . 
Firm’s real financial wealth fta  is composed of the holdings of international 
bonds ftb , and peso and dollar loans: 
*f f
t t t ta b z z= − −                        (12) 
The flow constraint is: 
* * * *( ) ( )f f l l ft t t t t t t t t t t t t t ta ra i i z i i z y w l p nε= − − − − − + − − −Ω
i
    (13) 
                                                        
20 One example of the imported foreign inputs may be the imported capital-intensive components. Firms in 
developing countries import the components and use local labor to assembly the components into final goods. 
21 We assume the spot exchange market does not work here. That is, the firm can only borrow dollar loans to pay 
the foreign inputs and peso loans to pay labor wage. The firm cannot borrow dollar first and then convert into peso 
at the spot exchange market. 
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where lti  is the nominal interest rate of peso loans, and 
*l
ti  the interest rate of dollar 
loans. Please notice that the term *( )lt t t ti i zε− −  represents the additional cost incurred 
by the firm for having to use peso loans to pay the wage of labor, and * * *( )lt t ti i z− the 
additional cost for having to use dollar loans to finance the payment for imported 
foreign inputs. For the complete derivation, see the appendix.  
We obtain the lifetime profits of the firm by integrating (13) and imposing the 
transversality condition: 
* * * *
0
0 0
[ ( ) ( ) ]f rt f l l rtt t t t t t t t t t t t te dt a y w l p n i i z i i z e dtε
∞ ∞
− −Ω = + − − − − − − −∫ ∫   (14) 
where 0
fa  is the initial financial wealth of the firm.  
Therefore, the firm’s optimization problem consists in choosing labor tl  and 
imported foreign inputs tn , in order to maximize the present discounted value of 
profits Eq.(14), given the initial financial wealth 0
fa  and the time paths of 
*,  ,  ,  ,  lt t t t tw p i iε  and *lti : 
, 0
   
t t
f rt
t
l n
Max e dt
∞ −Ω∫  
s.t. * * * *0
0 0
[ ( ) ( ) ]f rt f l l rtt t t t t t t t t t t t te dt a y w l p n i i z i i z e dtε
∞ ∞
− −Ω = + − − − − − − −∫ ∫  
    t t tz w l=  
    *t t tz p nα=  
and 
1 1
1( )t t ty n l
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
− −
−= +  
The F.O.C.s are: 
1 1 1 1
* *1( ) [1 ( )]lt t t t t tn l n p i i
σ σ
σ σ σ σ α
− − −−+ = + −               (15) 
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1 1 1 1
*1( ) [1 ( )]lt t t t t t tn l l w i i
σ σ
σ σ σ σ ε
− − −−+ = + − −              (16) 
These equations state that, the firm must equalize the marginal product of the 
production factors to their marginal cost. The marginal product of foreign inputs has 
to be equal to its relative international price, plus the additional cost for having to use 
dollar loans instead of bonds for the payment. The marginal product of labor is equal 
to the wage payment plus the additional cost that the firm has to use peso loans to 
finance the wage. 
 
1.4.4 Banks 
The assets of banks, bta , are composed of the following parts, all in real terms: 
peso and dollar loans to firms, respectively tz  and 
*
tz ; and reserves on peso 
deposits, t tdδ , where tδ is the reserve ratio. The liability side of banks includes the 
peso deposits collected from households and bonds issued from international bond 
markets, btb . Here banks can only borrow but they can not lend in the international 
bond market.  
Banks incur cost in collecting deposits and issuing loans. We assume the cost of 
banks to “produce” deposits and loans, η , is divided into two parts, respectively for 
peso and dollar activities: 
*1/ 1/( ) ( ( ) )btt t tAd Bz Cz D b
ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρη = + + +  
where 1ρ > . A, B, C and D are parameters that measures the efficiency of banks to 
produce deposits and loans in peso and dollar, and A, B, C, D > 0. To compare the 
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different economy response to monetary shocks in domestic bank dominance scenario 
and foreign bank dominance scenario, we will assume foreign banks have different 
efficiency parameters from domestic banks.  
Banks’ financial wealth is given by: 
* (1 )b bt t t t t ta z z d bδ= + − − −                 (17) 
The flow constraint is: 
* * * * *
* 1/ * 1/
( ) ( ) ( )
      ( ) ( ) ( ( ) )
b b l l
t t t t t t t t t t t t t
d b b
t t t t t t t t t
a ra i d i i z i i z
i i d Ad Bz Cz D bρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ε δ ε
ε
= − + + − − + −
− − − −Ω − + − +
i
  (18) 
where btΩ  is the profits of banks. The derivation is provided in the appendix. 
We assume there is no assets accumulation or decumulation in banks every 
period, so 0bta =
i
, which implies:  
* (1 )bt t t t tb z z dδ= + − −                   (19) 
Banks’ lifetime profits can be obtained by integrating (18) and imposing the 
transversality condition: 
* * * * *
0
0 0
* 1/ * 1/
[( ) ( ) ( )
                 ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ]
b rt b l l
t t t t t t t t t t t t
d b rt
t t t t t t t t
e dt a i i z i i z i d
i i d Ad Bz Cz D b e dtρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ε ε δ
ε
∞ ∞
−
−
Ω = + − − + − − +
− − − − + − +
∫ ∫    (20) 
where 0
ba  is the initial wealth of banks.  
Banks choose domestic peso deposits td , peso loans tz , and dollar loans 
*
tz  
to maximize the present discounted value of profits Eq.(20), given the initial assets 
0
ba  and the time paths of * *, , , ,l l dt t t t ti i i iε  and tδ . The holdings of bonds btb  are 
adjusted to ensure that Eq. (19) hold in every period. 
The F.O.C.s are: 
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1 1
* 1 * 1( ) ( ( ) ) ( )l b bt t t t t t t t ti i B Ad Bz z D Cz D b b
ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρρ ρε
− −
− −= + + + + +       (21) 
1 1
* * * * 1 * 1( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( )l b b bt t t t t t t ti i C Cz D b z D Cz D b b
ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ
− −
− −= + + + +       (22) 
1 1
* 1 * 1(1 )( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ( ) ) ( )d b bt t t t t t t t t t ti i A Ad Bz d D Cz D b b
ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρρ ρδ ε δ
− −
− −= − + − + + − +  
(23) 
Some insights can be obtained immediately from Eq.(21)-(23). First, these 
equations reflect the financial distortion in the economy. If banking is costless, banks 
will equate the lending rate with the bond interest rate, and equate the deposit rate 
with the bond interest rate weighted by (1 )tδ− . Second, the spread between loan 
interest rate and bond interest rate depends not only on the marginal cost of credit, but 
also the marginal cost of bonds. For example, when tz  increases, it directly increases 
the interest rate lti  through the rise of the marginal cost of peso loans, and at the 
same time, indirectly through the rise of the marginal cost of bonds, since increasing 
tz  raises the demand for bonds. Similarly, the spread between deposit rate and bond 
interest rate is also affected not only by the marginal cost of deposits but also by the 
marginal cost of bonds. 
 
1.4.5 Government 
The government holds international reserves in the form of international bonds, 
g
tb . Its liabilities consist of the reserves on peso deposits of banks. The government 
receives returns from the international reserves and uses the returns to give lump-sum 
transfer to households. The government can not lend in the banking market. The 
monetary authority in government sets the path of the rate of devaluation, tε , and 
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determines the reserve ratios for deposits, tδ . 
Government’s assets are: 
g g
t t t ta b dδ= −                          (24) 
Following Edwards and Végh (1997), we assume that the banking cost is not a 
social cost.22 The flow constraint is given by: 
* 1/ * 1/( ) ( ) ( ( ) )g g bt t t t t t t t t t ta ra i d Ad Bz Cz D b
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρε δ τ= + + − + + + +i    (25) 
which can give us the lifetime constraint: 
* 1/ * 1/
0
0 0
[( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ]rt g b rtt t t t t t t t te dt a i d Ad Bz Cz D b e dt
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρτ ε δ
∞ ∞
− −= + + + + + +∫ ∫   (26)  
 
1.4.6 Equilibrium Conditions 
The economy’s flow constraint is derived from aggregating the flow constraints 
of the four agents (households, firms, banks and government), given by equations (3), 
(13), (18) and (25), and taking into account *t t tπ π ε= +  and * *t ti r π= + : 
t t t t t tk rk y p n c= + − −
i
                    (27) 
where tk  denotes the economy’s net stock of bonds, and 
h f b g
t t t t tk b b b b= + − + .  
The economy’s resource constraint can be derived from (27) by imposing the 
appropriate transversality condition: 
 0
0
( ) 0rtt t t tk y p n c e dt
∞
−+ − − =∫ 23                   (28) 
                                                        
22 Edwards and Végh (1997) justifies this assumption by saying “some federal agency providing (at zero cost) the 
monitoring and administrative services needed to run the banks. The profits of this federal agency are returned to 
households as lump-sum transfers.”  
23  If the scenario is foreign bank dominant in the banking market, the resource constraint is: 
0
0
( ) 0b rtt t t t tk y p n c e dt
∞
−+ − − −Ω =∫ . This does not change the resource constraint too much since banks are 
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1.4.7 Competitive Equilibrium 
The competitive equilibrium is defined by the set of allocations of 
households { , , , }ht t t tc l d a , firms
*{ , , , , }ft t t t tl n z z a , banks 
*{ , , , }bt t t td b z z , and 
prices *{ , , , }d l lt t t ti i i w , given the exogenous prices and policy 
variables * * *{ , , , , , , }mtt t t t t t ti P P Pε δ π , such that: 
1. F.O.C.s for households, Eq.(7) (8), for firms, Eq.(15) (16),and for banks, 
Eq.(21) (22) (23) hold; 
2. Government budget constraint, Eq.(25) (26) is satisfied; 
3. The labor market clears. The labor supply function is given by Eq.(8), and 
the labor demand function is given by Eq.(16). When the labor market clears, 
supply demand
t tl l= . 
4. Financial market clears. There are three financial products in the economy, 
,t td z  and 
*
tz . The deposit supply function is given by Eq.(4), and the deposit 
demand function is given by Eq.(23), and demand supplyt td d= . The peso loan demand 
function is given by Eq.(10) given the optimal labor inputs tl , the peso loan supply 
function is given by Eq.(21), and demand supplyt tz z= . The dollar loan demand function is 
given by Eq.(11) given the optimal foreign inputs tn , the dollar loan supply function 
is given by Eq.(22), and * demand * supplyt tz z= . 
5. The economy’s flow constraint Eq.(27) and resource constraint Eq.(28) hold. 
These conditions state the current account identity that CA KA= − .   
                                                                                                                                                               
competitive and in equilibrium their profits are zero. 
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1.5 Simulation  
In this section, we analyze the effects of external and internal shocks on the 
economy by applying numerical simulation. The economy is assumed initially in 
steady-state equilibrium, and when the shock occurs, the economy adjusts 
instantaneously and shifts to a new steady-state equilibrium.  
To understand the importance of foreign bank penetration to the host country, we 
compare two scenarios of the host banking sector, one of which is characterized by 
domestic bank dominance (or no foreign bank presence), and the other foreign bank 
dominance (or all banks are foreign owned). Thinking about the phenomenal presence 
of foreign banks in some markets, these assumptions, although extreme, still make 
sense. 
The presence of foreign banks, since they are more efficient in producing 
deposits and loans, is expected to buffer some external and internal shocks. If this is 
justified, it might make the case for more financial liberalization in developing 
countries. With deeper integration with the rest of world in capital mobility, the 
developing countries may benefit from more credit and more favored interest rate. 
When external shocks hit the economy, the economy may be less affected. However, 
for central banks, it raises more challenges to the effectiveness of monetary policy 
since the foreign banks might be less sensitive to the monetary changes. Compared 
with domestic bank dominance, the dominance of foreign banks might imply that the 
economy will respond to monetary policy less than expected, therefore the central 
  
26
 
banks may need to conduct the monetary policy more starkly. 
Unfortunately, the model in Section 4 can not be solved analytically. The 
difficulties to explore how the cost efficiency parameters affect the response of the 
variables of interest force us to apply numerical simulation in our question. The 
parameters we choose are illustrated in Table 1.4. All parameters are assumed at 
reasonable values. The difference between foreign and domestic banks lies in that 
foreign banks are more cost efficient in producing foreign currency denominated 
loans and borrowing from external source, therefore the cost efficiency parameters C 
and D are set at 0.03 and 0.06, while the counterparts in domestic banks are set at 0.07 
and 0.15 respectively. There are some arguments among economists on whether 
foreign banks overcome their information disadvantage in host countries with their 
cost efficiency.24 In our simulation, we set the parameters A and B, which measure 
banks’ cost efficiency in domestic currency deposits and loans, at the same values for 
both foreign and domestic banks, where A = 0.025 and B = 0.05. That is, we assume 
foreign banks is as cost efficient as domestic ones in domestic currency business.  
<Table 1.4> 
 
1.5.1 International Interest Rate Shock 
We increase international interest rate from 0.01 to 0.34, and the results are 
provided in Figure 1.4. 
                                                        
24 For example, Jeon and Miller (2005) believes that in general, the empirical evidence that foreign banks perform 
better than domestic banks implies that their cost efficiency advantage overpowers their information disadvantage 
in developing countries. Berger et al (2001) finds only banks from the U.S. exceed the domestic banks in cost 
efficiency and offset their disadvantage in information accession. 
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<Figure 1.4> 
In the steady state, the foreign bank dominated economy, compared to domestic 
bank dominated economy, observes higher bank credit denominated in both 
currencies. Foreign banks provide lower loan interest rates, which is favored to the 
bank dependent firms to finance their production factors. Foreign banks collect less 
domestic deposits but resort to more external borrowing (which is proxied by more 
international bonds). This is consistent to the general agreement that foreign banks 
have a better access to external funding, and can bring more capital inflow into the 
host country. Different from the past literature, the external funding of banks is 
endogenous instead exogenous. Foreign banks will bring more external capital into 
the host country because it is optimal for it to do so. Lower interest rate of loans 
reduce the marginal cost of production factors, so firms will demand more credit to 
pay for more labors and imported inputs. The more inputs in production result in 
higher output. The wage is as well higher due to higher demand for labor, and higher 
labor inputs also imply the unemployment rate in the foreign bank dominated 
economy may be lower than the domestic banks dominated economy. However, 
consumption is lower when foreign banks are dominant because the lower deposit rate 
increases the opportunity cost of consumption. In our simulation, the economy 
experiences a trade deficit, but the foreign bank dominance helps to reduce the deficit.  
When the economy is hit by an international interest rate shock, these two 
economies respond in the same direction but at different pace. Banks (both domestic 
and foreign) will increase their interest rates of loans, which increase the marginal 
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cost of labor and imported inputs and therefore reduce firms’ demand for these two 
production factors. Output falls correspondingly. The less demand for labors results in 
lower wage and less employment. Banks increase the deposit interest rate, but the 
opportunity cost of consumption still increase because the increase in deposit interest 
rate is slower than the increase in international interest rate, thus banks collect fewer 
deposits. With loans being reduced, banks reduce their external funding. However, 
foreign bank dominated economy is less affected by the international interest rate 
shock in terms of the response magnitude. Thanks to the higher cost efficiency in 
foreign banks, their loans in both currencies fall at a smaller rate, which prevents the 
marginal cost of labor and imported inputs from increasing too much, so the demand 
for these two production factors will be reduced less which buffers the fall in output. 
Wages will also be reduced only by a smaller extent and it detains a rapid increase of 
unemployment. The deposits are less reduced and as well the consumption. Foreign 
banks reduce their external funding less than domestic banks, which means the capital 
inflow will not fluctuate too much.  
It is very interesting that foreign banks and domestic banks adjust their interest 
rate at the same rate, but foreign banks always charge smaller interest rate of loans.  
In sum, when the economy is hit by international interest rate shock, foreign 
bank presence plays a stabilizing force that prevents the real economic activities from 
falling too much, so the economy is better off from less fluctuation.  
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1.5.2 Monetary Policy Shock 
Given the international interest rate unchanged, which is set at 0.04, we assume 
the central bank needs to execute contractionary monetary policy for some reason by 
increasing the reserve requirement ratio from 0.01 to 0.34. The results are provided in 
Figure 1.5. 
<Figure 1.5> 
The economy dominated by foreign banks experiences higher credit, production 
inputs, output, wage and employment at any level of reserve requirement ratio. 
Foreign banks provide more loans but collect fewer deposits, and borrow more 
external funding. When the economy is hit by internal monetary policy shocks, both 
economies react in the same direction but at different rate, except the external funding. 
Foreign banks increase their interest rates of loans but much more slightly in 
comparison to domestic banks, especially the interest rate of dollar loans. The demand 
for loans then will be reduced by a smaller extent, and as well the labors and imported 
inputs. Output is less dampened thanks to smaller reduction in production factor 
inputs. The less affected demand for labor also stops the wage and employment from 
being reduced too much. Banks will reduce their deposit interest rate, but the 
reduction in foreign banks is more slowly than domestic banks. The fall in deposit 
interest rate increases the opportunity cost of consumption, and leads to the fall in 
consumption. The fall in consumption is buffered since the fall in deposit interest rate 
and correspondingly the rise in the opportunity cost of consumption is slower. Foreign 
and domestic banks will behave differently to adjust their external funding. Foreign 
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banks will increase their borrowing from international capital, because the fall in their 
loans is smaller relative to the fall in deposits, so they need to resort to more external 
funding. Domestic banks will reduce their external funding since the reduction in their 
loans exceeds the fall in the deposits, so they need to cut down instead of increase 
their external borrowing.  
The contrast between domestic and foreign banks response to monetary policy 
shocks is very impressive. It implies that monetary policy can be a very effective 
instrument to affect the macroeconomy by the central bank when the banking sector is 
dominated by domestic banks, however, after foreign banks become dominant, the 
effectiveness of monetary policy is partially lost. This finding suggests central 
bankers keep cautious and avoid overestimating the force of monetary policy. 
 
1.5.3 Monetary Policy as the Stabilization Tool under International Interest Rate 
Shock 
When the economy is hit by external interest rate shock, government can isolate 
output from being affected by executing appropriate monetary policy. We hold the 
output to be constant at 0.0455 and 0.0966 respectively for domestic and foreign bank 
dominated economy, produced when international interest rate set at 0.04 and reserve 
requirement ratio set at 0.08. Then we increase the international interest rate from 
0.01 to 0.69. The results are provided in Figure 1.6. 
<Figure 1.6> 
The government can carry out expansionary monetary policy to isolate output 
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from being reduced by cutting down the reserve requirement ratio.25 The reduction in 
reserve requirement ratio can offset the effect of the increase in international interest 
rate on production factor. Banks increase their loan interest rate to offset the increase 
in international interest rate. Labor and imported inputs will be held constant, and 
correspondingly wage will not be changed either. Loans in both currencies maintain 
constant, deposits and external funds will be reduced, but the reduction in the reserve 
requirement ratio will hold the bank assets and liability to be equal. 
In the foreign bank dominated economy, the government has to reduce the 
reserve requirement ratio more aggressively, in comparison to the domestic bank 
dominated economy. It needs to adjust down the reserve requirement ratio more 
greatly in terms of magnitude and more quickly in terms of speed. If the government 
is retarded to do so, the output will be reduced associated with reduction in production 
inputs and employment, which means the economy will suffer from a depression.  
Although the government can isolate the output from being reduced, it can not 
isolate consumption at the same time. Consumption will fall because of the increase 
of its opportunity cost. However, consumption will fall more slowly in the foreign 
bank dominated economy. 
 
 
 
                                                        
25 The government can also isolate the output by adjusting down the exchange rate, which means an appreciation 
of its currency. What they need to do is only reducing the rate of depreciation ε at the same rate of the increase in 
international interest rate. All variables will be held constant, except the foreign currency loan interest rate. 
However, it is hard to judge whether this is a better policy solution in our model. In reality, the developing 
countries are reluctant to appreciate their currency. 
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1.5.4 Exchange Rate Policy Shock 
We assume the government adjusts its exchange rate policy by increasing the 
rate of depreciation for some reason. We set the parameters at the benchmark value, 
and increase the rate of depreciation ε from 0.01 to 0.69. The results are shown in 
Figure 1.7.  
<Figure 1.7> 
Consumption will fall as the currency is depreciated, although the interest rate of 
deposits increases, partially offsetting the increase of opportunity cost of consumption 
from currency depreciation. Banks increase the loan interest rates, and cut down the 
credit to firms. Firms demand less production factor, resulting in a fall in output, wage 
and employment. 
The response of the economy dominated by foreign banks is very similar to the 
one under the shock of international interest rate shock, in terms of both magnitude 
and speed. The variables of interest adjust at a slower rate than in the economy 
dominated by domestic banks. However, in the foreign bank dominated economy, the 
effect of exchange rate on dollar loan interest rate is much more slight, being reflected 
by a small rise of the interest rate, as opposed to a much more obvious increase in the 
domestic bank dominance economy. This can be explained by the slower variation in 
banks’ marginal cost to offer dollar loans and borrow international bonds, due to the 
initial higher amount of dollar loans and bonds.  
This finding serves as evidence that the foreign bank presence is a stabilizing 
force in the economy, but may be at the cost of a part of the effectiveness of domestic 
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policies. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
The increasing presence of foreign banks in emerging markets raised the 
question to economists what are the implications of it to host countries. In our paper, 
the cost efficiency of banks plays important role in producing loans and deposits, and 
deciding the interest rates of lending and borrowing. Households’ deposits and then 
consumption are affected. The bank-dependent firms determine their optimal labor 
and foreign inputs by equalizing the marginal products and the marginal costs of 
production factors, which are affected by banks’ interest rates. Firms’ optimal 
decisions affect the demand for labor, the wage in labor market and the output of the 
economy.  
In the steady state, the economy dominated by foreign banks in banking sector, 
in comparison to the economy dominated by domestic banks, observes more financial 
credits in both currencies and more capital inflow via banks. Higher credit supports 
more demand for production factors and produces more output. Wage is also higher 
due to higher demand for labors. When the economy is hit by international interest 
rate shock, the economy dominated by foreign banks will respond in a different 
pattern by reducing their loans and deposits (denominated in both currencies) on a 
slower pace. The real economic activities, such as output, consumption, production 
factors and wage, will also be adjusted down but more slowly than the economy with 
dominant domestic banks. The above results suggest that foreign banks can be a 
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benedictory and stabilizing force to the host country, so a further financial 
liberalization can make the economy better off. However, our simulation findings also 
imply the benediction from more foreign bank participation is not cost-free. The 
monetary policy loses part of its effectiveness in influencing the real economic 
activities. When the international interest rate is steadily given, and for some reason 
the central bank carries out contractionary monetary policy, foreign banks reduce their 
loans and deposits more reluctantly, in contrast to a quicker drop by domestic banks. 
In terms of interest rate, foreign banks are as well less sensitive by only adjusting it 
more slowly. The real activities are thus less affected by monetary policy. When the 
economy is hit by international interest rate shock, albeit the central bank can adopt 
expansionary monetary policy to stabilize the output, it needs to do it more 
aggressively when foreign banks are dominant. Based on the comparison to the 
economy dominated by domestic banks, monetary policy loses some of its edge to 
help the central bank to manage the real economy. The central bankers may need to 
remain cautious to execute their monetary policy by avoiding an overestimate of its 
effectiveness when facing an increase in foreign bank presence. The adjustment of 
exchange rate policy results in similar variation in variables as to the shock in 
international interest rate. 
This paper is far from an end to the research on the implication of foreign bank 
penetration on macro-economy of the host country. In a more complex reality, 
domestic and foreign banks usually co-exist and may interact with each other in the 
banking sector which is more close to an oligopoly with differentiated products. 
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Therefore it is worthwhile to improve our model by establishing it upon an imperfect 
competitive framework. This will be left to our future research. 
 
 
Appendix A to Chapter 1 
 
A.1 The Model 
A.1.1 Households 
Households’ nominal assets holding is: 
h h
t t t tA D E B= + ⋅  
It can be rewritten into the real terms: 
h h
t t ta d b= +  
On one side, 
* fh d h h
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t ttA i D E i B E B P P w l P P cτ= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅Ω + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅
i i
 
=>   *
h
fd h ht
t t t t t t t t t tt
t
A i d i b b w l c
P
ε τ= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +Ω + + −
i
 
On the other side, 
h h h
t t t t t tA D E B E B= + ⋅ + ⋅
i ii i
 
=>    *
h
h h ht
t t t t t t t t
t
A d d b b b
P
π π ε= + ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅
i ii
 
Therefore 
* *( ) ( ) fh h d ht t t t t t t t t t t t tta d b i d i b w l cπ π τ= + = − + − +Ω + + −
i ii
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=>   * * *( ) ( ) fh h dt t t t t t t t t t t tta i a i i d w l cπ ε τ= − − + − +Ω + + −
i
 
=>    
* *
0
*
0
[ ( ) ]
                         [ ( ) ]
h h rt
t t t t
f d rt
t t t t t t t tt
a i a e dt
w l c i i d e dt
π
τ ε
∞ −
∞ −
− − =
Ω + + − − + −
∫
∫
i
 
Here we impose TVC, lim 0h rtt
t
a e−→∞ = , and 0
ha  is the initial financial assets of 
the household. Then we can get the lifetime budget constraint. 
*
0 0 0
( )  [ ( ) ]fh rt d rtt t t t t t t tta w l e dt c i i d e dtτ ε∞ ∞− −+ Ω + + = + + −∫ ∫  
 
 
 A.1.2 Firms 
Firms need to borrow from banks tZ  and 
*
tZ  to pay for the wage for labors 
and a part of the payment for imported foreign inputs. 
t t tZ W l=  
* *m
t t tZ P nα=  
where tW  is the nominal wage of labor, which is equal to t tP w⋅ , and *mtP  is the 
international price of imported inputs. This price is exogenously determined in foreign 
goods market.  
In real terms, they can be rewritten as: 
t t tz w l=  
*
t t tz p nα=  
Firm’s nominal financial wealth is: 
*f f
t t t t t tA E B Z E Z= − −  
It can be rewritten in real terms as: 
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*f f
t t t ta b z z= − −  
On one side, 
* * * * *f f f fl l m
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tt t t tA E i B E B i Z E i Z E Z P y W l E P n P= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅Ω
i i i
 
=>   * * * *
f
f f fl lt
t t t t t t t t t t t t tt t t
t
A i b b i z i z z y w l p n
P
ε ε= + − − − + − − −Ω
i
 
On the other side, 
* *f f f
tt t t t t tt t tA E B E B Z E Z E Z= + − − −
i i ii i i
 
=>     * * * * *
f
f f ft
t t t t t t t t t tt t t
t
A b b b z z z z z
P
π ε π π ε= + + − − − − −
i i ii
 
Therefore, 
* * * * * *( ) ( ) ( )f f f fl lt t t t t t t t t t t t t t tt t t ta b z z i b i z i z y w l p nπ π π= − − = − − − − − + − − −Ω
i i ii
 
=>  * * * * * *( ) ( ) ( )f f fl lt t t t t t t t t t t t t tt t ta i a i i z i i z y w l p nπ ε= − + + − + − + − − −Ω
i
 
=>     
* *
* *
( )* *
0
( )* * * *
0
[ ( ) ]
                 [ ( ) ( ) ]
t t
t t
f f i t
t tt t
f i tl l l
t t t t t t t t t t t tt
a i a e dt
y w l p n i i z i i z e dt
π
π
π
ε
∞ − −
∞ − −
− −
= − − −Ω − − − − −
∫
∫
i
 
After imposing the TVC:
* *( )lim 0t tf i tt
t
a e π− −→∞ = , we have the firm’s lifetime 
budget constraint: 
* * * *( ) ( )* * * *
0
0 0
 [ ( ) ( ) ]t t t tf fi t i tl l lt t t t t t t t t t t tt e dt a y w l p n i i z i i z e dt
π πε
∞ ∞− − − −Ω = + − − − − − − −∫ ∫  
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A.1.3 Banks 
Bank’s nominal assets are: 
*b b
t t t t t t t t tA Z E Z D D E Bδ= + + − −  
It can be rewritten in real terms as: 
* (1 )b bt t t t t ta z z d bδ= + − − −  
On one side, 
* * *
* 1/ * 1/
0
        [( ) ( ( ) ) ]
b l l
t t t t t t t t t t
d b b b b
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
A D i Z i E Z E Z
i D E i B E B P P Ad Bz Cz D bρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
δ= ⋅ + + +
− − − − ⋅Ω − ⋅ + + +
i i
i  
=>   
* * *
* 1/ * 1/        [( ) ( ( ) ) ]
b
l lt
t t t t t t
t
d b b b b
t t t t t t t t t t t
A i z i z z
P
i d i b b Ad Bz Cz D bρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ε
ε
= ⋅ + +
− − − −Ω − + + +
i
 
On the other side, 
* *b b b
t t t t t t t t t t t t tA D Z E Z E Z D E B E Bδ= + + + − − −
i i ii i i i i
 
=>    * * * * *(1 )( )
b
b b bt
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
A z z z z z d d b b b
P
π π ε δ π π ε= + + + + − − + − − −
i i ii i
 
Therefore 
*
* * * * *
1/ * 1/
(1 )
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
        [( ) ( ( ) ) ]
b b
t t t t t t
l l d b
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
b b
t t t t t
a z z d b
i z i z i d d i b
Ad Bz Cz D bρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
δ
π π π π δ π
= + − − −
= − + − − − − − − ⋅
−Ω − + + +
i i ii i
 
=>  
* * * * * * * *
1/ * 1/
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
       [( ) ( ( ) ) ]
b b l l d
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
b b
t t t t t
a i a i i z i i z i d i i d
Ad Bz Cz D bρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
π ε ε δ ε= − + − − + − − + − − −
−Ω − + + +
i
 
=> 
* *
* *
( )* *
0
* * * * * *
( )1/ * 1/
0
[ ( ) ]
[( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
         
[( ) ( ( ) ) ]
t t
t t
i tb b
t t t t
l l d
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
i tb b
t t t t t
a i a e dt
i i z i i z i d i i d
Ad Bz Cz D b e dt
π
πρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
π
ε ε δ ε
∞
− −
∞
− −
− − ⋅ =
− − + − − + − − −
−Ω − + + +
∫
∫
i
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=>  0 * * * * * *
0 1/ * 1/
0
[( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
         
[( ) ( ( ) ) ]
b rt
t
l l d
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tb
b rt
t t t t
e dt
i i z i i z i d i i d
a
Ad Bz Cz D b e dtρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ε ε δ ε
∞
−
∞
−
Ω =
− − + − − + − − −+ − + + +
∫
∫
 
 
A.1.4 Government 
The nominal assets of government is: 
g g
t t t t tA E B Dδ= −  
In real terms: 
g g
t t t ta b dδ= −  
On one side, 
* 1/ * 1/[( ) ( ( ) ) ]g g g bt t t t t t t t t t t t tA i E B E B P P Ad Bz Cz D b
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρτ= + − + + + +i i  
=>    * 1/ * 1/[( ) ( ( ) ) ]
g
g g bt
t t t t t t t t t
t
A i b b Ad Bz Cz D b
P
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρε τ= + − + + + +
i
 
On the other side, 
g g g
t t t tt t tA E B E B Dδ= + −
i ii i
 
=>   *
g
g g gt
t t t t t t tt t t
t
A b b b d d
P
ε π δ δ π= + + − −
i i i
 
=>  
* * 1/ * 1/          ( ) [( ) ( ( ) ) ] 
g g
t t t t
g b
t t t t t t t t t t t
a b d
i b d Ad Bz Cz D bρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
δ
π π δ τ
= −
= − + − + + + +
i i i
 
=>   * 1/ * 1/ ( ) [( ) ( ( ) ) ]g g bt t t t t t t t t t ta r a i d Ad Bz Cz D b
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρε δ τ= ⋅ + + − + + + +i  
=>      
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0
* 1/ * 1/
0
(  )
            {( ) [( ) ( ( ) ) ]}  
g g rt
t t
b rt
t t t t t t t t t
a ra e dt
i d Ad Bz Cz D b e dtρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρε δ τ
∞
−
∞
−
− =
+ − + + + +
∫
∫
i
 
=>       
0
* 1/ * 1/
0
0
            {( ) [( ) ( ( ) ) ]}  
rt
t
g b rt
t t t t t t t t
e dt
a i d Ad Bz Cz D b e dtρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
τ
ε δ
∞
−
∞
−
=
+ + + + + +
∫
∫
 
 
A.1.5 Equilibrium Conditions 
*
* * * *
* * * * *
*
 
( )
  ( ) ( )
  ( ) ( ) ( )
  ( )
h f b g h f b g
t t t t t t t t
h d f b
t t t t t t t t t t t
f l l f
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
b l l
t t t t t t t t t t t t
d
t t t t
a a a a b b b b
ra i i d w l c
ra i i z i i z y w l p n
ra i i z i i z i d
i i d
ε τ
ε
ε ε δ
ε
+ + + = + − +
= − + − +Ω +Ω + + −
+ + + − + − + − − −Ω
+ + − − + − − +
− − − −Ω
      
1/ * 1/
* 1/ * 1/
[( ) ( ( ) ) ]
  ( ) [( ) ( ( ) ) ]
b b
t t t t t
g b
t t t t t t t t t t
Ad Bz Cz D b
ra i d Ad Bz Cz D b
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρε δ τ
− + + +
+ + + − + + + +
 
=>   
                            ( )
f g f gh b h b
t t t tt t t t
f gh b
t t t t t tt t
a a a a b b b b
r b b b b y p n c
+ + + = + − +
= + + + + − −
      
 
=> t t t t t tk rk y p n c= + − −
i
 
 
A.2 The Domestic and External Shocks to the Economy 
From the F.O.C.s of the agents in the economy, ,t tc z ,
*
tz  and wt can be 
expressed in the following equations:  
1 1
* 1 * 11 1 [ ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ] 0b bt t t t t t t t t t
t
i A Ad Bz d D Cz D b b
c
ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρρ ρφ δ ε δλ
− −
− −− − + + + − − + =   (B1) 
1 11 1 1 1* *
* * 1 * 11[( ) ( ) ] ( ) {1 [ ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ]} 0b b bt t t t t t t t t t
t t t
z z z p C Cz D b z D Cz D b b
p w p
ρ ρσ σ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρρ ρσ σ σ σ αα α
− −− − − − −−+ − + + + + =   (B2) 
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1 11 1 1 1*
1 * 11[( ) ( ) ] ( ) [1 ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ] 0b bt t t t t t t t t t
t t t
z z z w B Ad Bz z D Cz D b b
p w w
ρ ρσ σ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρρ ρσ σ σ σ
α
− −− − − − −−+ − + + + + =   (B3) 
1 0t tw zλ− − =                            (B4) 
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Chapter 2: Transmission of Monetary Policy via Domestic and Foreign Banks in 
Emerging Economies 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As foreign bank penetration has become increasingly sizable in emerging 
markets since the late 1990s, a natural question that emerges among not only 
economists but also central bankers is the following: could the transmission of 
monetary policy be different through domestic and foreign banks? Would the 
monetary policy have different distributional effects across foreign and domestic 
banks? If foreign banks respond less to host country monetary policy changes, then 
the effectiveness of the monetary policy of the host countries will be attenuated given 
an increasing number of foreign banks in the host banking sector.  
This paper examines whether monetary policy shocks are transmitted 
differently by foreign and domestic banks, which is equivalent to examining whether 
an active bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission exists. The 
implication could be critically important for economists to understand the relevance 
of bank lending channel in transmitting monetary shocks, to help answer the question 
whether foreign bank penetration in emerging economies leads to more credit 
volatility, and also for central bankers in the recipient countries to conduct appropriate 
monetary policy.26 
The transmission channels of monetary policy have been intensively debated in 
                                                        
26 Another related implication, although beyond the scope of this paper, is that the borrowers of foreign and 
domestic banks might be affected differently due to banks’ difference sensitivity to monetary policy. If domestic 
banks are more responsive, their dependent firms would be more affected than the borrowers of foreign banks. In 
the case that domestic banks mainly serve small businesses, these small firms may be seriously affected by 
monetary policy and cause some other problems, for example, a rise in unemployment rate. Therefore to 
understand the heterogeneity between foreign and domestic banks in response to monetary policy is really a 
critical question to not only economists but central bank decision makers. 
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literature. Economists generally agree that at least four channels existing to transmit 
the monetary policy shocks into the real side of economy: the interest rate channel, 
the exchange rate channel, the other assets price channel and the bank credit 
channel.27 In the first three channels, no special role of banks has been designed. 
Banks have only a passive role since by assumption they could frictionlessly 
substitute alternative forms of liabilities thereby monetary policy shocks would have 
no supply-side effects on their credit provision. After the pioneering work by 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), the bank lending channel has received considerable 
attention from economists. The bank lending channel theory assumes that the bank 
loans and other forms of liabilities (such as bonds) are not perfect substitutes for firms, 
which have to depend on banks for investment finance, and deposits and other forms 
of liabilities (such as equities) are not perfect substitutes for banks either. When the 
central bank tightens the money supply, it extracts banks’ reserves and reduces their 
deposits. Since banks can not perfectly substitute deposits with other liabilities, loan 
supply has to be reduced, which affects firms’ investment and then output.28 The 
bank lending channel theory explains how a nominal monetary shock affects the real 
side of economy through the shock transmission via banks’ non-trivial behavior.29 
                                                        
27 In the interest rate channel literature, when the central bank carries out contractionary monetary policy, the 
nominal interest rate rises, leading to a rise in the real interest rate (at least for a short time) because of sticky 
prices, which in turn affects firms’ investment decision and output in the economy. The exchange rate channel 
focuses on the changes in exchange rate due to the changes in monetary policy and the relative price of domestic 
and foreign goods, and its effect on the net export and overall outputs. The other assets price channel argues that 
monetary policy can affect the price of assets such as land and stocks, which in turn affects firms’ balance-sheet or 
consumers’ lifetime income, leading to changes in investments or consumption. 
28 In the generally called “bank credit channel” there include the bank lending channel and the balance-sheet 
channel. The balance-sheet channel argues that a contractionary monetary policy will deteriorate firms’ 
balance-sheet by reducing their cash-flow or their net worth, cause worse adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems, and lead to less credit from banks and lower investment. In our paper, we do not consider the effect of 
balance-sheet channel by assuming that the effect of monetary policy on credit demand is symmetric for all banks 
and then controlling for it in our regression model. 
29 Two additional things are worth emphasizing: first, the bank credit channel does not rule out the existence of 
interest rate channel or other transmission channels, the best way to describe its importance may be that it only 
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Some empirical evidence have been found consistent with this theory. An active bank 
lending channel means that banks with different characteristics respond differently to 
monetary policy shocks since they have different abilities to shield their loans.  
In our paper, we find evidence that, consistent with the bank lending channel, 
foreign banks show smaller sensitivity to domestic monetary policy shocks than their 
domestic peers. When the central bank takes a tightening monetary policy, the effects 
are less pronounced for foreign banks in that they adjust down their loans by a smaller 
magnitude. This smaller sensitivity is found in both the short-run and the long-run. 
This finding suggests that host monetary policy might become less effective given an 
increasingly dominant foreign bank presence in the financial sector. At the same time, 
we study the determinants of the smaller sensitivity of foreign banks. Other studies 
before have found that the different pass-through of monetary policy is driven by 
banks’ varying characteristics in liquidity, capitalization and size. In our paper, we 
move forward to study whether the difference in foreign and domestic banks’ 
responses to monetary policy is also driven by some other relevant factors 
independent of the above characteristics. Our evidence suggests that even if foreign 
and domestic banks converge in those aspects, they would still display different 
sensitivity to host monetary policy. These findings are consistent with the internal 
capital market hypothesis, which suggests that foreign banks have access to an 
internal capital markets connecting to their parent banks overseas, and this internal 
capital market could help them to be isolated from the exogenous shocks in host 
                                                                                                                                                               
amplifies the effect of interest rate channel; second, monetary policy can affect real outputs only in short-term. 
When prices adjust, outputs will return back to potential level, and in the long-term, monetary policy only affects 
the price level. 
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financial market. In addition, most of the studies on the bank lending channel focus on 
the banks in developed economies, and only a few in some individual emerging or 
developing economies. Our paper fills in this gap by examining whether an active 
bank lending channel generally exists in emerging economies. We construct and use a 
panel dataset of more than 1200 banks in the emerging economies of Eastern & 
Central Europe, Latin America and Asia over 1996 – 2003. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some relevant 
works on the effect of foreign bank penetration on bank credit stability. Section 3 
describes our dataset and presents descriptive statistics; then econometric 
methodology and empirical results are presented in section 4. We extend our research 
briefly in section 5 and 6, while section 7 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Our paper contributes to the literature on bank lending channel of monetary 
policy transmission. The hypothesis of the bank lending channel is based on Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988) and Kashyap and Stein (1995). Many empirical works have been 
conducted to seek the evidence of its existence. Studies (at least early works) are 
mainly concentrated on industrialized countries, such as the U.S. (See Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992), Kashyap et al. (1993), Peek and Rosengren (1995), Hancock and 
Wilcox (1998), Kishan and Opiela (2000) and Kashyap and Stein (2000).) They find 
evidence in accordance with the existence of bank lending channel.30 De Bondt (1998) 
                                                        
30 Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap et al. (1993) work with aggregate data. Although they find a 
monetary contraction tends to be followed by a reduction in aggregate bank credit, which can be interpreted as 
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finds evidence of bank lending channel in Germany, Belgium and Holland. Steudler 
and Zurlinden (1998) and Bichsel and Perrez (2004) detect a bank lending channel in 
Switzerland. Gambacorta (2005) tests the effectiveness of the bank lending channel in 
Italy. After Edwards and Végh (1997), researches are also examining the bank lending 
channel in emerging markets. Examples include: Agung (1998) for Indonesia, Alfaro 
et al. (2004) for Chile, Juks (2004) for Estonia, Mora (2005) for Mexico, and Arena et 
al. (2006) for Latin American and Asian countries. In many cases, evidence in line 
with the existence of bank lending channel are found.  
The evidence consistent with an active bank lending channel is discovered 
through banks’ cross-sectional difference in behavior, driven by their varying 
characteristics such as liquidity, capitalization and size, which are believed to be the 
main determinants of banks’ ability to supply loans and thus response to monetary 
shocks. For example, Kashyap and Stein (1995) find different sensitivity across banks 
in different size. Small banks are more responsive to monetary policy shocks than big 
banks. Kashyap and Stein (2000) finds that more liquid banks exhibit higher lending 
growth, and the effects are stronger under contractionary monetary policy. An 
interpretation in accordance with the theory of bank lending channel is that, the 
impacts of contractionary monetary policy on banks’ lending are stronger for less 
liquid banks since they can not easily sell off liquid assets to maintain loans. Kishan 
and Opiela (2000) find the distributional effects of monetary policy on bank loans 
                                                                                                                                                               
consistent with the existence bank lending channel, it is also consistent with other transmission channels. 
Therefore their findings are not enough to explicitly identify bank lending channel out of other channels. Peek and 
Rosengren (1995), Hancock and Wilcox (1998) and Kashyap and Stein (2000) use bank level data and their results 
are in line with the existence of bank lending channel.  
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depend on capitalization and asset size.31 Uncapitalized and small banks are more 
responsive to monetary shocks because they are unable to raise alternative funding 
under contractionary monetary policy. Gambacorta (2005) also finds heterogeneity in 
the monetary policy pass-through exists among banks with different level of 
capitalization and liquidity. However, it is worth emphasizing that these findings may 
not universally hold for any particular country. For example, Loupias et al. (2002) 
finds similar role played by liquidity as Kashyap and Stein (2000), but no significant 
impact by size and capitalization. Gambacorta (2005) finds no evidence of size to 
identify the distributional effect of monetary policy.  
Efficiency might be another important factor to influence banks behavior as well. 
Jeon and Miller (2005), studying the performance of domestic and foreign banks in 
Korea, attributes better efficiency and governance identified for foreign banks to the 
better performance. They argue that foreign banks could achieve better efficiency and 
better asset and liability management since they rely on the governance of mother 
banks. 
Although the above-mentioned bank characteristics are usually found to be 
important determinants of banks’ lending behavior, they are likely not the end of the 
story. If banks converge in these characteristics, they are expected to have the same 
behavior. Our paper examines and finds this may not be true. Independent of banks’ 
own balance-sheet strength, their affiliation with mother bank could be another 
determinant of their behavior but has been only scantly paid attention to. Houston and 
                                                        
31 Peek and Rosengren (1995) and Hancock and Wilcox (1998) also find capital plays important role in 
determining banks’ credit growth, but they did not distinguish asset size as another important factor. 
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James (1998) find that loan growth among banks affiliated with a multi-bank holding 
company is less sensitive to bank’s cash flow, liquidity, and capital position when 
compared to unaffiliated banks. Ashcraft (2003) finds that stand-alone bank lending is 
sensitive to changes in the monetary policy while affiliated bank lending is largely 
unaffected. Gambacorta (2005) also finds that affiliated banks’ loan growth is less 
sensitive to monetary shocks than unaffiliated banks. These papers suggest that 
mother banks can establish an internal capital markets to allocate capital among their 
subsidiaries, so affiliated banks have better access to alternative liabilities to smooth 
away the effects of policy-induced reduction in deposits on lending. Our paper, which 
studies banks’ different behavior across their ownership, is quite close to this literature. 
Foreign banks, affiliated with their holding banks abroad, may take advantage of the 
internal capital markets to buffer the impacts of monetary policy on loans.32 Our 
empirical evidence that ownership still plays relevant role in determining banks’ 
responses to monetary policy, after other bank characteristics have been controlled for, 
is consistent with this hypothesis. De Haas and Naaborg (2006), by focused 
interviews with managers of foreign banks and their affiliates, finds that parent banks 
do use internal capital market to steer the credit of their subsidiaries in Eastern and 
Central Europe. When foreign banks could not raise enough funding, parent banks 
transfer capital to them in exchange for shares or debt titles.33  
Our paper is also related to the literature that addresses the effects of foreign 
                                                        
32 Different from Houston and James (1998), Ashcraft (2003) and Gambacorta (2005), which use data in one 
particular country, we use data across 35 countries. Our paper is more close to a test whether internal capital 
markets also exit between parent bank and its affiliated banks overseas.  
33 When a subsidiary could not raise new capital, it could receive funds from parent bank in exchange for (new) 
shares. When a subsidiary requires additional liquidity, parent bank may transfer funds in exchange for debt titles. 
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bank penetration on the credit stability in host countries. Some empirical studies have 
tried to address it, but provide mixed answers. A detailed review of the literature on 
this aspect has been provided in the first essay of the writer’s thesis. Our evidence that 
monetary policy effects are less pronounced for foreign banks suggests foreign banks 
play a stabilizing role. A brief examination on the effects of foreign banks’ home 
conditions also finds no evidence that foreign banks might transmit and propagate 
external shocks from their home country to the host markets. 
According to our knowledge, Arena et al. (2006) is the only study that tries to 
identify the bank lending channel across foreign and domestic banks by comparing 
their response of loans, deposits and interest rates to the changes in monetary 
conditions. Although they find some evidence that foreign banks have lower 
sensitivity of credit, their evidence is very weak. Using more extensive dataset, which 
includes not only Latin American and Asian but also Eastern & Central European 
countries, we find more evidence that support foreign banks’ lower sensitivity to 
monetary policy shocks.  
 
2.3 Data 
We construct our unbalanced panel dataset with both bank-level and 
macroeconomic data. The bank-level data are from Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope 
database, which has been frequently used in many empirical researches. BankScope 
earns its reputation by comprehensive coverage of banks in large number of countries. 
Many researchers have documented the coverage of BankScope data (For example, 
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Claessens et al. (2001)). Arena et al. (2006) also mentioned a second advantage to 
using BankScope database in that the accounting items are presented in standardized 
form after being adjusted for differences in accounting and reporting standards across 
countries.  
Series are composed of 6850 yearly observations, covering 1273 banks in 35 
countries in Eastern & Central Europe, Latin America and Asia during the period 
1996-2003. The sample includes all major countries in the above-mentioned 
continents.34 Table 2.1 reports the number of domestic and foreign banks of each 
country over the years in our dataset. Only commercial banks are selected in the 
dataset to reduce the possible biased results from different nature and business scope 
among banks in different specializations. That is, there is no investment banks, 
corporative banks, real estate & mortgage banks, medium & long term banks, saving 
banks, security houses (but likely under the name of bank), non banking credit 
institutions, and specialized governmental credit institutions included in our dataset. 
Although this selection may reduce the number of our observations, its advantage is 
worth taking this cost.  
<Table 2.1> 
The identification of foreign banks is one of the most important steps in our 
study. A bank is defined as “foreign” if more than 50% of its assets are owned by 
                                                        
34 Eastern & Central European countries include: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine. 
Latin American countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. Asian economies include: Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Philippines, and Thailand. 
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foreign individuals, firms (including banks) or international organizations.35 Different 
from the identification in Arena et al (2006), we do not only classify the banks from 
industrialized OECD countries as “foreign”. Any bank whose owner is not from the 
host country is treated as “foreign”.36 BankScope records the ownership of bank only 
in the latest year when data are updated, so we have to resort to various sources to pin 
down the ownership status of the banks in every year during 1996-2003. The steps we 
take, basically following Arena et al (2006), are: first, we review bank’s profile of 
historical evolution on its website. If a bank has experienced international ownership 
change, it usually highlights it in the profile; second, we depend on another database, 
SDC Platinum, where comprehensive merger & acquisition information are recorded, 
to trace back when a domestic bank is acquired by foreigners; third, if by following 
these two steps we are unable to identify the ownership of the bank, we resort to 
various other information sources, such as banks’ annual reports, central banks’ 
publication and news reports available on the internet. To identify government-owned 
banks we follow the same methods. Two dummies are constructed to capture bank’s 
ownership. The first is the international ownership dummy (FOREIGN) which is 
equal to 1 for the years the bank was foreign-owned, 0 otherwise.37 To divide 
government- and private-owned within domestic banks, we constructed the second 
dummy (STATE) which is equal to 1 if the (domestic) bank is owned by the 
government and 0 otherwise. 
                                                        
35 In our dataset, some banks are owned by European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
36 For example, some Argentinean banks also operate in Brazil, such as Banco de la Nacion Argentina. In Arena et 
al (2006) they are not “foreign” banks because Argentina is not a member of OECD, but in our paper and in reality, 
they are. 
37 That is, for a bank which was initially domestic but acquired by foreigners later, we marked it 0 in the dummy 
FOREIGN when it was domestic, and in and since the year when it was bought, we marked it 1. 
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Another important separation of banks is between subsidiaries and branches of 
foreign banks. After talking with an expert from BankScope, we are informed that 
currently only subsidiaries are included in the database, so we do not have to make 
distinction between these two forms of affiliation of foreign banks. The exclusion of 
foreign bank branches from BankScope prevents us from detecting the different 
monetary policy responses attributable to different forms of affiliation.  
Another issue in data collection is that some reports are provided by BankScope 
in both unconsolidated and consolidated form. As much as possible we use 
unconsolidated reports. We use the consolidated ones only when there are no 
unconsolidated reports provided or we miss important data in unconsolidated 
reports.38 In our dataset 418 observations are consolidated figures. 
Banks’ interest rates on loans and deposits are among the variables of most 
interest for us, but unfortunately they are not reported in BankScope. We approximate 
the yearly average loan interest rate by interest income over total earning assets, and 
the deposit interest rate by interest expenses over deposits & short-term funding. In 
reality, banks charges different loan interest rates for loans with different maturities, 
and deposits rates also vary with different terms of deposits, and the short-term 
interest rate may have somewhat different sensitivity to monetary shocks from 
long-term rate, so our interest rate series are no doubt imperfect. However, since the 
limitation of our data, this is the best solution we can ever reach. 
Outliers were removed based on the following criteria. First, we dropped the 
                                                        
38 We have to use many consolidated reports for Hong Kong’s banks, since in unconsolidated they usually report 
no interest income and interest expenses, which are critical for us to calculate loan and deposit interest rates. 
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observations with negative values for total assets, total earning assets, loans, deposits, 
or equities. These negative values could only be interpreted as errors in the database. 
156 observations were removed this way. Second, we calculated the growth rate in 
total assets, loans and deposits. 224 observations were eliminated where the growth 
rate in total assets exceeded 200%, or the growth rate in loans and deposits exceeded 
300%.39 Third, we deleted the observations where either loan interest rate or deposit 
interest rate is above 500%, considering that in some countries financial crisis might 
cause banks to rise up their interest rate hugely. 31 observations were eliminated this 
way. Fourth, we removed 308 observations in which total assets, or loans, or deposits 
were missing. Finally, we deleted the banks which did not have at least 2 successive 
year observations, that is, 71 observations. After the data cleaning, we have 6850 
observations left in the dataset. 
The macro variables are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS). When 
the needed series are not available from IFS, we extract them from the economy’s 
central bank website.40 We select macroeconomic series of not only host, but also 
home countries. The series include: Treasury bill rate, money market rate, discount 
rate, GDP, CPI, and exchange rate (end-of-period and period-average). A critical work 
is to select the appropriate monetary policy indicators, which have been presented in 
Table 2.2 for all host and home countries. Our criteria are: we first choose Treasury 
bill rate for every country. If this rate is not available, or it has fewer observations 
than money market rate, we choose money market rate. If both rates are not available, 
                                                        
39 Arena et al (2006) follows the same criteria to drop the outlier in the growth rate of total assets, loans and 
deposits. 
40 We did this in the case of Taiwan. All macro data are from its central bank’s website. 
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we consider discount rate.41 Although it might be better to match the monetary 
policies in host and home country in foreign bank’s observations, assuming foreign 
banks’ behavior is not only affected by host country’s monetary policy but also home 
country’s monetary policy, the constraints in the data sources stops us from doing that. 
<Table 2.2> 
Before moving forward to the econometric part, we want to find out whether 
domestic and foreign banks have some different features at a quick glance. We do this 
by presenting the descriptive statistics in Table 2.3, first pooling all bank-level 
observations, and then separate by regions: Eastern & Central Europe, Latin America 
and Asia. Domestic banks are then divided into state- and private-owned. We report 
then t-test in Table 2.4 for the significance of the difference between domestic and 
foreign banks in some important aspects. We also show the correlation between our 
main variables including monetary policy indicator, to take a quick detection if 
monetary policy may be associated with the changes in these variables. 
<Table 2.3> <Table 2.4>  
Some interesting facts emerge from the descriptive statistics. Firstly, foreign 
banks have higher liquidity and capitalization degree. Foreign banks display a higher 
ratio of liquid assets over total assets, and at the same time, it has a higher ratio of 
loans over total assets as well.42 Foreign banks depend relatively less on deposits but 
                                                        
41 One problem for discount rate as our monetary policy proxy is that it may not vary over years. For example, in 
India’s case, we do not have Treasury bill rate and only few data in money market rate, and the discount rate does 
not vary between 1997-1998 and 1999-2000, therefore we had to go to India’s central bank’s website, extract the 
weighted average call money market rate and use it as our indicator of monetary policy. Similar story takes place 
in Slovak Republic, where we have no Treasury bill rate and only few money market rate data, and the discount 
rate remains constant for 5 years, so we used the Slovak Republic’s central bank website to calculate the average 3 
month Bratislava interbank offered rate as its monetary policy proxy.  
42 Depending on different reporting criteria amongst countries, there are two different definitions on liquid assets 
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more on equities than domestic banks, and this difference is significant. This may be 
interpreted as consistent with the imperfect substitution between deposits and other 
external funding, and may imply foreign banks have better access to other funding 
sources other than deposits, and these sources are likely to be less affected by 
monetary policy. When we separate our observations across continents, this finding 
still holds in Latin America and Asia, but the opposite in Eastern & Central Europe. 
This may be associated with the entry mode of foreign banks. Merger & Acquisition 
foreign banks are more dependent on deposits but less on equities. In Eastern & 
Central Europe, 115 out of the total 202 foreign banks entered through merger & 
acquisition, while in Latin America only 90 out of 233, and in Asia 38 out of 114 
foreign banks are established through take-over. This implies that Merger & 
Acquisition foreign banks inherit some features from their predecessors.  
Secondly, foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks. The efficiency 
is measured by non interest expenses over average assets, which is smaller for foreign 
banks. This evidence is consistent with many studies that conclude foreign banks are 
more cost-efficient. Combined with the above significant difference in liquidity and 
capitalization, this confirms the need to hold these characteristics constant first if we 
want to examine whether there is some other relevant factors in determining banks’ 
behavior. 
                                                                                                                                                               
in our BankScope data. The “narrow” definition includes: cash and equivalent, deposits and loans to banks with 
less than three months to run to maturity and quoted/listed government bonds known by the analyst responsible to 
be realizable within three months; the “broad” measure includes: cash & equivalent, deposits with banks (all), 
loans to banks (all), deposits with central banks & governmental authorities (all), and other securities. Overall, 
liquid assets is the assets allocated as opposed to loans, and is used to indicate how much assets a bank owns to 
buffer a run on the bank. The fact that foreign banks have both higher ratios of loans and liquid assets relative to 
total assets might imply that foreign banks have less fixed assets, equity investment (such as investments in 
subsidiaries and associates) and other assets. 
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Thirdly, it seems difficult to conclude that there is any explicitly different 
pattern in interest rates between domestic and foreign banks. Overall, domestic banks 
charge lower loan interest rate and also offer lower deposits interest rate in terms of 
the mean value. However, this pattern changes when we consider the median, in that 
foreign banks charge lower median loan interest rate and offer lower median deposits 
interest rate. We strongly suspect that the former result might be due to the inevitable 
effects of big values on the mean. In both Eastern & Central Europe and Asia, foreign 
banks charge lower loan interest rate than their domestic peers. Only in Latin America, 
the opposite pattern is found, but Latin America is the continent where banks have 
once charged and offered huge interest rates because of financial crises.  
Fourthly, in terms of the growth rate of total assets, loans and deposits, domestic 
banks display higher growth rate than foreign banks, although the differences are not 
significant. This might imply foreign banks are more stable, or less aggressive to 
expand their business.  
Fifthly, within domestic banks, state-owned banks show different operation 
behavior from their domestic private counterparts. State-owned banks depend more 
on deposits but they show weaker ambition to provide more loans, indicated by 
smaller ratio of loans relative to total assets and the higher ratio of liquid assets 
relative to total assets. State-owned banks charge significantly lower interest rate on 
loans, but their interest rate paid on deposits is not significantly smaller, resulting in a 
much smaller interest rate spread, lower net interest margin and return on average 
assets. The impressive difference between state-owned banks from domestic private 
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banks implies that state-owned banks may be unable to really maximize their profits 
by market-orientation. It also highlights that we have to treat them separately in the 
analysis. 
<Table 2.5> 
Finally, the correlation table (Table 2.5) gives us the association between the 
allocation of bank assets, interest rate and the monetary policy in host countries. 
When banks allocate more assets into loans, they have to reduce the holding of liquid 
assets, which is indicated by the strong negative association between the ratio of loans 
/ total assets and liquid assets / total assets. Similarly, when banks depend more on 
deposits on their liability side, they need less equities, so the correlation between 
deposits / total assets and equity/total deposits is also negative. When there is a 
contractionary monetary policy, both the interest rates of loans and deposits increase, 
as showed by the positive association between the monetary policy indicator and bank 
interest rates. The ratio of loans to total assets varies negatively with monetary policy, 
and similarly for the ratio of deposits to total assets. The growth rates of loans and 
deposits are also negatively associated with monetary policy, indicating that banks 
would slow down or decrease their loans supply, and collect less deposits. The 
allocation of bank assets into liquid assets is positively associated with monetary 
policy, but the association seems weak. The ratio of equity to total assets also 
increases with contractionary monetary policy, implying that banks have to resort to 
other funding sources to offset the decrease in deposits.  
When we group our observations into domestic and foreign banks, their 
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correlation with monetary policy seems different. The negative correlation between 
monetary policy and loans and deposits is smaller in foreign banks than domestic 
banks. Growth rates of loans and deposits in foreign banks seem less affected by 
monetary policy. Meanwhile, the liquidity and equity in foreign banks are also less 
correlated with monetary policy. It may imply the weaker effects of monetary policy 
on foreign banks’ balance sheet. However, the association between interest rates and 
monetary policy is stronger for foreign banks than for the domestic counterparts, 
which once again might be due to the potential bias in approximating these interest 
rates.  
 
2.4 Empirical results 
2.4.1 Pooled OLS model 
We first construct a pooled OLS model as our bench framework.  
The general form of our pooled OLS model is as follows: 
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where  
, ,i j tgr is the percentage loan supply (deposit collection) growth of bank i (in 
country j) in year t relative to t-1. Two year lag are included in the regressors on the 
RHS to capture the persistence of the dependent variable. The reason we include two 
instead of one year lag is that, in the loans there are not only short-term loans which 
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are due in one year but also long-term ones that have longer maturity, therefore only 
one year lag will not be sufficient to capture the persistence of dependent variable 
caused by its longer components. For deposits, there are not only demand deposits but 
also term deposits that may have a term longer than one year. To analyze the response 
of liquid assets, we also regressed the percentage growth rate of liquid assets on the 
same explanatory variables. The only difference is we include only one year lag of the 
growth rate of liquidity, since liquidity is hold for buffer stock purpose and mainly 
composed of cash and short term securities. 
0α  is the intercept term; 
,j tmpΔ is the change in the monetary policy of country j, which is equal to the 
first order difference of the monetary indicator in year t relative to year t-1; one year 
lag of ,j tmpΔ is also included because credit contracts between banks and their 
borrowers may cause banks’ response to be shown only with a lag.  
foreigni,j,t and statei,j,t are two dummies to distinguish bank’s ownership status 
and divide banks into three categories: domestic private banks (which is the 
benchmark), domestic state-owned and foreign-owned. 
, , i j tother characteristics is a matrix of banks’ other characteristics, which 
includes: bank’s liquidity (represented by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets), 
capitalization (represented by the ratio of equities to total assets), bank size (indicated 
by the bank’s loan over total domestic credit)43 and efficiency (by the ratio of non 
                                                        
43 We do not try to normalize our bank size proxy, like Gambacorta (2005), Arena et al (2006) and many others. 
The reason is that any attempt to normalization will cause bias since we hardly collects all banks’ total assets data 
in every single year. Missing values are inevitable in BankScope database. 
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interest expenses to total assets).44 To reduce the potential endogeneity of these 
control variables, we use their one-year lag values.  
We add the dummies foreigni,j,t and statei,j,t and the other characteristics 
variables’ interaction term with ,j tmpΔ  and , 1j tmp −Δ  as well. A significant 
coefficient sη will imply there are some other relevant factors, independent of banks’ 
own financial strength, that leads to banks’ different monetary policy responses, 
which is consistent with the internal capital market hypothesis. 
jtmacro  is the matrix of host country macro economic variables, including real 
GDP growth rate, inflation rate, and currency depreciation rate. Assuming that the 
loan demand of the domestic banks is not systematically different from that of foreign 
banks, these variables help to control the variation in credit demand of borrowers.  
country effect and year effect are also included in some cases to capture some 
national cultural factors, and the average trend in other factors, that may affect banks’ 
operations. 
, ,i j tu is the error term.  
0 , , , , , , , , ,s s s sα α β φ η θ ϕ δ γ ξ  are the coefficients (or coefficient vectors) that we 
are going to estimate. 
i = 1, 2, … N which indicates a specific bank i; 
j = 1, 2, … J indicating a particular country j; 
t = 1, 2,… T indicating a particular year t. 
The most important assumption of pooled OLS lies in the distribution of the 
                                                        
44 Non interest expenses include the expenses on overheads and loan loss provision. 
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error term ijtu  and its correlation with explanatory variables.
45 It is assumed that 
2~ (0, )ijt uu IID σ  and ( )ijtE u = 0'tx . Avoiding a stronger assumption that 
( | ) 0ijtE u =1 2 Tx , x , ...x , which is more likely to fail in reality, this contemporaneous 
exogeneity assumption only restricts that the error term is not correlated with the 
explanatory variables in the contemporaneous year, or in other words, it allows the 
correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables for year t ≠ s.  
Although this contemporaneous exogeneity can not guarantee our estimated 
coefficients are unbiased, it is enough for the purpose of asymptotic consistency. The 
inclusion of lags of dependent variable causes no harm to pooled OLS since we also 
assumed no autocorrelation in the error term. However, the contemporaneous 
exogeneity assumption is also an obvious drawback to applying pooled OLS in our 
case. In this framework, we implicitly assume there are no unobserved bank 
characteristics, which are correlated with contemporaneous independent variables. 
This assumption may fail if we think about bank’s ambition or managers’ personality, 
which may persist over years and correlates the error term with contemporaneous 
explanatory variables. If this is the case, the pooled OLS estimators will be biased and 
inconsistent. 
The empirical results from pooled OLS are provided in Table 2.6. Although only 
working as our starting framework, pooled OLS still displays some interesting results.  
<Table 2.6> 
First, we find evidence for the effects of monetary policy on banks’ loan and 
                                                        
45 The assumption that there is no linear relationship between explanatory variables is reasonably held.  
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deposit growth, which in most cases are statistically significant. The negative 
coefficients for ,j tmpΔ and , 1j tmp −Δ  indicate that banks will reduce the growth rate 
of their loans and deposits when central bank conducts contractionary monetary 
policy.46 Banks may not immediately respond to the monetary policy shock but with 
one year lag, or the effect of the monetary policy could last for more than one year. 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis of credit channel.  
Second, the usual negative and significant coefficient of , ,i j tforeign shows 
foreign banks on average have lower growth rate in loans and deposits than domestic 
private banks. 47  In general the interaction variables , , ,*i j t j tforeign mpΔ  and 
, , , 1*i j t j tforeign mp −Δ  show positive sign in line with a priori expectations and are 
significant in many cases.48 This indicates that foreign banks adjust their growth rate 
of credit and deposit by smaller extent, resulting in lower sensitivity to monetary 
policy. For example, the results in Table 2.6 column (5) implies that, an unexpected 
contractionary shock on monetary policy (raising the indicator by 1 percentage point) 
will cause a contemporaneous decrease in average loan growth rate of domestic 
private banks by 0.57%, while foreign banks in the same period will reduce it by only 
0.15% (and is not significantly different from zero). Similarly, a 1 percentage point 
contractionary monetary policy shock may reduce the average deposit growth rate of 
domestic private banks by 0.50%, while foreign banks in the same period would 
                                                        
46 In Eastern & Central Europe, the effects of monetary policy show the expected negative sign but are statistically 
insignificant in many cases. One explanation is that the foreign capital inflow compensates the policy-induced 
drop of loans and deposits. 
47 In Eastern & Central Europe, foreign banks have a higher average growth rate of loans and deposits. This might 
be related with the rising FDI in this region. 
48 The correlation between Δmpj,t and Δmpj, t-1 is -0.19. This weak correlation rules out the possible serious 
multicollinearity induced by these two regressors. 
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reduce it by only 0.21% (and is only marginally significant). Even after adding 
interaction explanatory variables to control for possible transmission channels of 
monetary policy via other characteristics, the estimated coefficients are quite stable in 
terms of sign and value. It implies that foreign banks dampen the effects of monetary 
policy due to some reasons other than their liquidity, capitalization, bank size and 
efficiency. Consistent with Ashcraft (2003), this supports the importance of internal 
capital market between foreign banks and their parent banks. Foreign banks’ 
adjustment of liquid assets also implies that they may have alternative sources of 
funding from internal capital market. A tightened money supply might increase or 
hold domestic private banks’ liquid assets, since they need to keep liquidity to prevent 
a run on bank. Foreign banks are found that they raise their liquid assets by a smaller 
extent or even reduce them, suggesting they are less constrained to alternative funding 
sources. 
In Latin American countries, foreign banks show significantly different and 
weaker response to monetary policy changes as opposed to domestic private banks in 
both loans and deposits. Based on the results from Table 2.6 column (5), 1 percentage 
point increase in monetary policy indicator would reduce the contemporaneous loan 
growth rate by 0.64% for domestic private banks, while for foreign banks only by 
0.14%. Deposit growth rate in the same period would decrease by 0.86% for domestic 
private banks, while for foreign banks by only 0.38%. In Asia, foreign banks do not 
show different response in loans although their deposits growth is significantly slower. 
In Eastern & Central Europe, although the difference is not statistically significant, 
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the signs imply that foreign banks do not adjust down their loans more even when 
their deposit growth becomes lower than that of domestic private banks. This 
evidence supports the argument that foreign banks can play a stabilizing role in host 
country.  
In general, the loan growth rate of state-owned banks would increase, rather 
than decrease, contemporaneously when central bank conducts tightening monetary 
policy. The growth of deposits follows the same manner. This deviation might imply 
that the credit relationship between state-owned banks and their clients is not sensitive 
to external monetary shocks, or state-owned banks are more easily interfered by the 
government to provide credit to some particular firms when monetary condition 
becomes contractionary.  
Third, bank’s other characteristics show expected signs in most cases, although 
not always significant. Consistent with Kashyap and Stein (2000), more liquid banks 
show higher average growth in loans. This can be explained by the fact that more 
liquid banks could increase or maintain their growth of loans by drawing down the 
holding of liquid assets. Liquid banks also show that they have significantly slower 
growth in deposits. This is because banks will have less incentive to collect deposits 
when they allocate relatively less assets to loans. More capitalized banks, having 
better access to alternative sources of liabilities, could also have higher growth rate of 
deposits. This can be explained by the fact that higher capitalization could be 
interpreted by markets as lower risk of the bank. More capitalized banks have quicker 
shortfall in deposits when central bank conducts tightening monetary policy, 
  
64
 
indicating less importance of deposits for them to finance loans. Bank size in some 
cases shows its damping effects to monetary policy shocks, and this is consistent with 
Kishan and Opiela (2000). Efficiency does not show statistically significant results in 
many cases, but it seems that more efficient banks achieve higher growth. The fact 
that only a few characteristic-monetary policy interaction terms are significant may 
imply that the transmission of monetary policy via bank characteristics is 
heterogeneous across different countries. It may imply that in some countries liquidity 
plays an important role in determining  banks’ response while in some other 
countries capitalization and bank size may be more important. When we pool these 
countries together, the effects from these bank characteristics “on the average” 
disappear. 
Fourth, the growth rate of real GDP is in general a determinant of the growth of 
loans and deposits. Higher growth in GDP, representing the increase in credit demand, 
is associated with higher credit growth. This is consistent with the dependence of 
firms on banks to finance their investment. Higher inflation in general reduces firms’ 
credit demand, since firms will be reluctant to borrow more loans when they expect 
the real return of their investment will be reduced. Currency depreciation in many 
cases also reduces banks’ lending. The positive coefficient of depreciation for deposits 
could be explained by valuation effects, that is, the foreign currency’s value in terms 
of local currency “rises” with worse currency depreciation. This coefficient is 
statistically significant in Eastern and Central Europe where dollarization is intense. 
We also calculated the long-run multiplier of the monetary policy shock on the 
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growth rate of loans and deposits, which measures the cumulative effect of one unit 
shock of monetary policy. The results are provided in Table 2.7. The calculation is 
mainly based on the specification (3) and (5) shown in Table 6. Specification (3) 
allows the multipliers to be easily given by: /(1 )s sβ α−∑ ∑  for domestic private 
banks, / (1 )s sη α−∑ ∑ (where η stands for the coefficients for , , ,*i j t j tforeign mpΔ  
and , , , 1*i j t j tforeign mp −Δ ) representing the difference between foreign banks and 
domestic private banks in response, and ( ) / (1 )s s sβ η α+ −∑ ∑ ∑  is the overall effect of 
monetary policy shock on foreign banks in the long run. When specification (5) is 
employed, the long-run multiplier of monetary policy for domestic private banks is 
given by
1
( ) / (1 )s stcharacteristicsβ γ α−+ ⋅ −∑ ∑ ∑ , where γ represents the coefficients 
of the interaction terms of bank characteristics and monetary policy. characteristics  
is the mean value of the bank characteristics. The difference of foreign banks in 
response is the same, and the overall effect of monetary policy on foreign banks is 
therefore
1
( ) / (1 )s s stcharacteristicsβ γ η α−+ ⋅ + −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . In most cases, these two 
specifications provide us with similar long-run multipliers.49 The standard error is 
calculated by employing delta method. 
<Table 2.7> 
                                                        
49 The only exception is Eastern & Central Europe, where the calculated long-run multipliers show large 
difference. One reason might be the high correlation between the year and country effects and other explanatory 
variables. If we exclude the year and country effects, the calculated long-run multiplier for growth rate of loans is 
-1.5007. The high correlation between year and country effects and other macro-variables are found in some cases, 
for example, the correlation between depreciation and year1999 is 0.4661, the correlation between Belarus country 
effect and inflation is 0.5934, between Belarus country effect and depreciation is 0.4409. Another reason is the 
high correlation between monetary indicator and their interaction terms with bank characteristics. If we further 
exclude the interaction of capitalization and monetary policy, the calculated long-run multiplier is equal to -1.0068, 
which is very close to the calculated long-run multiplier -0.9214 based on specification (3). Without dropping year 
and country effects, the difference would remain large even if we remove either the interaction of monetary policy 
with liquidity or capitalization or both. This reminds us that we need to be very cautious to regard the long-run 
multiplier of monetary policy for European banks. 
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Monetary policy shock, in general, has significant contractionary effects on 
loans and deposits for both domestic private banks and foreign banks. Foreign banks 
display significant difference by adjusting the growth rate of loans at a slower pace. 
Based on the specification (5), 1 percentage point increase in the monetary policy 
indicator would cumulatively reduce the growth rate of loans and deposits of domestic 
private banks by 1.75% and 1.01%, but only by 0.91% and 0.75% for foreign banks. 
After dividing our samples across regions, we find that only in Asia foreign banks are 
more actively adjusting their loans and deposits, while in Eastern & Central Europe 
and Latin America, the effects of contractionary monetary policy were larger for 
domestic private banks. The magnitude of our long-run multipliers is comparable with 
Gambacorta (2005), which helps to ensure our results are less likely deviant.50 We 
also find that monetary policy has significant long-run effect on both foreign and 
domestic private banks. Foreign banks, as the “affiliated banks” in Gambacorta 
(2005), show more sluggishness to adjust down their loans under contractionary 
monetary policy. The fact that the long-run multiplier of one unit shock in monetary 
policy is greater than the impact multiplier implies that banks would take some time 
to adjust their portfolio allocation, or in other words, the total effect of monetary 
policy could be observed by only the long-run multiplier.  
The counterintuitive behavior of foreign banks in Asia is driven by the banks in 
Indonesia. The reason lies on that Indonesian bank system collapsed in the 1997 
                                                        
50 Gambacorta (2005) found the long-run multiplier of monetary policy on the growth of lending of Italian banks 
is -1.350. He also compared his results with some others. de Bonte found the long-run multiplier is -1.398 using 
BankScope database. These comparable magnitudes help us to believe our calculated long-run multiplier makes 
good sense.  
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Southeastern Asian crisis. Indonesian government conducted banking restructuring 
program to rebuild the banking system, which has been seen costly and slow.51 
Considering that the malfunctioning banking system might lead to biased results, we 
re-estimated the model after removing the observations from Indonesia (149 out of 
903 observations in Asia), and the new results are shortly reported in Table 2.8. 
Monetary policy still imposes negative effects on the growth of loans and deposits in 
most cases (contemporaneously and with a lag), but not statistically significant. 
Foreign banks show significantly different behavior by reducing much less or even 
increase their loans, which is consistent with what we found in general. In the 
long-run, one unit increase in monetary policy indicator would reduce the loan growth 
of Asian domestic private banks cumulatively by around 2%, still close to the 
long-run multiplier with Indonesian observations. However, foreign banks do not 
show negative response to contractionary monetary policy. The long-run multiplier for 
foreign banks in Asia becomes positive, although not significantly different from zero. 
This might imply that foreign banks are taking over the market share from domestic 
banks. With regards to deposits, they are reduced in both domestic private banks and 
foreign banks, but the reduction in foreign banks is much smaller both 
contemporaneously and in a long run, although not statistically significant. To 
summarize, after removing Indonesian observations, our results are consistent with 
                                                        
51 According to our knowledge, Indonesia is the only victim in 1997 Southeastern Asian crisis whose banking 
system collapsed. To rebuild its banking system, Indonesian government closed 48 unviable banks, merged 4 
state-owned banks, and recapitalized 19. The restructuring program cost Indonesia government a large part of its 
revenue, and so reduced government expenditure on other public projects. For example, in 1998-99, the public 
debt for restructure banking system took 42.8% of the government revenue. The economic recovery process is 
slow partly because of the vulnerabilities of Indonesia fundamentals and partly because of political uncertainties. 
In 2003, its real GDP just recovered to the pre-crisis level. 
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those in general and in Eastern & Central Europe and Latin America.  
<Table 2.8> 
The long-run multiplier of monetary policy on the growth rate of loans and 
deposits for state-owned banks is equal to around 0.80% and 0.43%, but they are 
statistically insignificant. The lack of significant response of state-owned banks to 
monetary policy reflects the non-market orientation of these banks. 
Interest rate is another important aspect to observe the different response of 
foreign and domestic banks. Gambacorta (2007) argues that the effect of monetary 
tightening on bank interest rates should be more pronounced for small, low-liquid and 
low-capitalized banks. In our paper, we are more interested to find whether banks 
with different ownership show different response in interest rates. If foreign banks 
could have more capacity to shield their credit relationship under contractionary 
monetary policy, they should adjust their interest rates by a smaller amount.  
<Table 2.9> 
We regressed the first order difference of interest rates on the same explanatory 
variables except the dependent variable which enters with only one year lag. The 
reason why we choose only one year lag is that first order difference of interest rate is 
less likely showing a persistence of more than one year. Initially we got very 
counterintuitive results shortly provided in Table 2.9, which indicate that foreign 
banks would increase their interest rates (of loans and deposits) by significantly 
higher extent than domestic private banks. Since foreign banks are less sensitive to cut 
down their loans when central bank conducts contractionary monetary policy, the 
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results only imply a disconnection between banks’ interest rates and loans. The results 
are found to be driven by the foreign banks in Latin American countries, while in 
Eastern & Central Europe foreign banks do not show any difference in adjusting 
interest rates and in Asia foreign banks increase their interest rates by a significantly 
smaller extent. The reasons we have counterintuitive results might lie on that, first, the 
approximate interest rates is far from perfect since it at best could be only regarded as 
an “average” rate for various loans and deposits with different maturities; these 
interest rates in reality have different response and sensitivity to monetary shocks; 
second, the effect of large values in our approximated interest rates may be too strong 
to be ignored. Most of the large interest rates are from three countries: Brazil in 1999, 
Paraguay in 2002-2003, and Uruguay in 2002-2003, which reflect the banking crises 
in these three countries.52 After refining our data by dropping the interest rates that 
are higher than 100%, and by this eliminating most crisis years, we re-ran the 
regression and obtained the results reported in Table 2.10, which are consistent with 
our previous finding on the loan and deposit growth rates.  
<Table 2.10> 
In general, the responses of interest rates only provide limited evidence for the 
existence of a bank lending channel and the different transmission via foreign and 
                                                        
52 Brazil’s 1998 crisis was triggered by investors’ expectation that Brazil would eventually devaluate the real. 
Capital flight reached $28 billion in 1998, which caused the central bank to raise interest rates in an effort to slow 
it. Banks might also lose reserves due to the capital flight, and were forced to increase their interest rate greatly. 
The crises in Paraguay and Uruguay in 2002-2003 were believed a repercussion of Argentine crisis, plus their own 
domestic economic and political problems. In Uruguay, for example, the exports of goods to Argentina fell by 70% 
in 2002, and tourism from Argentina fell a half. This considerable contraction in Uruguay’s economy led to a 
massive run on banks by depositors. The government was forced to freeze banking operations. In total 
approximately 33% of the country’s deposits were taken out of banks. In Paraguay, exports to Argentina fell by 
two-thirds during only the first months in 2002. The banking system was seriously affected and triggered sizable 
deposits outflows. The currency guarani depreciated by 34% against U.S. dollar. 
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domestic banks. A contractionary increase in monetary policy indicator by 1 
percentage point would contemporaneously raise the loan interest rate of domestic 
private banks by around 0.35 percentage points, while foreign banks would increase it 
by approximately 0.06 percentage points less. In terms of deposit interest rate, 
domestic private banks would increase it by 0.28 percentage points, while foreign 
banks would increase it by 0.02 less. However, foreign banks do not show any 
significant difference in adjusting their interest rates in general and in Eastern & 
Central Europe and Latin America. Only in Asia, foreign banks raise their interest 
rates by a significantly smaller extent than domestic private banks. A one percentage 
point increase in the monetary policy indicator would contemporaneously raise the 
loan and deposit interest rate of Asian domestic private banks by 0.48 and 0.45 
percentage points respectively, while foreign banks would raise them by only 0.22 and 
0.30.  
Most of other parameters show the expected signs, although only some of them 
are significant. Higher capitalized banks would raise their interest rates less, since 
they are less dependent on deposits to finance their loans. Big banks also have smaller 
increase in interest rates in most cases, which might be due to their advantage in 
larger networks to collect deposits and contact with customers, although this effect is 
not always statistically significant. Less efficient banks also tend to raise their interest 
rates by smaller extent. The reason is that banks with higher loan loss provision could 
be more expansionary to provide credit. Liquidity does not show conclusive effect on 
the behavior of interest rates.  
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Among the macroeconomic variables, the growth in GDP reduces the rise in the 
loan interest rate. Depreciation increases the loan and deposit interest rates, but this 
effect is mainly driven by Latin American countries. In Eastern & Central Europe and 
Asia, depreciation has the opposite effect. The reason might be that the depreciation 
of the domestic currency encourages banks to provide more foreign currency services 
which could lower the interest rates. Inflation in Eastern & Central Europe and Asia 
raises the interest rates of loans and deposits.  
 
2.4.2 Panel VAR model 
We move forward by using panel vector autoregression (panel VAR) method to 
examine the dynamics of banks’ adjustment.53 The reasons are: firstly, it is difficult 
distinguish the response of loans from monetary policy from its response to shocks in 
deposits or liquid assets in pooled OLS framework;54 secondly, our pooled OLS 
model has assumed that there are no unobserved bank characteristics correlated with 
contemporaneous independent variables, which might be too strong to be held. 
The advantage of panel VAR lies on its combination of traditional VAR 
approach and panel data methodology to address the above issues. It treats all 
variables in the system as endogenous, and by the orthogonalized impulse-response 
functions, it can trace out the response of one variable (say growth rate of loans) to an 
orthogonalized shock in another variable (say monetary policy), holding other shocks 
                                                        
53 Our approach is close to Love and Zicchino (2002). 
54 It would result in inconsistent estimates if we put contemporaneous deposits or liquid assets on the RHS in 
pooled OLS, since the allocation of loans and liquid assets and the collection of deposits could be determined at 
the same time. 
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(in growth rate of deposits or growth rate of liquid assets) constant. At the same time, 
it allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity in banks. To start, we specify a 
reduced-form VAR model as follows: 
0 1 1ijt ijt i ijtz z f e−= Γ + Γ + +  
where ijtz  is a vector, { , , , }jt ijt ijt ijtmp grdeposits grlq grloansΔ where jtmpΔ is the 
change in the monetary policy indicator in country j at time t, ,ijt ijtgrdeposits grlq and 
ijtgrloans respectively represent the growth rate of deposits, liquid assets and loan by 
bank i in country j at time t. fi  is the unobserved bank-fixed effect, and eijt is the error 
term.  
To identify the impulse response functions, a restriction on the structural form of 
the VAR has to be imposed first, which conventionally is adopted by assuming a 
particular ordering of the variables in terms of their effects to others. The variables 
that come earlier are assumed to affect the following ones contemporaneously and 
with a lag, while the variables that come later could only affect the earlier ones with a 
lag. In our case, a change in monetary policy affects banks’ deposits, liquidity and 
loans contemporaneously and with a lag. Deposits affect liquidity and loans 
contemporaneously and as well as with a lag, but liquidity and loans could affect 
deposits only with a lag. Banks’ operation could affect the monetary policy only with 
a lag. Two assumptions are implicitly made here: the effect of monetary policy falls 
symmetrically upon all banks; and the central bank would adjust its monetary policy 
according to banks’ behavior. 
The fixed effects, fi, are removed by forward mean-differencing, which is often 
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referred to as the Helmert procedure (Arellano and Bover (1995)).55 Then the 
reduced-form VAR is estimated by system-GMM, and the impulse-response functions 
are derived. Standard errors of the impulse-response functions are computed using 
Monte-Carlo simulations. To compare the responses of foreign banks and domestic 
banks, we divide our samples into two datasets according to bank ownership.56 
The results of the estimation of the reduced-form VAR by system GMM is 
provided in Table 2.11. For both domestic private banks and foreign banks, the 
response of loans and deposits to monetary policy is negative as expected, indicating 
that contractionary monetary policy will reduce both loans and deposits. The impact 
of monetary policy is almost twice larger in domestic private banks than foreign 
banks. For domestic private banks, the sensitivity of loans to deposits is significantly 
positive, implying loans and deposits would move in the same direction, while for 
foreign banks, the sensitivity is not significant although it is positive as expected. 
<Table 2.11> 
Our particular interest concentrates on the impulse response of loans and 
deposits to monetary policy shocks, which are provided in Table 2.12 and graphically 
reported in Figure 2.1. Loans and deposits both fall with the shock of contractionary 
monetary policy, but the largest contraction is observed one year later. This indicates 
the friction of financial markets to adjust portfolio allocation with the changes in 
monetary condition. Banks might be unable to reduce their loans immediately because 
                                                        
55 When a lag of the dependent variable is on the RHS, a simple mean-differencing to remove the fixed effects 
will cause biased estimates, since the demeaned explanatory variable will be correlated with the demeaned error 
term. 
56 Domestic state-owned banks are eliminated from our samples, because by using GMM method, too many 
observations for them are lost. 
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of their credit contracts with clients. The effect of monetary policy shock continues to 
be significant for approximately three years.  
<Table 2.12> 
<Figure 2.1> 
In comparison to domestic private banks, foreign banks clearly show smaller 
response in loans and deposits, especially contemporaneously and one or two years 
later. For example, to one standard deviation shock in monetary policy, domestic 
private banks reduce the growth rate of loans by nearly 3% contemporaneously while 
foreign banks only by 1% (and not significantly different from zero). In the following 
year, domestic private banks adjust down the growth of loans by more than 6%, while 
foreign banks only by 4.7%. The differences in the response are significant in both 
years. Even in the third year, foreign banks still show smaller adjustment than 
domestic private peers, although the difference loses significance. In terms of the 
growth of deposits, similar pattern is shown. The growth rate of deposits in foreign 
banks is adjusted less than domestic private banks. The different impulse responses 
between domestic private and foreign banks are illustrated in Figure 2.2 (differencing 
“domestic private” by “foreign”). Since the response of loans and deposits are 
negative for both domestic and foreign banks, the differences that are significantly 
smaller than zero indicate the weaker response in foreign banks. Easily seen from 
Figure 2.2, the differences are usually significant. 57 
                                                        
57  We also tried to extend the lag length to 2 years, so our reduced-form VAR is slightly modified to: 
0 1 1 2 2ijt ijt ijt i ijtz z z f e− −= Γ + Γ + Γ + +  
Generally, the response of loans and deposits follow the same pattern as the earlier model. Foreign banks are 
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<Figure 2.2> 
As an alternative specification, we include the growth rate of GDP in our model, 
and keep the same ordering except that we put the growth rate of GDP earlier than 
monetary policy. The results are not changed qualitatively, although some values 
change in magnitude.  
 
2.5 Further Analysis: Home Country Effect and Entry Mode 
2.5.1 Foreign banks’ home country effect 
In this section, we provide a brief study on the effect of home country conditions 
on foreign banks’ behavior in host countries, which helps to answer the question 
whether foreign banks may play a destabilizing force in the host countries by 
transmitting and propagating the shocks from their home countries. At the same time, 
it also tests whether the weaker response of foreign banks to host monetary policy is 
only a reflection of the effects of their home country conditions. The distribution of 
foreign banks by home countries is reported in Table 2.13.  
<Table 2.13> 
Firstly, we extend our pooled OLS model by allowing for the effect of home 
country’s monetary policy (contemporaneously and with a lag), growth of real GDP, 
                                                                                                                                                               
still less responsive contemporaneously and one year later. However, in the second and third year, the effects on 
loans and deposits become positive, which seems counter-intuitive. There might be some explanations. An 
econometric explanation might be that the error terms could not be really orthogonalized, so the shocks in the 
monetary policy might be negatively correlated with some other shocks that might increase the loans. For example, 
when central bank conducts tightening policy, the increased interest rate might attract more capital inflows from 
outside for higher return, which offset the loss of deposits and may cause an increase of loans. Unfortunately, 
without data to control this possibility, the above explanation can hardly be tested. Another explanation might be 
that some banks would fail under tightening monetary condition. They either closed their operation, or were 
absorbed or merged by other banks. The survived banks then might take over their market share and the credit of 
loans would increase. 
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and inflation, respectively, indicated by the interaction terms foreigni,j,t * home Δmpk,t, 
foreigni,j,t * home Δmpk,t-1, foreigni,j,t * home gr(gdp)k,t,  and foreigni,j,t * home 
inflationk,t. The results are shortly reported in Table 2.14. We find only limited 
evidence that foreign banks are affected, with a lag, by their home country monetary 
policy, but no evidence that they may transmit the shocks from their home output 
growth or inflation. A contractionary monetary policy in home country may increase 
foreign banks’ growth rate of loans in host countries, consistent with the hypothesis of 
internal capital market, since a tightening monetary policy in home country would 
reduce banks’ loans there and drive them to shift capital to their overseas subsidiaries. 
However, with or without the fixed effects for home countries, the coefficient on 
foreigni,j,t * home Δmpk,t-1 is only marginally significant, so it does not provide strong 
support for the sensitivity of foreign banks in host countries to shocks in their home 
country.  
<Table 2.14> 
The coefficients on the interaction term foreigni,j,t * Δmpj,t and foreigni,j,t * 
Δmpj,t-1 are only slightly changed in value, and significance remains. This implies that 
our earlier results are robust and not driven by the effects from foreign banks’ home 
country. 
Secondly, we also include home country conditions into our panel VAR model. 
Assuming that home country monetary policy may contemporaneously and with a lag 
affect host country monetary policy and foreign banks’ loans, while host monetary 
  
77
 
policy and foreign banks’ loans could only affect home monetary policy with a lag,58 
we find no evidence that foreign banks’ loans are significantly affected by home 
monetary policy while the significant effect from domestic monetary policy does not 
change. These results are provided in Figure 2.3. Consistent with the results in the 
pooled OLS model, foreign banks’ loans may increase under a tightening monetary 
policy in their home countries, but this increase is not statistically significant in all 
periods. We also try some alternative specifications,59 and the results are qualitatively 
the same. In all cases we find no significant increase of foreign banks’ loans in host 
countries attributable to a shock in their home country monetary policy or other home 
condition. Meanwhile the magnitude and significance of foreign banks’ response to 
domestic monetary policy are not undermined.  
<Figure 2.3> 
Overall, we do not find strong evidence that foreign banks play a destabilizing 
role in host countries by propagating the shocks from their home countries. The 
results in this section at best only provide a weak support on foreign banks’ sensitivity 
to home monetary policy. In addition, after allowing for home conditions, our earlier 
results do not change. 
 
                                                        
58 The intuition here is that the monetary policy in home countries, which are usually more advanced economies, 
will spill its effect over to affect the monetary policy in host countries. This spill-over is observed in Figure 4 in 
that a tightening monetary policy in home countries is associated with a contraction of monetary policy in host 
countries. However, host countries’ monetary policy has no significant effect on home countries’ monetary policy 
as expected. 
59 These alternative specifications include adding home country real GDP growth rate and foreign bank’s deposits. 
We also tried to use the difference between host country and home country monetary policy, instead of the two 
variables separately. The results are similar and no evidence is found that foreign banks show significant response 
to home country monetary policy. When home country monetary policy is tightened more relative to host country 
monetary policy, foreign banks significantly increase their loans in host countries. All these results are available 
upon request.  
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2.5.2 Foreign bank entry mode 
In this part, we briefly study how the entry mode affects foreign banks’ behavior 
in host countries. The distribution of foreign banks by entry mode is reported in Table 
2.15, and the descriptive statistics for these two types of banks in Table 2.16. 
<Table 2.15> <Table 2.16> 
We constructed two dummy variables, greenfieldi,j,t and takeoveri,j,t, respectively 
for foreign banks de novo established and via merger & acquisitions. Therefore our 
sample is divided into four categories: domestic private banks (which is the 
benchmark), domestic state owned banks, greenfield foreign banks and takeover 
foreign banks. The interaction terms of greenfield banks and takeover banks with 
domestic monetary policy, greenfieldi,j,t *Δmpj,t, greenfieldi,j,t *Δmpj,t-1, takeoveri,j,t *
Δmpj,t and takeoveri,j,t *Δmpj,t-1 are also included to observe whether and how 
foreign banks with different entry mode may show different responses to domestic 
monetary policy. The pooled OLS results are reported in Table 2.17. 
<Table 2.17> 
In most cases, both greenfield and takeover foreign banks show positive sign on 
the interaction term coefficients, which implies that both of these two types of foreign 
banks may have smaller sensitivity to host monetary policy than domestic private 
banks. Different entry mode would not cause opposite behavior across foreign banks 
in responding to host monetary policy shocks. In addition, the significantly smaller 
sensitivity of takeover foreign banks relative to domestic private banks is consistent 
with that the change in lending is driven by the force on supply side instead of 
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demand side, since takeover foreign banks could have similar borrowers to domestic 
banks. 
However, for greenfield foreign banks, their different response from domestic 
private banks is not statistically significant. We also tested and found that, although 
the coefficient on takeoveri,j,t*Δmpj,t does not significantly differ from that on 
greenfieldi,j,t*Δmpj,t, the coefficient on takeoveri,j,t*Δmpj,t-1 is significantly larger than 
that on greenfieldi,j,t*Δmpj,t-1, suggesting that takeover foreign banks may be more 
stable than greenfield peers under a host monetary shock. We also reestimate our 
panel VAR model by separating our sample into greenfield and takeover foreign 
banks, and the result is qualitatively similar to the pooled OLS model. In most periods, 
both greenfield and takeover banks show smaller response than domestic private 
banks. Greenfield foreign banks are found more sensitive to domestic monetary policy 
than takeover foreign banks in the second, third and fourth periods. We represent their 
impulse response graphically in Figure 2.4.  
<Figure 2.4> 
This finding raises the question why takeover foreign banks are relatively less 
sensitive than their greenfield counterparts. To answer this question, we first need to 
understand what each entry mode implies for banks’ behavior. Entry mode might 
imply the different integration degrees of banks with their mother institutions, which 
leads to a common belief that greenfield banks should be more closely integrated with 
their mother banks. If this is true, greenfield foreign banks are probably less 
responsive to host country monetary policy shocks. However, this belief needs to be 
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carefully examined. Only entry mode by itself can not necessarily guarantee different 
linkage degree between mother banks and their subsidiaries. It may also indicate the 
cost of entry or the strategy of operation. In addition, entry mode might also indicate 
the familiarity of the management group to local market. The management groups in 
takeover banks are likely more familiar to the host market, and it helps these banks to 
partially offset the shocks from monetary policy. Therefore entry mode might mean 
more than just the integration degree between mother and subsidiary banks. At this 
moment we hardly conclude the explicit determinants of takeover foreign banks’ 
weaker sensitivity, and this finding could serve as a start for an extension of our 
research in the future. 
 
2.6 Foreign bank penetration level and monetary policy effects: evidence from 
aggregated data 
In this section, we examine the stabilizing force of foreign banks in credit 
provision under monetary policy shocks by using aggregated data. We find that the 
effects of monetary policy on banking sector total loans are dampened in the 
economies with higher foreign bank penetration level. This result is consistent with 
the evidence found from bank-level data. 
The model is as follows: 
, 0 , 1 1 , 2 , 1
0 , 1 , , 2 , , 1
( ) ( )
                     * *
                       var  var
j t j t j t j t
j t j t j t j t j t
gr loans gr loans mp mp
peneta peneta mp peneta mp
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β β β
α α α
λ η
− −
−
= ⋅ + ⋅Δ + ⋅Δ
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+ ⋅ + ⋅ ,j tles u+
where gr(loans)j,t is the growth rate of banking sector total loans in country j in year t, 
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Δmpj,t and Δmpj,t-1 represent contemporaneous and one year lag monetary policy. 
penetaj,t represents foreign bank penetration level in terms of total assets, and 
penetaj,t*Δmpj,t and penetaj,t*Δmpj,t-1 represent their interactions with monetary policy.  
The other financial sector variables are included to control the factors that may 
affect the growth of total loans in the banking sector. sbstaj,t represents the market 
share of state-owned banks in the banking sector, and sbstaj,t*Δmpj,t and 
sbstaj,t*Δmpj,t-1 are their interaction with monetary policy. concentaj,t means the 
concentration level of the largest three banks in the banking sector, and 
concentaj,t*Δmpj,t and concentaj,t*Δmpj,t-1 follow the same syntax. lqtaj,t-1 means the 
weighted average liquidity of all banks in the banking sector, and equitytaj,t-1 the 
weighted average capitalization level of all banks in the banking sector60. To reduce 
the possible endogeneity problem, one year lag is used instead of their current values. 
We use niraaallj,t-1, net interest revenue over average assets for all banks, to measure 
the competition level in the banking sector, following Claessens et al (2001) in the 
sense that banks’ net interest revenue relative to total assets is reduced when the 
market is more competitive. The interaction terms of above variables with monetary 
policy are also included. domcreditj,t is the total banking sector credit divided by GDP, 
representing the bank dependence level of the host countries. llploansj,t-1 represents 
the weighted average bank loan loss provision relative to total loans. This variable is 
used to measure the overall riskiness in the banking market. It is interacted with 
penetaj,t since foreign banks may have different responses to market risk. We also 
                                                        
60 Liquidity and capitalization are weighted by individual banks’ share in the banking sector in terms of their total 
assets. 
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include some macroeconomic variables to control the effects on total loans from 
demand side, such as inflationj.t-1 and gr(GDP)j,t-1 . Their interactions with penetaj,t are 
added to distinguish foreign banks’ possible different response to shocks in demand. 
Several dummies for crisis are also included. The dummy crisisj,t is designed by 
following Cull and Martinez Peria (2007) for countries in crisis periods, and four  
alternative crisis dummies, asiacrisisj,t, bracrisisj,t, ruscrisisj,t and argcrisisj,t, are 
constructed to distinguish the crisis period for affected countries specifically in 1997 
Southeast Asia crisis, 1998 Brazil crisis, 1998 Russia crisis and 2000 Argentina crisis. 
All the aggregated data, such as penetaj,t, sbstaj,t, concentaj,t, lqtaj,t-1, equitytaj,t-1, 
niraaallj,t-1 and llploansj,t-1, are constructed based on the bank-level data. For example, 
penetaj,t, is calculated by aggregating all foreign banks’ total assets and dividing it 
over the total banking assets in the host country. The other variables follow similar 
construction method. 
<Table 2.18> 
The results are provided in Table 2.18. Δmpj,t , and Δmpj,t-1 in some cases, is 
significantly negative, indicating that the growth rate of banking sector total loans 
would decrease when the central bank conducts contractionary monetary policy.  
penetaj,t*Δmpj,t is positive and significant at any conventional significance level in all 
specifications. This suggests that the effects of monetary policy, at least in the 
contemporaneous year, are less pronounced in economies with higher foreign bank 
penetration level. 
For robust test purpose, we changed the variable penetaj,t alternatively by two 
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means. The first is measuring the foreign bank penetration level in terms of loans 
rather than total assets, and the second is using the foreign bank presence series 
calculated by Micco et al (2004)61. The results are shown in specification (11), (12) 
and (13). Both of these two new measures give us qualitatively same results as before. 
Higher foreign bank penetration level buffers the effect of monetary policy on credit 
growth. We also changed the variable niraaallj,t-1 by using nieaaallj,t-1, which is 
non-interest expenses over average assets for all banks to measure the 
competitiveness in the banking market, or niraadomj,t-1, net interest revenue over 
average assets for only domestic banks, or nieaadomj,t-1, non-interest expenses over 
average assets for only domestic banks. In Claessens et al (2001) it is argued that 
non-interest expenses decreases as the banking market competition increases, since 
domestic banks are stimulated to raise efficiency for their survival. The results remain 
qualitatively same after using these measurements.62 
Some other interesting results are also revealed. Higher state-owned bank 
dominance in the banking sector tends to dampen the potency of monetary policy on 
credit growth, since state-owned banks are less market-oriented. Loan growth is 
smaller in countries where banking sector is more concentrated, but higher in better 
capitalized banking sector. Monetary policy is also less effective in better capitalized 
banking sector, consistent with Kishan and Opiela (2000). This might be due to that 
banks with higher capitalization have better alternative sources to substitute the 
                                                        
61 Micco et al (2004) measure foreign bank penetration level in a more sophisticated way. For example, assuming 
in an economy there is only one bank, if 51% of total assets in this bank are owned by a foreign bank, they 
measure the foreign bank penetration level by 51%. In our paper, foreign bank penetration is measured as 100%.   
62 Even we change these competition variables by using the data from Beck et al (2000), net interest revenue over 
total earning assets and overcost over total assets, the results remain qualitatively same. 
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deposit loss under contractionary monetary policy, and therefore could stabilize their 
loan provision. It is interesting that monetary policy is more potent in more liquid 
banking market. One potential explanation is high liquidity may reflect poor health in 
small banks and they would increase their liquid assets (by reducing credit) to avoid a 
run on bank when monetary condition becomes tightening. Credit grows more quickly 
in more competitive banking market, and in some specifications it seems to suggest 
that monetary policy would be more pronounced in less competitive banking market. 
One reason could be banks are declined to reduce lending and lose market shares to 
their competitors. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Although studies on bank lending channel and foreign bank penetration are not 
uncommon, there are very few that explore the transmission of monetary policy in 
emerging economies via the bank lending channel across domestic and foreign banks. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on the bank lending channel in emerging 
economies, by going beyond the commonly considered characteristics of banks such 
as liquidity, capitalization, size and efficiency, and focusing on the difference in 
banks’ ownership. Our paper also adds to the literature on the effects of foreign bank 
penetration on financial stability in the host countries. In addition, according to our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that examines the dynamic effects of monetary 
policy by applying panel VAR methodology. 
This paper investigates the different transmission of the monetary policy via 
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domestic and foreign banks. By observing a large sample of more than 1200 banks in 
35 emerging economies in Eastern & Central Europe, Latin America and Asia, our 
results suggest that heterogeneity in the monetary policy pass-through exists between 
domestic and foreign banks, consistent with the existence of an active bank lending 
channel. We find evidence that foreign banks are less sensitive to contractionary 
monetary shocks in host countries by lowering their loans and deposits less than 
domestic private banks, and this lower sensitivity is driven by some factors 
independent of banks’ own liquidity, capitalization, size and efficiency. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis of internal capital markets between the foreign banks 
and their parent banks. Consistent evidence of less pronounced monetary policy in 
economies with higher foreign bank penetration level is also found by using 
aggregated data. Our findings highlight the stabilizing role that the foreign bank 
presence may play in host countries, and at the same time the potential tradeoff as 
monetary policy becomes less effective. 
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Chapter 3: Foreign Bank Penetration, Resource Allocation and Output Growth 
in Emerging Economies 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This paper is specifically interested in studying the implication of foreign bank 
penetration on resource allocation and economic growth in host emerging economies. 
Foreign bank penetration, bringing both benefits and concerns, may affect the 
economic growth directly and indirectly. Direct benefits may arise if foreign banks 
introduce additional capital into the host countries, energetically seek profitable uses 
for these funds and exert corporate control. By doing these, foreign banks may 
directly boost the efficiency of resource allocation in favor of accelerated economic 
growth. 63  Meanwhile, foreign bank penetration could achieve better resource 
allocation indirectly, by intensifying competition in the banking market and 
stimulating domestic banks to improve their efficiency in financial service. 
(Demirguc-Kunt, et al (1998)). So far, only little evidence is found that increasingly 
higher foreign bank penetration is directly associated with host countries’ economic 
growth. More research have been conducted and found evidence that foreign bank 
penetration may accelerate economic growth indirectly by adding more competition 
and inducing the efficiency gains in the banking sector.  
This paper addresses whether foreign banks’ direct effect on resource allocation 
is relevant, after the competitiveness in the banking sector has been controlled. I 
specifically examine whether the effects of capital and labor on output growth would 
                                                        
63 In the second essay of this thesis, I find that the level of foreign bank penetration level is not directly associated 
with higher lending growth rate in the banking sector.  
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be higher in economies with more pronounced foreign bank participation, given 
competitiveness and their interaction with capital and labor controlled. A positive 
answer would contribute an addition to the literature on the direct effect of foreign 
bank penetration in host economies, suggesting foreign banks tend to seek good 
borrowers and directly have resources allocated in the most productive sectors. It is 
worthwhile to note that, following Demirguc-Kunt et al (1998), the difference 
between the terms “direct” and “indirect” lies on that, foreign banks “directly” search 
and find good borrowers, and “indirectly” drive domestic bank to compete more 
actively. Both ways could have resources well allocated and produce higher output. 
The implication is that, besides stimulating higher competition in the banking sector, 
foreign bank penetration has relevant additional effects on better resource allocation.  
Our finding suggests some evidence that higher foreign bank penetration may 
improve economic growth by having capital allocated to the most productive sectors. 
The effect of capital growth on output growth is higher in economies where foreign 
bank presence is more pronounced, which is interpreted as consistent with the 
hypothesis that foreign banks could help capital better allocated into most productive 
sectors. Even the effects from higher competitiveness in the banking market on capital 
allocation have been controlled, the higher effects of capital growth on output growth 
in highly foreign bank penetrated economies remain. However, no different effect of 
labor on output growth is discovered in economies with different foreign bank 
participation. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two briefly reviews 
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the related literature. The next sector introduces the data and reports descriptive 
statistics. The forth section introduces the models used to test the role of foreign 
banks in improving resource allocation. The fifth section concludes.   
 
3.2 Literature Review 
This is paper is closely related with the literature of finance-growth nexus. It has 
been intensively debated whether financial development plays a relevant role in 
economic growth.64 Financial system is important for economic growth in allocating 
capital, monitoring borrowers, exerting corporate control, facilitating risk 
management and so on.65 The level of financial development is found positively 
associated with long-run economic growth (Goldsmith (1969), King and Levine 
(1993a and 1993b), De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), Rajan and Zingales (1998) and 
Levine et al (2000), Beck et al (2004)).  
However, the implication of foreign bank entry on economic growth is still far 
from conclusion. There is only limited works on the direct linkage between foreign 
bank entry and economic growth in host economies. The direct impact of foreign bank 
penetration could be from bringing additional capital into the host economies, 
energetically seeking profitable use for their funds, exerting corporate control and 
facilitating risk management. Demirguc-Kunt et al (1998) find no evidence that 
foreign banks directly influence long-run economic growth, but the increased 
                                                        
64 Some influential economists believe that finance is a relatively unimportant factor in economic development. 
For example, Lucas (1988) said the relationship between financial and economic development is “badly 
over-stressed”.  
65 The “financial system” in Levine (1996) includes not only banks, but a broad mix of financial instruments, 
markets and institutions. 
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participation of foreign banks tends to lower the probability of a banking crisis. 
Bayraktar and Wang (2006) find some evidence on both direct and indirect link 
between foreign bank presence and economic growth by observing 28 developed and 
developing countries.66  
In contrast to limited works that find direct impact of foreign bank presence on 
economic growth, more works have been conducted and found foreign banks could 
indirectly foster higher economic growth by adding competition and improving the 
efficiency in the banking sector. Claessens et al (1997) find evidence that increasing 
foreign bank presence is associated with lower profits and costs in domestic banking 
sector, which reflects a higher competition and efficiency stimulated by foreign entry. 
Demirguc-Kunt et al (1998) find foreign bank penetration tend to render domestic 
banking sector more efficient, and economic growth is positively associated with the 
efficiency of banking industry. Martinez Peria et al (2004) also find increased foreign 
bank entry is associated with cost reduction throughout the banking system.  
It is not clear yet whether foreign bank penetration has a positive or negative 
effect on firms’ access to credit. A common argument against foreign bank entry is 
that foreign banks would tend to “cherry pick” the most profitable borrowers, leaving 
some firms unattended, especially the small and medium sized firms who are likely 
informationally opaque. If this argument is justified, a high level of foreign bank 
                                                        
66 Capital and labor are excluded in their regression model since the cost of capital (then the capital accumulation) 
is assumed to be affected by financial development and labor is assumed playing no special role. However, 
economies with comparably equivalent financial development are still observed with substantial difference in 
capital cost. The cost of capital could be more affected by monetary policy rather than the development of financial 
sector. In our paper, I include some measures of the development in financial market, and capital accumulation and 
labor are still fundamental production factors that affect economic growth. The pool of both developed and 
developing countries also only partially helps to answer the question whether and how foreign bank penetration 
could affect economic growth for emerging and relatively poor economies.  
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penetration may hurt the economic growth of host countries since small and medium 
sized firms represents the largest group of the total enterprises and hire a large share 
of employees. 67  Berger et al (2001) find that foreign banks avoid lending to 
informationally opaque firms. Clarke et al (2001) find that foreign bank penetration 
improves financing conditions for enterprises of all sizes, although this process seems 
to benefit larger firms more. Clarke et al (2002) find that foreign banks in a sample of 
four Latin American countries generally lend less to small businesses than private 
domestic banks, but the difference is primarily driven by the behavior of small foreign 
banks, and large foreign banks lend more to small businesses than large domestic 
banks in two countries. Detragiache et al (2006) developed a theoretical model and 
find empirical evidence in 89 poor countries to support that credit to the private sector 
is lower in countries with more foreign bank participation when foreign banks depend 
on hard data for loan decisions. Gormley (2007) uses data in India and finds that 
foreign banks finance only a small set of very profitable firms and on average firms 
were 8 percentage points less likely to have a loan. Giannetti and Ongena (2007) find 
although foreign banks lending stimulates growth in firm sales and assets, the effect is 
weaker for small firms.  
 
3.3 Data 
Annual country level data are used in our analysis, covering 35 main emerging 
economies in three regions: Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and Asia.68 
                                                        
67 In addition, foreign banks may not accelerate long-run economic growth if they spur excessive borrowing. 
68 The countries include: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
  
81
 
The time interval is from 1996 to 2003. All variables are averaged over the years 1996 
- 1999 and 2000-2003. Therefore, every country has two observations, respectively 
measuring the mean value of the variables of interest over the periods before and after 
200069. By this means, the results of our estimation could be interpreted in the sense 
of long-run relationship between foreign bank penetration and economic growth. 
Foreign bank penetration level is calculated by aggregating individual foreign 
banks’ total assets and dividing the sum over the banking sector total assets. This 
measure reflects the dominance of foreign banks in the host countries banking market. 
Consistent with the second essay, I only select commercial banks to construct the 
aggregate level. Foreign bank penetration varies among the sample countries, with on 
the average the lowest three in India, Thailand and Ecuador (only 0.76%, 5.51% and 
5.73% respectively), and the highest three in Albania, Hong Kong and Hungary 
(90.94%, 89.16% and 76.28%). In general, Eastern and Central Europe is observed 
with the highest average foreign bank presence level (43.76%), and Asia the lowest 
(only 19.69%). For robustness test need, I also constructed the penetration level in 
terms of loans, by aggregating the loans of foreign banks and dividing over the 
banking sector total loans. Another alternative series to measure foreign bank 
penetration level is borrowed from Micco et al (2004), which is also calculated based 
on bank assets but in a more sophisticated way. All three series are significantly 
correlated. I also constructed the series for state-owned banks dominance in the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
69 Due to data limitation, Ecuador has only annual data since 2000. 
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banking sector, following the same method.  
Except foreign bank penetration level, the ratio of domestic credit over GDP is 
used to proxy the financial structure in the sample countries. This measure reflects the 
importance of banking sector in terms of the relative size of its credit. Another proxy 
that could be used is the ratio of credit to private sector over GDP, however, these two 
proxies are highly correlated. Following Levine and Zervos (1998), I also add stock 
market turnover rate to measure the development in stock market since it has been 
found to have independent effects on economic growth. The data of stock market 
turnover rate is borrowed from the dataset constructed by Beck et al (2000). 
In order to examine whether foreign bank penetration could play additional role 
after the competitiveness of the banking sector has been controlled, I measure the 
competitiveness by using the weighted average net interest revenue over average 
assets for all banks, in the sense that the net interest revenue would be lower in a more 
competitive banking market. A higher value in net interest revenue over average 
assets indicates a weaker competition across banks. Concentration level is also 
calculated to measure the competition among banks, since it is expected that 
competition would be undermined in a more concentrated market. The concentration 
level is calculated by aggregating the total assets of the largest three banks in the 
country and dividing it over the banking sector total assets. These two measures are 
positively correlated but not significant.  
Capital and labor are two fundamental resources to affect economic growth in 
our model. Capital input is measured by the gross fixed capital formation, equivalent 
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to gross domestic fixed investment, which includes plant, machinery, and equipment 
purchases; land improvements; and the construction of infrastructure. Growth rate of 
fixed capital formation is expected positively related to growth rate of output. The 
series is directly selected from World Development Indicator (WDI) database. Labor 
input is measured by employed labor force. I first select the data of labor force from 
WDI and unemployment rate from International Financial Statistics (IFS). The 
number of employed labor force is calculated from: labor force * (1 - unemployment 
rate), and based on which the growth rate of employed labor force is calculated. It is 
not necessary that the growth rate of employed labor is positively correlated with the 
growth rate of output since there may exist substitution effects between capital and 
labor. 
It is expected that the initial development level could affect the later economic 
growth, so I use normalized GDP per capita in 1995 (in terms of dollars of constant 
value) to control its effects. A country on a lower initial development stage may grow 
faster than the countries on a higher level, reflecting a convergence of economic 
growth across countries. Inflation and depreciation rate are included by following the 
empirical growth literature as being correlated with the growth across countries (Beck 
et al (2000)). Since I have very short interval of observations, I omit a specific 
variable to control the advance in technology by assuming it would not change 
substantially. 
<Table 3.1> 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.1. Some characteristics of 
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emerging economies are revealed from these statistics, for example, emerging 
economies are characterized with relatively large variation in their growth (the 
standard deviation is above 3.33% and larger than the mean 2.50%), high but variant 
capital growth rate (mean 4.30% and standard deviation 10.17%)70, and slower 
growth rate in employed labor force (0.98%) which might be due to the relatively 
high unemployment rate in emerging economies. Inflation and depreciation rate are 
high in sample countries (both approximately 10%). In banking sector, foreign 
participation is high on the average (around 37% in both terms of total assets and 
loans), and state-owned banks remain a relatively high share (21.71%). This reflects 
the process of financial liberalization process in these economies, by privatizing the 
state-owned banks and allowing more foreign participants. The dependence on banks 
for finance varies substantially across countries, ranging from the lowest in Lithuania 
(13.47%) and the highest in Malaysia (207.35%).  
<Table 3.2> 
Simple correlation statistics are reported in Table 3.2. The growth rate of fixed 
capital is positively correlated with the growth rate of real GDP per capita, which may 
suggest that an important source of growth for emerging economies is accumulated 
capital stock. The growth rate of employed labor is negatively correlated with output 
growth rate although the correlation is not significant. This is not surprising if the 
growth of emerging economies depends more on the growth of capital, which 
substitutes labor in production. Foreign bank penetration level is positively but 
                                                        
70 Albania is observed with the highest average growth rate of fixed capital, while Colombia is observed with the 
largest growth reduction in fixed capital. 
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weakly correlated with output growth, consistent with the difficulties in the literature 
to find direct association between foreign bank penetration and economic growth. 
Although foreign bank penetration level is negatively correlated with net interest 
revenue over average assets, consistent with the general finding that foreign banks 
stimulate more intense competition in the banking market, the correlation is not 
significant.71  
 
3.4 Model and Results  
In this section I examine whether the effects of capital and labor vary under 
different foreign bank penetration level. After controlling the competitiveness of the 
banking sector and other variables, if we still find evidence that the effect of these two 
production factors on output growth is higher in countries where foreign bank 
presence is more pronounced, it can be interpreted as the evidence of “direct effect” 
defined by Demirguc-Kunt et al (1998), that is, foreign banks not only foster a more 
competitive banking market, but also has additional and relevant effects to have 
resources better allocated, by using their more advanced expertise and experience to 
seek and identify good borrowers, or exerting more stringent monitor and corporate 
control. 
Two econometric methods are employed: pooled OLS and fixed-effects 
estimation. The model of pooled OLS is as follows: 
                                                        
71 The correlation between alternative foreign bank penetration and competitiveness measures is also negative but 
insignificant. 
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The model of fixed-effects estimation is: 
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Different assumptions are applied in above two methods. In pooled OLS, for the 
purpose of statistic consistency, contemporaneous exogeneity is assumed that the 
error term εi,t is not correlated with the regressors in the same period. I also assume 
there is no time-constant fixed effect in each country, or this fixed effect is not 
correlated with regressors. This assumption is relaxed in fixed-effects estimation by 
allowing fixed country effect fi and assuming fi could be correlated with independent 
variables. In contrast to the assumption of contemporaneous exogeneity in pooled 
OLS, strict exogeneity is assumed that the error term εi,t is not correlated with 
regressors in all periods. This might be a strong assumption since the feedback from 
GDP growth rate in period t might affect the regressors in the period t+1. However, 
the lagged value of the growth rate of GDP per capita is only weakly and 
insignificantly correlated with regressors in next period, which is interpreted as 
evidence against any important feedback. 
In both models, the dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita. 
Capital and labor are included in the model as the fundamental production factors that 
affect economic growth. The input of capital is represented by gr(fixed capital)i,t, the 
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growth rate of gross fixed capital formation. Labor input is represented by gr(labor)i,t, 
the growth rate of employed labor force. Financial structure variables are included to 
follow the finance-growth nexus literature to examine whether financial sector is 
relevant for economic growth. domcrediti,t is the total banking sector credit divided by 
GDP and represents the size of banking in financial structure. stturnoveri,t is the stock 
market turnover rate, measuring the development in alternative financial markets. 
niraaalli,t is the weighted average net interest revenue over average assets for all 
banks, which measures the competitiveness of the banking sector. sbstai,t measures the 
relevance of state-owned banks in terms of total assets. In pooled OLS, the variable to 
control initial development level, inidevelopmenti, is included, which is a constant 
value of normalized real GDP per capita in 1995 across countries.  
The variable, penetai,t is used again as the measure of foreign bank penetration 
level in terms of total assets. I interact penetration level with production inputs, 
gr(fixed capital)i,t and gr(labor)i,t. Positive coefficients before penetai,t*gr(fixed 
capital)i,t and penetai,t*gr(labor)i,t  would suggest that in an economy characterized 
with higher foreign bank penetration level, capital and labor are better allocated in 
more productive sectors and have higher contribution for economic growth.  
<Table 3.3> 
The benchmark results are reported in Table 3.3. The coefficient before gr(fixed 
capital)i,t is positive and significant, implying a higher growth rate of fixed capital 
accumulation is associated with higher growth rate. The coefficient before gr(labor)i,t 
is negative, suggesting the economic growth in observed countries are associated with 
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a reduction in employed labor force. This is consistent with the substitution between 
capital and labor. The initial development, inidevelopmenti, is negative and 
statistically significant, which can be interpreted as an evidence of convergence across 
countries. Inflation and depreciation both show expected negative sign, although only 
depreciation is significant in pooled OLS.72  
The financial sector variables only provide limited evidence for a significant 
relationship between finance and economic growth. The economic growth rate is not 
significantly affected by domcrediti,t , the size of banking in financial structure. Stock 
market turnover rate shows significantly positive in only fixed-effects estimation, 
consistent with Levine and Zervos (1998) in that an active stock market is positively 
associated with economic growth.  
The competitiveness in banking sector suggests significant association with 
economic growth. The coefficient on niraaalli,t keeps negative and significant in 
almost all specifications, which implies that higher competitiveness in banking sector 
is associated with higher economic growth. Since the interactions of niraaalli,t with 
resource allocation have been included in the model, the coefficient on niraaalli,t 
could be interpreted as additional effects of competition on economic growth, for 
example, a competitive banking sector could lower the cost of external financing for 
firms and foster higher output growth. This result is consistent with Claessens and 
Laeven (2005). 
Now I focus on the results related to foreign bank penetration level, competition 
                                                        
72 Since inflation and depreciation rate are highly correlated, we have tried to drop either one of them. The results 
are not changed qualitatively, and the estimated coefficients are only little changed. 
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and resource allocation. In specification (1) and (2), the coefficient before 
niraaalli,t*gr(fixed capital)i,t is negative and significant, meaning that the contribution 
of capital growth would be higher in a more competitive banking sector relative to a 
less competitive one. However, the interaction term niraaalli,t*gr(labor)i,t is either 
insignificant or positive in the estimations. The positive sign before this term might be 
interpreted as the substitution between capital and labor would be higher in a more 
competitive environment (relative to a less competitive one)73. After the effects of 
competition on resource allocation have been controlled, interaction term before 
penetai,t*gr(fixed capital)i,t is still positive and significant, suggesting the effect of 
fixed capital growth on output growth is higher in economies with more pronounced 
foreign bank penetration. Since banks could channel capital to more productive firms 
through their lending behavior, this can be read as evidence that higher foreign bank 
penetration would induce more productive allocation of capital. However, the 
coefficient before penetai,t*gr(labor)i,t is insignificant, implying the effect of labor on 
GDP growth is not different across countries with different level of foreign bank 
penetration. These results suggest that foreign banks play an additional role in 
improving capital allocation besides bringing more competition, consistent with the 
hypothetical “direct effect” by Demirguc-Kunt et al (1998). The “direct effect” might 
be derived from foreign banks’ better expertise and experience to identify potential 
good borrowers, or more stringent monitor and corporate control. Since we use 
averaged yearly data over 4 year, our results could be interpreted in the sense of 
                                                        
73 One possible reason is that higher competition would have credit more readily channeled to capital-intensive 
firms and substitute more labor force. 
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long-run relationship between foreign bank penetration, resource allocation and 
economic growth. 
How could we quantitatively interpret the effect of foreign bank presence on 
capital allocation? Take specification (1) in Table 3 for example. In an economy with 
no foreign banks in its banking sector, having other things unchanged, 1% increase in 
growth rate of fixed capital is associated with an increase in GDP per capita growth 
rate by around 0.244%. If foreign bank penetration increases by 10%, it tends to 
increase the GDP per capita additionally by 0.01 %. If the economy is characterized 
with the average foreign bank presence level (in the sample, 36.92%), the increase in 
GDP per capita growth would be around 0.281%. It is worthwhile to note that 
although the effect of foreign bank penetration on resource allocation is statistically 
significant, it is numerically small, which suggests that the benefits of foreign bank 
penetration on long-run economic growth should not be overstated.  
To test the robustness of the results, I first use alternative measures of foreign 
bank penetration level, respectively in terms of loans and the data from Micco et al 
(2004). The results are reported in Table 3.4. The results are qualitatively similar. 
Even by using the data from Micco et al (2004), the magnitude of the estimate on 
penetai,t*gr(fixed capital)i,t in both estimations are close to the estimate by using 
initial series. The coefficient is significant in fixed-effects estimation and only 
narrowly insignificant in pooled OLS. 
<Table 3.4> 
I also use alternative measures for the competitiveness to conduct robustness test. 
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The results are reported in Table 3.5, where I replace weighted net interest revenue 
over average assets for all banks by using weighted net interest revenue over average 
assets for only domestic banks (niraadomi,t), weighted non-interest expenses over 
average assets for all banks (nieaaalli,t), and weighted non-interest expenses over 
average assets for only domestic banks (nieaadomi,t). The coefficient before 
penetai,t*gr(fixed capital)i,t remains qualitatively the same, but only significant when 
using nieaaalli,t as competition measure. The reason might be that foreign banks 
entered the host market via merger & acquisition, and reduced substantially the 
number of domestic banks. The accuracy of measurement for competitiveness by 
observing only domestic banks is therefore undermined. I also use concentration rate 
to measure the competition, since a more concentrated banking market would be less 
competitive. However, all significance of interaction between foreign bank 
penetration and competition with resource allocation disappear. The reason could be 
the poor proxy of concentration rate for competition level. The correlation between 
concentration rate with all other competitiveness measure are tiny (less than 0.1), but 
relatively large with foreign bank penetration level (more than 0.21). 
<Table 3.5> 
Finally I test robustness of our estimates by replacing domcrediti,t with 
credittoprivatei,t, the ratio of credit to private sector, which is argued by many 
research a better measure of banking development (such as Levine and Zervos(1998) 
and Beck et al (2000)). I also interact this measure with gr(fixed capital)i,t and 
gr(labor)i,t to control the possibility that the observed effects are actually attributable 
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to the advances in banking development. The results are reported in Table 3.6. The 
coefficient before penetai,t*gr(fixed capital)i,t remains numerically similar and 
statistically significant in fixed-effects estimation, and only slightly insignificant in 
pooled OLS. The effects of competitiveness remain, while no significant difference is 
found in economies with different level of credittoprivatei,t.  
<Table 3.6> 
Although we find some evidence that the effects of capital growth on output 
growth is higher in economies with higher foreign bank participation, these evidence 
need to be interpreted very cautiously. We only conclude that the evidence is 
consistent with the view that higher foreign bank penetration stimulates economic 
growth by having capital better allocated. A shortcoming in our estimation is the short 
time-series dimension. After being averaged over 1996-1999 and 2000-2003, each 
country has only 2 observations, which limited our choice for econometric methods. 
The strict exogeneity assumption of fixed-effects estimation might be violated if the 
feedback from GDP growth to regressors is relevant. GMM might overcome the 
drawbacks in fixed-effects estimation, but it can not be conducted with so few 
observations. 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
This paper addresses the relationship between foreign bank penetration and 
economic growth by arguing that foreign banks could affect economic growth through 
more efficient resource allocation. After controlling the competitiveness in the 
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banking sector, through which resources could be also allocated to the most 
productive sectors, I find evidence that foreign banks play an additional role to better 
distribute capital. The evidence is consistent with the hypothetical “direct effect” of 
foreign banks by energetically seeking and identifying good borrowers, and imposing 
more stringent monitor and corporate control. Although the effect of foreign bank 
penetration on better resource allocation is statistically significant, it is numerically 
small, which suggests that the benefits of foreign bank participation in host banking 
sector should not be overstated. 
However, this paper only adds only a modest contribution to the limited research 
on foreign bank presence and economic growth. Further research on this issue is 
required by using alternative econometric methods or expanded cross-sectional and 
time-series dimensions. 
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Appendix of Tables 
Table 1. 1 Foreign Ownership of Banks 
Shares of Assets of Foreign Banks to Total Assets of Banking Sector 
East & Central Europe        
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Bulgaria 0.01 0.05 0.18 0.31 0.83 0.82 0.85 0.79 
Croatia 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.29 0.53 0.57 0.90 0.91 
Czech Republic 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.87 
Hungary 0.54 0.70 0.69 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.99 1.00 
Poland 0.15 0.19 0.46 0.74 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98 
Romania   0.41 0.31 0.41 0.43 0.53 0.89 
Russia 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 
Slovak Republic 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.22 0.35 0.89 0.96 0.97 
Slovenia 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.18 0.32 
Ukraine  0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.11 
Latin America         
Argentina  0.35 0.49 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.47 0.38 
Brazil  0.17 0.22 0.26 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.31 
Chile  0.22 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.42 0.37 
Colombia  0.23 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.11 
Ecuador     0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04 
Mexico 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.70 0.75 0.69 
Peru  0.38 0.42 0.62 0.60 0.68 0.63 0.60 
Uruguay  0.32 0.33 0.36 0.50 0.58 0.87  
Venezuela  0.45 0.43 0.41 0.48 0.45 0.39 0.40 
Asia         
China 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hong Kong SAR  0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.91 
India 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Indonesia 0.08 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.18 0.29 
Korea  0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.30 
Macau SAR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Malaysia 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.29 0.37 0.38 0.39 
Pakistan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Philippines 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Singapore  0.06 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.19 0.05 0.04 
Thailand  0.02 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 
Notes: Foreign bank is defined as the domestically-based bank with 50% or more assets owned 
by foreign individual(s) or foreign firm(s) or international institution(s).  
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data available in BvDEP BankScope CD-ROM 
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Table 1. 2 Claims on BIS Reporting Banks 
 
Notes: 1: BIS reporting banks' cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in foreign 
currencies. 2: BIS reporting banks' local claims in local currencies 
Source: BIS 
 
 International Claims1 Local Claims2 
 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005
Eastern & Central Europe          
Bulgaria 1.3 1.4 2.1 5.6 9.2 0.4 0.1 0.8 2.6 3.3 
Croatia 3.8 7.3 11.7 19.3 28.1 0.002 0.9 6.6 10.8 18.2
Czech Republic 12.2 11.4 14.1 19.9 29 5.8 15.4 28.2 55.8 65.4
Hungary 16.1 16.9 23.5 47.5 56.6 5.1 7.9 12.8 22.4 26.1
Poland 14.4 22.2 32.7 45.4 64.5 7.8 27.8 44.5 63 60.5
Romania 3.1 3.1 4.8 13.2 22.2 0.3 0.6 1.4 3.9 9.7 
Russia 58.6 39.6 37.5 61.5 96.9 0.4 0.9 2 5.6 7.8 
Slovak Republic 4.8 3.8 5.2 10 13.7 0.7 1.6 8.4 14.3 26.4
Slovenia 2.5 3.7 5.6 9.5 15.4  0.02 1.2 2.1 2.5 
Ukraine 1.3 0.8 1.1 3.9 9.4 0.052 0.06 0.3 0.3 3.2 
Latin America           
Argentina 61.5 68.8 28.1 18.7 15.4 21.4 23.3 11.5 12.5 12.2
Bolivia 2 1.3 1.4  0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2  0.2 
Brazil 73.3 67.7 53.2 53.6 60.2 62.5 72.1 50.2 66.4 100.3
Chile 22.2 22.3 20.8 20.5 21.3 17.2 27.6 22.3 31.1 36.3
Colombia 17.1 11.6 9.3 8 8.4 5 5.4 4.4 6.6 8.6 
Ecuador 3.7 1.6 1.4 1.8 2.1 0.2 0.06 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Mexico 65 63.7 65.7 64.6 69.1 20.5 80.4 149.8 166.4 195.1
Peru 10.6 13.2 10.5 10 11 1.4 3.1 2.6 3.5 3.7 
Uruguay 5.5 4.9 3.2 3 3.2 1.6 1.7 0.9 0.9 1.1 
Venezuela 12.6 13.2 13.1 10.7 12.6 5.5 10 5.3 9.4 11.5
Asia            
China 58.2 58.3 43.7 80.6 94.5 1.2 3.4 5.7 10.6 20.1
Hong Kong SAR 131.4 110 81.9 108.3 118.2 138.4 165.2 166 191.6 192.2
India 19.3 22.2 17.6 42.6 55.7 10.6 16.8 21.4 29.4 37.2
Indonesia 44.8 40.2 28.2 30.7 33.1 2.9 4.5 5.3 7.1 11.4
Korea 65.3 58.8 60.9 81.4 89.9 10.7 18.1 25.8 79.5 131.3
Macau SAR 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.9 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.9 
Malaysia 20.8 20.8 20.3 33.2 34.1 6.6 29 31 40.5 44.5
Pakistan 5 4.1 2.3 2 1.9 2.3 3 3.5 3.8 3.8 
Philippines 16.2 16.5 16 19.8 20.9 3.5 5.3 4.9 4.7 5.7 
Singapore 125.1 100.1 85.5 103.1 108.3 26.5 32.4 44.3 54.5 57.5
Taiwan, China 21 18.1 17.9 43.9 42.6 12.8 16.2 23.3 34.9 35.9
Thailand 40.7 26.7 17.5 19.5 21.3 10.4 16.6 17.9 21.4 22.1
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Table 1. 3 Ratio of Local to International Claims and Domestic Bank Credit 
 Local claims1/International Claims2 Local claims/Domestic Bank Credit3 
 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005
 in percentages 
East & Central Europe           
Bulgaria 31 7 38 46 35 19 4 20 27 30 
Croatia  12 56 55 64 0 10 42 43 67 
Czech Republic 48 135 200 280 225 14 53 81 99  
Hungary 32 46 54 47 46 17 31 31 33 40 
Poland 54 125 136 138 93 14 47 61 61 61 
Romania 10 19 29 29 43 4 13 23 31 55 
Russia 1 2 5 9 8 0.7 1 2 3 5 
Slovak Republic 15 42 161 143 192 5 14 59 69 1 
Slovenia  0.5 21 22 16  0.2 10 10 11 
Ukraine 4 7 27 7 34 0.7 0.8 2 1 11 
Latin America           
Argentina 35 33 40 66 79 22 24 19 18 18 
Bolivia 20 38 14  40 8 11 5  5 
Brazil 85 106 94 123 166 12 17 16 12 13 
Chile 77 123 107 151 170 33 53 46 43 43 
Colombia 29 46 47 82 102 17 23 19 19 20 
Ecuador 5 3 7 11 9 20 30 50 100 66 
Mexico 31 126 228 257 282 13 45 81 88 93 
Peru 13 23 24 35 33 11 22 19 28 28 
Uruguay 29 34 28 30 34 15 16 10 11 15 
Venezuela 43 75 40 87 91 37 66 46 83 66 
Asia           
China 2 5 13 13 21 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4  
Hong Kong SAR 105 150 202 176 162 56 71 71 78 75 
India 55 75 121 69 66 5 7 7 6 7 
Indonesia 6 11 18 23 34 4 5 5 5 8 
Korea 16 30 42 97 146 3 4 4 11 16 
Macau SAR 7 69 13 16 31 2.2 34 12 75  
Malaysia 31 139 152 121 130 7 29 28 29 28 
Pakistan 46 73 152 190 200 7 10 12 9 7 
Philippines 21 32 30 23 27 7 12 11 10 12 
Singapore 21 32 51 52 53 36 44 63 64 73 
Taiwan, China 60 89 130 79 84      
Thailand 25 62 102 109 103 6 13 14 13 14 
 
Notes: 1: BIS reporting banks' local claims in local currencies. 2: Reporting banks' cross-border 
claims in all currencies and local claims in foreign currencies. 3: IFS domestic credit adjusted for the 
end-period exchange rate. Domestic credit is the credit provided by banks in the local markets.  
Source: BIS, IFS, and author’s calculation. 
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Table 1. 4 Simulation Parameters 
Benchmark Parameter  
p 0.2 
λ  3.65 
α  0.75 
φ  0.65 
σ  0.4 
ρ  1.85 
ε  0.01 
*i  0.04 
δ  0.08 
 
Domestic Bank Dominance 
Scenario 
Foreign Bank Dominance 
Scenario 
A 0.025 0.025 
B 0.05 0.05 
C 0.07 0.03 
D 0.15 0.06 
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Table 2. 1 Number of Domestic and Foreign Banks in Dataset 
Country  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
East & Central Europe 
D 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Albania 
F 0 1 0 4 5 5 5 5 
D 5 5 4 8 7 9 7 6 
Belarus 
F 0 1 0 2 3 4 6 5 
D 7 11 11 7 8 5 7 8 
Bulgaria 
F 1 4 6 10 13 13 14 13 
D 31 37 29 24 20 19 16 14 
Croatia 
F 1 3 4 7 14 15 16 14 
D 10 10 9 8 7 5 5 6 
Czech 
F 9 10 10 13 15 15 15 14 
D 8 9 3 2 2 2 3 3 
Estonia 
F 0 0 1 2 3 3 3 2 
D 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 
Hungary 
F 17 22 19 22 22 18 18 17 
D 16 19 15 17 15 15 14 14 
Latvia 
F 0 3 3 4 4 4 5 6 
D 7 9 10 9 6 5 4 4 
Lithuania 
F 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 5 
D 7 7 7 8 7 7 7 7 
Macedonia 
F 1 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 
D 5 6 5 8 9 9 9 7 
Moldova 
F 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
D 24 25 16 12 8 4 4 4 
Poland 
F 11 12 19 22 29 29 28 27 
D 2 5 10 11 10 10 8 4 
Romania 
F 2 2 8 9 11 12 13 14 
D 11 11 9 8 6 4 2 1 
Slovak 
F 7 7 7 6 8 8 11 10 
D 21 21 16 16 15 11 8 7 
Slovenia 
F 3 3 2 2 2 3 4 4 
D 9 16 18 24 26 26 23 17 
Ukraine 
F 1 3 3 4 5 7 7 7 
Latin America 
D 44 53 51 45 38 38 38 32 
Argentina 
F 16 22 28 29 29 29 21 19 
D 2 9 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Bolivia 
F 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
D 63 77 69 62 57 64 60 46 
Brazil 
F 33 36 46 49 48 46 43 29 
D 1 13 13 12 12 12 11 11 
Chile 
F 8 16 15 14 13 12 11 11 
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D 8 20 17 15 17 17 19 19 
Colombia 
F 5 10 9 8 8 7 7 7 
D 0 3 3 2 18 18 19 19 
Ecuador 
F 0 2 2 2 4 3 3 3 
D 17 17 17 18 16 15 13 12 
Mexico 
F 16 13 17 16 16 13 16 12 
D 2 5 9 8 8 6 6 5 
Paraguay 
F 3 8 14 14 14 13 11 9 
D 8 13 12 7 8 5 5 5 
Peru 
F 3 10 11 10 10 10 10 9 
D 3 6 7 6 7 6 1 2 
Uruguay 
F 7 10 12 12 26 25 23 21 
D 5 17 17 31 24 24 23 21 
Venezuela 
F 1 6 6 12 13 9 8 6 
Asia 
D 9 10 11 12 10 7 8 7 
Hong Kong 
F 20 25 25 24 26 26 26 24 
D 57 59 60 61 59 55 54 49 
India 
F 1 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 
D 36 36 25 34 31 30 31 24 
Indonesia 
F 19 17 15 20 20 19 17 16 
D 18 28 18 17 15 15 15 12 
Korea 
F 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 4 
D 20 20 20 17 12 11 10 9 
Malaysia 
F 10 10 11 11 12 14 14 13 
D 9 12 9 9 9 6 4 4 
Singapore 
F 4 4 6 5 8 7 7 6 
D 17 20 20 17 16 20 25 26 
Philippines 
F 5 6 6 9 7 5 7 6 
D 6 11 10 8 8 9 10 10 
Thailand 
F 0 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 
          
D 492 622 559 552 519 497 476 421 
OVERALL 
F 207 278 318 359 407 397 392 354 
 T 699 900 877 911 926 894 868 775 
 
Notes: Only commercial banks are covered in our dataset. The numbers of banks are summarized after the 
removal of outliers. “D” represents domestic banks, and “F” foreign banks. “T” means “total”. 
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Table 2. 2 Monetary Policy Indicators 
Country Indicator of Monetary Policy Country Indicator of Monetary Policy 
Albania Treasury Bill Rate Latvia Treasury Bill Rate 
Argentina Money Market Rate Lithuania Treasury Bill Rate 
Australia Money Market Rate Luxemburg Money Market Rate 
Austria Money Market Rate Macedonia Discount Rate 
Belarus Discount Rate Macau Money Market Rate 
Bahrain Treasury Bill Rate Malaysia Treasury Bill Rate 
Belgium Treasury Bill Rate Maldives Money Market Rate 
Bolivia Treasury Bill Rate Mexico Treasury Bill Rate 
Brazil Treasury Bill Rate Moldova Treasury Bill Rate 
Bulgaria Treasury Bill Rate Netherlands Money Market Rate 
Canada Treasury Bill Rate Paraguay Money Market Rate 
Chile Discount Rate Peru Money Market Rate 
China Money Market Rate Philippines Treasury Bill Rate 
Colombia Money Market Rate Poland Money Market Rate 
Croatia Money Market Rate Portugal Money Market Rate 
Czech Treasury Bill Rate Romania Treasury Bill Rate 
Cyprus Money Market Rate Russia Money Market Rate 
Denmark Money Market Rate Saudi Arabia Deposit Rate 
Ecuador Discount Rate Singapore Treasury Bill Rate 
Estonia Money Market Rate Slovak Money Market Rate 
Finland Money Market Rate Slovenia Money Market Rate 
France Treasury Bill Rate South Africa Treasury Bill Rate 
Germany Treasury Bill Rate Spain Treasury Bill Rate 
Greece Treasury Bill Rate Sweden Treasury Bill Rate 
Hong Kong Money Market Rate Switzerland Treasury Bill Rate 
Hungary Treasury Bill Rate Taiwan Money Market Rate 
India Money Market Rate Thailand Money Market Rate 
Indonesia Money Market Rate Turkey Money Market Rate 
Ireland Money Market Rate UK Treasury Bill Rate 
Israel Treasury Bill Rate Ukraine Money Market Rate 
Italy Treasury Bill Rate Uruguay Money Market Rate 
Japan Money Market Rate US Treasury Bill Rate 
Korea Money Market Rate Venezuela Money Market Rate 
Kuwait Money Market Rate   
 
Notes: (1) India’s money market rate, to be exact, the weighted average call money market rate, is extracted 
from its central bank’s website. (3) Slovakia’s money market rate is author’s own calculation based on the average 
3 month Bratislava Interbank Offered Rates. (4) Taiwan’s money market rate is from its central bank website, since 
it is not available from IFS. (5) Saudi Arabia’s monetary indicator is deposit rate, since it is the only rate available 
from IFS. Source: IFS and some central banks’ websites. 
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Table 2. 3 Descriptive statistics: domestic vs. foreign banks 
 Domestic Banks Foreign Banks 
 obs Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max obs Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max 
 OVERALL 
Loans/Total Assets 4138 47.24 19.07 48.32 0 97.77 2712 48.52 22.15 48.76 0 99.98 
Liquid Assets/ Total Assets 4137 35.22 20.04 32.85 0.16 99.76 2710 37.27 20.81 35.39 0 100 
Total Earning Assets/ Total Assets 4138 85.38 10.61 88.34 9.72 100 2712 86.48 12.18 90.18 0.20 100 
Total Non Earning Assets/ Total Assets 4136 10.27 8.68 7.81 0 74.00 2712 10.69 11.30 6.87 0 98.69 
Deposit/Total Assets 4138 69.71 20.23 75.93 0 98.51 2712 65.22 24.64 74.21 0 98.87 
Equity/Total Assets 4138 14.45 12.73 10.74 0 99.52 2703 16.72 15.38 11.74 1.00 99.68 
Non Interest Expenses/Average Assets 4078 8.28 14.77 5.72 0.15 666.02 2678 6.63 7.37 4.86 0 123.53 
Interest Rate of Loans 4092 16.41 17.73 11.74 0.18 434.97 2697 18.60 31.73 10.73 0 500 
Interest Rate of Deposits 4072 11.50 17.99 7.54 0 447.65 2685 16.40 35.26 7.03 0 461.31 
Interest Rate Spread 4072 4.94 14.83 3.59 -327.53 229.25 2685 2.22 20.86 3.00 -368.13 260 
Growth Rate of Total Assets 3260 11.55 29.78 8.23 -94.61 193.13 2274 10.90 35.20 7.10 -92.25 195.51 
Growth Rate of Loans 3248 13.46 42.88 8.39 -100 294.93 2266 13.06 49.27 6.63 -100 298.85 
Growth Rate of Deposits 3252 13.29 36.65 8.45 -100 235.85 2267 12.76 48.16 6.81 -100 295.97 
Growth Rate of Loan Interest Rate 3220 6.16 90.20 -5.14 -97.90 2585.74 2259 9.96 74.14 -6.13 -97.98 1148.99
Growth Rate of Deposit Interest Rate 3198 20.60 357.18 -5.67 -100 14816.1 2242 21.51 164.40 -8.83 -100 5590.63
Net Interest Margin 4095 7.10 8.34 4.8 -72.31 104.21 2697 5.97 6.38 4.43 -34.54 127.34 
Return on Average Assets 4115 1.06 4.49 1.04 -70.3 62.24 2704 0.75 5.33 1 -111.13 68.6 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
 Domestic Banks Foreign Banks 
 obs Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max obs Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max 
 East & Central Europe 
Loans/Total Assets 1191 43.86 17.41 45.13 0 84.21 912 45.43 18.37 44.82 0 98.01 
Liquid Assets/ Total Assets 1191 40.00 18.46 37.56 4.66 96.39 912 43.60 18.48 42.33 0.34 99.11 
Total Earning Assets/ Total Assets 1191 83.62 10.56 86.56 26.04 98.43 912 90.01 6.86 91.70 29.41 99.66 
Total Non Earning Assets/ Total Assets 1189 9.34 7.67 7.20 0 54.65 912 6.55 4.95 5.20 0 35.13 
Deposit/Total Assets 1191 72.19 16.65 76.07 2.35 98.51 912 76.12 14.74 80.22 0 96.08 
Equity/Total Assets 1191 17.65 13.42 13.78 0 95.24 912 14.31 11.61 10.62 1.16 98.12 
Non Interest Expenses/Average Assets 1157 9.67 23.42 7.21 0.15 666.02 903 5.95 6.78 4.64 0.07 123.53 
Interest Rate of Loans 1166 13.46 9.30 11.02 1.06 98.22 908 10.78 17.27 8.30 0.77 500 
Interest Rate of Deposits 1163 7.94 7.94 5.87 0 127.55 905 7.90 16.76 5.16 0.52 318.15 
Interest Rate Spread 1163 5.55 7.48 4.72 -121.53 65.35 905 2.88 16.54 3.14 -307.95 260 
Growth Rate of Total Assets 910 17.04 33.72 12.12 -94.61 188.62 782 19.69 34.17 13.20 -86.35 195.51 
Growth Rate of Loans 907 26.11 52.92 17.02 -100 294.93 780 28.55 48.82 20.64 -100 298.85 
Growth Rate of Deposits 910 21.10 45.84 13.23 -94.74 235.85 781 22.70 44.80 14.05 -100 295.97 
Growth Rate of Loan Interest Rate 890 1.36 84.76 -10.13 -86.39 1942.11 777 -3.37 37.23 -8.95 -78.85 550.73 
Growth Rate of Deposit Interest Rate 883 26.36 518.27 -10.03 -93.30 14816.1 773 -0.32 71.45 -12.42 -86.59 1399.15
Net Interest Margin 1169 7.22 6.01 5.76 -19.35 73.01 908 4.96 3.44 4.09 -5.26 28.54 
Return on Average Assets 1178 1.34 4.10 1.21 -33.59 35.1 908 1.07 3.64 1.1 -35.19 65.62 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
 Domestic Banks Foreign Banks 
 obs Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max obs Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max 
 Latin America 
Loans/Total Assets 1620 47.31 21.29 50.11 0 95.65 1214 47.59 24.07 48.27 0 99.69 
Liquid Assets/ Total Assets 1619 31.40 20.94 26.57 0.34 99.76 1214 34.76 21.73 31.12 0.16 100 
Total Earning Assets/ Total Assets 1620 82.86 11.09 85.31 25.17 100 1214 81.35 14.53 84.91 8.24 100 
Total Non Earning Assets/ Total Assets 1620 13.23 9.86 10.62 0 74.00 1214 15.62 13.70 11.85 0 88.67 
Deposit/Total Assets 1620 62.11 23.41 68.75 0 97.10 1214 55.70 28.21 64.33 0 96.68 
Equity/Total Assets 1620 16.18 13.72 11.94 0.09 99.52 1214 19.01 18.20 12.45 1.43 99.68 
Non Interest Expenses/Average Assets 1610 10.97 11.25 8.59 0.16 201.92 1209 8.53 8.45 6.42 0 93.51 
Interest Rate of Loans 1612 23.33 24.41 18.80 0.18 434.97 1211 29.13 42.38 17.50 0.23 448.29 
Interest Rate of Deposits 1605 16.61 26.13 11.05 0 447.65 1202 26.65 47.99 12.52 0 461.31 
Interest Rate Spread 1605 6.76 21.57 5.79 -327.53 229.25 1202 2.60 26.35 3.94 -368.13 172.97 
Growth Rate of Total Assets 1270 7.79 31.14 5.44 -90.46 193.13 1004 6.15 36.82 3.56 -92.25 195.49 
Growth Rate of Loans 1262 5.90 41.72 2.15 -100 273.68 998 4.09 49.92 -1.14 -100 292.83 
Growth Rate of Deposits 1263 8.18 35.87 5.27 -100 221.14 998 6.18 51.71 2.13 -100 252.22 
Growth Rate of Loan Interest Rate 1262 14.26 96.34 -1.84 -97.90 2136.47 1000 26.37 100.28 2.00 -97.40 1148.99 
Growth Rate of Deposit Interest Rate 1254 32.07 354.18 -3.70 -100 11716.4 987 50.64 231.52 2.56 -100 5590.63 
Net Interest Margin 1612 10.23 10.42 7.33 -14.43 104.21 1211 7.70 7.74 5.79 -34.54 80.48 
Return on Average Assets 1612 1.30 5.80 1.21 -70.3 62.24 1212 0.27 6.51 0.8 -111.13 39.76 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
 Domestic Banks Foreign Banks 
 obs Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max obs Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max 
 Asia 
Loans/Total Assets 1327 50.17 17.05 49.26 0 97.77 586 55.23 22.00 56.95 0 99.98 
Liquid Assets/ Total Assets 1327 35.59 19.32 36.21 0.16 99.27 584 32.60 19.95 28.75 0 96.30 
Total Earning Assets/ Total Assets 1327 90.03 8.28 91.88 9.72 99.93 586 91.61 8.71 94.19 0.20 99.98 
Total Non Earning Assets/ Total Assets 1327 7.48 6.64 5.87 0.03 70.95 586 6.92 8.54 4.29 0.02 98.69 
Deposit/Total Assets 1327 76.76 15.24 80.93 0 94.86 586 67.99 21.09 74.22 0 98.87 
Equity/Total Assets 1327 9.48 8.75 6.64 0.09 98.85 577 15.69 13.32 12.27 1.00 97.34 
Non Interest Expenses/Average Assets 1311 3.75 2.78 3.27 0.15 38.29 566 3.66 3.76 2.42 0.02 35.26 
Interest Rate of Loans 1314 10.54 8.40 9.55 0.18 205.58 578 8.84 6.72 7.99 0 128.33 
Interest Rate of Deposits 1304 8.40 7.87 7.02 0.11 152.25 578 8.42 12.37 5.77 0 140.32 
Interest Rate Spread 1304 2.17 7.26 2.39 -141.04 158.98 578 0.42 12.11 2.01 -129.69 123.62 
Growth Rate of Total Assets 1080 11.36 23.20 8.24 -85.59 189.94 488 6.59 30.52 2.66 -64.44 152.39 
Growth Rate of Loans 1079 11.67 30.74 9.16 -99.52 283.26 488 6.63 42.28 0.97 -100 226.58 
Growth Rate of Deposits 1079 12.68 26.29 8.50 -97.46 220.66 488 10.32 43.01 3.85 -100 281.48 
Growth Rate of Loan Interest Rate 1068 0.60 86.37 -4.48 -90.17 2585.74 482 -2.57 41.02 -10.89 -97.98 276.80 
Growth Rate of Deposit Interest Rate 1061 2.23 111.64 -5.36 -98.64 2823.92 482 -3.11 68.88 -15.89 -96.37 802.67 
Net Interest Margin 1314 3.15 4.90 3.15 -72.31 51.04 578 3.95 5.84 3.16 -2.6 127.34 
Return on Average Assets 1325 0.50 2.48 0.82 -34.17 13.69 584 1.27 4.72 1.25 -23.02 68.6 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
 Private Domestic Banks Government-owned Domestic Banks 
 obs Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max obs Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max 
 OVERALL 
Loans/Total Assets 3237 48.06 19.35 50.35 0 97.72 901 44.26 17.74 43.43 0 97.77 
Liquid Assets/ Total Assets 3237 34.07 20.00 30.96 0.16 99.76 900 39.37 19.62 42.50 0.68 95.64 
Total Earning Assets/ Total Assets 3237 84.56 11.06 87.56 9.72 100 901 88.31 8.16 90.53 31.45 99.37 
Total Non Earning Assets/ Total Assets 3235 10.79 9.04 8.26 0 74.00 901 8.39 6.92 6.34 0.14 67.03 
Deposit/Total Assets 3237 68.44 20.39 74.78 0 97.70 901 74.25 18.96 80.04 0 98.51 
Equity/Total Assets 3237 15.82 13.06 11.89 0 99.52 901 9.53 10.04 6.35 0.09 97.16 
Non Interest Expenses/Average Assets 3203 8.70 15.88 6.17 -7.17 666.02 889 6.59 9.51 4.22 -12.99 219.84 
Interest Rate of Loans 3202 17.55 19.38 12.68 0.18 434.97 890 12.32 8.53 9.91 0.18 106.32 
Interest Rate of Deposits 3189 11.63 17.71 7.73 0 447.65 883 11.04 18.99 7.23 0.11 333.33 
Interest Rate Spread 3189 5.95 13.55 4.13 -327.53 229.25 883 1.32 18.31 2.79 -325.00 35.16 
Growth Rate of Total Assets 2535 12.02 30.94 8.42 -90.46 193.13 725 9.94 25.27 7.83 -94.61 159.94 
Growth Rate of Loans 2526 13.74 44.50 7.78 -100 294.93 722 12.49 36.68 9.70 -91.91 274.00 
Growth Rate of Deposits 2529 14.26 38.04 8.93 -100 235.85 723 9.92 31.12 7.61 -100 220.66 
Growth Rate of Loan Interest Rate 2505 6.68 83.92 -5.21 -97.90 2136.47 715 4.35 109.42 -4.84 -82.89 2585.74 
Growth Rate of Deposit Interest Rate 2490 18.85 318.20 -5.70 -100 14816.1 708 26.73 469.45 -5.58 -98.64 11716.4 
Net Interest Margin 3205 7.78 9.00 5.36 -72.31 104.21 890 4.66 4.60 3.62 -15.82 45.25 
Return on Average Assets 3219 1.26 4.43 1.14 -67.76 62.24 896 0.32 4.59 0.75 -70.3 35.1 
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Table 2. 4 Descriptive Statistics: t-tests 
Variable Domestic ≠ Foreign Domestic < Foreign Domestic > Foreign Domestic σ/μ Foreign σ/μ 
Loans/Total Assets 0.0108 0.0054 0.9946 0.4038 0.4565 
Liquid Assets/ Total Assets 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.5690 0.5584 
Total Earning Assets/ Total Assets 0.0001 0.0000 1.0000 0.1243 0.1408 
Total Non Earning Assets/ Total Assets 0.0818 0.0409 0.9591 0.8452 1.0571 
Deposit/Total Assets 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2901 0.3778 
Equity/Total Assets 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.8810 0.9199 
Non Interest Expenses/Average Assets 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.7934 1.1279 
Interest Rate of Loans 0.0003 0.0001 0.9999 1.0804 1.7059 
Interest Rate of Deposits 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.5643 2.1494 
Interest Rate Spread 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 3.0020 9.3964 
Growth Rate of Total Assets 0.4571 0.7715 0.2285 2.5784 3.2294 
Growth Rate of Loans 0.7495 0.6253 0.3747 3.1763 3.7726 
Growth Rate of Deposits 0.6435 0.6782 0.3218 2.7577 3.7743 
Growth Rate of Loan Interest Rate 0.0993 0.0496 0.9504 14.6429 7.4438 
Growth Rate of Deposit Interest Rate 0.9098 0.4549 0.5451 17.3383 7.6430 
Net Interest Margin 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.1746 1.0687 
Return on Average Assets 0.0108 0.9946 0.0054 4.2358 7.1067 
 
Notes: Domestic ≠ Foreign: p-value of two-sided t-test on equality of mean. H1: μ(domestic banks) ≠ μ(foreign banks). 
           Domestic < Foreign: p-value of one-sided t-test on equality of mean. H1: μ(domestic banks) < μ(foreign banks). 
           Domestic > Foreign: p-value of one-sided t-test on equality of mean. H1: μ(domestic banks) > μ(foreign banks). 
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Table 2.4 (Continued) 
Variable Private ≠ State Private<State  Private >State 
Loans/Total Assets 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Liquid Assets/ Total Assets 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Total Earning Assets/ Total Assets 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Total Non Earning Assets/ Total Assets 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Deposit/Total Assets 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Equity/Total Assets 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Non Interest Expenses/Average Assets 0.0002 0.9999 0.0001 
Interest Rate of Loans 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Interest Rate of Deposits 0.3822 0.8089 0.1911 
Interest Rate Spread 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Growth Rate of Total Assets 0.0979 0.9511 0.0489 
Growth Rate of Loans 0.4902 0.7549 0.2451 
Growth Rate of Deposits 0.0051 0.9975 0.0025 
Growth Rate of Loan Interest Rate 0.5431 0.7285 0.2715 
Growth Rate of Deposit Interest Rate 0.6045 0.3023 0.6977 
Net Interest Margin 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Return on Average Assets 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes: Private ≠ State: p-value of two-sided t-test on equality of mean. H1: μ(domestic private banks) ≠ μ(domestic state-owned banks). 
           Private < (>) State: p-value of one-sided t-test on equality of mean. H1: μ(domestic private banks) < (>) μ(domestic state-owned banks). 
p-value equal to or smaller than 5% (**), 10% (*). 
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Table 2. 5 Correlation among Selected Variables 
All Banks 
 Loans/TA Liquidity/TA Deposit/TA Equity/TA Loan Rate Deposit Rate Growth Rate 
of Loans 
Growth Rate 
of Deposits 
Growth Rate 
of Loan Rate
Growth Rate of 
Deposit Rate 
Monetary 
Policy 
Loans/TA 1.0000           
Liquidity/ TA -0.7818** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000          
Deposit/TA 0.2654**
(0.0000) 
-0.1533** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000         
Equity/TA -0.1532** 
(0.0000) 
0.0404** 
(0.0008) 
-0.5498** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000        
Loan Rate 0.0035 
(0.7740) 
-0.0591** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0953** 
(0.0000) 
0.1185** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000       
Deposit Rate -0.0157 
(0.1975) 
-0.0070 
(0.5671) 
-0.2587** 
(0.0000) 
0.1663** 
(0.0000) 
0.7638** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000      
Growth Rate of 
Loans 
0.1528**
(0.0000) 
-0.0493** 
(0.0002) 
0.0754** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0817** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1407** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1308** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Growth Rate of 
Deposits 
0.0555**
(0.0000) 
0.0173 
(0.1995) 
0.1635** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1323** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1144** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1589** 
(0.0000) 
0.5186** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Growth Rate of 
Loan Rate 
0.0071 
(0.5995) 
-0.0270** 
(0.0457) 
-0.0841** 
(0.0000) 
0.0448** 
(0.0009) 
0.3824** 
(0.0000) 
0.3043** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0611** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0956** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Growth Rate of 
Deposit Rate 
-0.0368** 
(0.0066) 
0.0184 
(0.1750) 
-0.1433** 
(0.0000) 
0.1863** 
(0.0000) 
0.1213** 
(0.0000) 
0.2379** 
(0.0000) 
0.0194 
(0.1528) 
-0.1096** 
(0.0000) 
0.2398** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
Monetary 
Policy  
-0.1178** 
(0.0000) 
0.0921** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1744** 
(0.0000) 
0.1271** 
(0.0000) 
0.3979** 
(0.0000) 
0.3438** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1194** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0854** 
(0.0000) 
0.2288** 
(0.0000) 
0.0812** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000 
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Table 2.5 (Continued) 
Domestic Banks 
 Loans/TA Liquidity/TA Deposit/TA Equity/TA Loan Rate Deposit Rate Growth Rate 
of Loans 
Growth Rate 
of Deposits 
Growth Rate 
of Loan Rate
Growth Rate of 
Deposit Rate 
Monetary 
Policy 
Loans/TA 1.0000           
Liquidity/ TA -0.7640** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000          
Deposit/TA 0.2130** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1071** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000         
Equity/TA -0.1237** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0088 
(0.5707) 
-0.5750** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000        
Loan Rate -0.0341** 
(0.0294) 
-0.0598** 
(0.0001) 
-0.1414** 
(0.0000) 
0.1800** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000       
Deposit Rate -0.0547** 
(0.0005) 
0.0087 
(0.5775) 
-0.3059** 
(0.0000) 
0.2060** 
(0.0000) 
0.6559** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000      
Growth Rate of 
Loans 
0.1052** 
(0.0000) 
0.0047 
(0.7899) 
0.0551** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0495** 
(0.0048) 
-0.1077** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0903** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Growth Rate of 
Deposits 
0.0168 
(0.3369) 
0.0468** 
(0.0075) 
0.1448** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0909** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0730** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1323** 
(0.0000) 
0.5030** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Growth Rate of 
Loan Rate 
0.0077 
(0.6628) 
-0.0314* 
(0.0753) 
-0.0770** 
(0.0000) 
0.0439** 
(0.0127) 
0.1946** 
(0.0000) 
0.1491** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0425** 
(0.0160) 
-0.0869** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Growth Rate of 
Deposit Rate 
-0.0385** 
(0.0293) 
0.0214 
(0.2271) 
-0.1420** 
(0.0000) 
0.2118** 
(0.0000) 
0.0434** 
(0.0141) 
0.1919** 
(0.0000) 
0.0611** 
(0.0006) 
-0.1016** 
(0.0000) 
0.1773** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
Monetary 
Policy  
-0.1621** 
(0.0000) 
0.1187** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1883** 
(0.0000) 
0.1707** 
(0.0000) 
0.3500** 
(0.0000) 
0.2708** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1713** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1381** 
(0.0000) 
0.1155** 
(0.0000) 
0.0348** 
(0.0491) 
1.0000 
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Table 2.5 (Continued) 
Foreign Banks 
 Loans/TA Liquidity/TA Deposit/TA Equity/TA Loan Rate Deposit Rate Growth Rate 
of Loans 
Growth Rate 
of Deposits 
Growth Rate 
of Loan Rate
Growth Rate of 
Deposit Rate 
Monetary 
Policy 
Loans/TA 1.0000           
Liquidity/ TA -0.8132** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000          
Deposit/TA 0.3316** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2014** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000         
Equity/TA -0.1915** 
(0.0000) 
0.0921** 
(0.0000) 
-0.5165** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000        
Loan Rate 0.0289 
(0.1337) 
-0.0671** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0595** 
(0.0020) 
0.0737** 
(0.0001) 
1.0000       
Deposit Rate 0.0048 
(0.8050) 
-0.0278 
(0.1500) 
-0.2294** 
(0.0000) 
0.1390** 
(0.0000) 
0.8112** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000      
Growth Rate of 
Loans 
0.2046** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1148** 
(0.0000) 
0.0962** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1148** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1695** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1648** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Growth Rate of 
Deposits 
0.0926** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0132 
(0.5292) 
0.1809** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1694** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1414** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1792** 
(0.0000) 
0.5354** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Growth Rate of 
Loan Rate 
0.0044 
(0.8330) 
-0.0230 
(0.2744) 
-0.0934** 
(0.0000) 
0.0440** 
(0.0370) 
0.6214** 
(0.0000) 
0.4947** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0909** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1128** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Growth Rate of 
Deposit Rate 
-0.0443** 
(0.0359) 
0.0137 
(0.5171) 
-0.1974** 
(0.0000) 
0.1780** 
(0.0000) 
0.3311** 
(0.0000) 
0.4771** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0874** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1723** 
(0.0000) 
0.5055** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
Monetary 
Policy  
-0.0645** 
(0.0008)
0.0546** 
(0.0046) 
-0.1582** 
(0.0000)
0.0747** 
(0.0001)
0.4591** 
(0.0000)
0.4241** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0634** 
(0.0026)
-0.0356 
(0.0914)
0.4056** 
(0.0000)
0.2313** 
(0.0000)
1.0000 
Notes: p-value in parenthesis. 5% significance (**) 10% significance (*) 
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Table 2. 6 Effects of Monetary Policy on Growth of Loans and Deposits 
Dependent Variable: gr(loans) 
(ALL ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
gr(loans)_1 .1856*** (.0258) 
.1960*** 
(.0259) 
.1608*** 
(.0263) 
.1953*** 
(.0260) 
.1609*** 
(.0265) 
gr(loans)_2 .0431 (.0263) 
.0456* 
(.0258) 
.0280 
(.0278) 
.0475* 
(.0261) 
.0289 
(.0281) 
Δmp -.5748*** (.1566) 
-.5185*** 
(.1553) 
-.5465*** 
(.1636) 
-.8266* 
(.4375) 
-.8790* 
(.4510) 
Δmp_1 -.7728*** (.1415) 
-.7200*** 
(.1391) 
-.7492*** 
(.1486) 
-.9832** 
(.3927) 
-1.1785*** 
(.4351) 
foreign -2.4449 (1.5478) 
-3.8481** 
(1.5849) 
-3.3719* 
(1.7237) 
-3.9901** 
(1.6094) 
-3.4723** 
(1.7219) 
state .9900 (1.5625) 
-.3621 
(1.6754) 
-.0254 
(1.7238) 
-.7330 
(1.7204) 
-.3398 
(1.7940) 
foreign*Δmp .5019*** (.1955) 
.4544** 
(.1910) 
.4017** 
(.1915) 
.4943** 
(.2277) 
.4208* 
(.2237) 
foreign*Δmp_1 .2904 (.1836) 
.3109* 
(.1833) 
.2190 
(.1972) 
.3228 
(.2013) 
.2572 
(.2100) 
state *Δmp 1.3928*** (.2554) 
1.3146*** 
(.2522) 
1.3071*** 
(.2438) 
1.1663*** 
(.3154) 
1.1945*** 
(.2900) 
state *Δmp_1 .9746*** (.2369) 
.9338*** 
(.2168) 
.9977*** 
(.2177) 
.7911*** 
(.2518) 
.8751*** 
(.2427) 
liquidity_1  .2441*** (.0488) 
.2260*** 
(.0654) 
.2484*** 
(.0519) 
.2333*** 
(.0676) 
capitalization_1  .1117 (.1079) 
.0879 
(.1192) 
.1296 
(.1230) 
.1010 
(.1338) 
bank size_1  .0149 (.0817) 
-.1272 
(.1034) 
.0675 
(.0999) 
-.0898 
(.1225) 
efficiency_1  .0149 (.0817) 
-.1190 
(.1022) 
-.1198 
(.0910) 
-.1285 
(.1061) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp    .0027 (.0058) 
.0038 
(.0060) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp_1    -.0012 (.0044) 
.0028 
(.0048) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    .0083 (.0148) 
.0080 
(.0148) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    .0099 (.0132) 
.0096 
(.0132) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    .0213* (.0124) 
.0190 
(.0140) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    .0198*** (.0067) 
.0218*** 
(.0070) 
efficiency_1*Δmp    .0025 (.0042) 
.0008 
(.0043) 
efficiency_1*Δmp_1    .0078 (.0055) 
.0051 
(.0057) 
gr(gdp) 1.1375*** (.2181) 
1.0201*** 
(.2222) 
.6928** 
(.2856) 
.9978*** 
(.2273) 
.6430** 
(.2860) 
inflation -.2501*** (.0446) 
-.2311*** 
(.0501) 
-.3084*** 
(.0643) 
-.2282*** 
(.0462) 
-.3092*** 
(.0645) 
depreciation .0261 (.0349) 
.0143 
(.0335) 
.0289 
(.0362) 
.0072 
(.0298) 
.0235 
(.0320) 
constant 5.4502*** (1.2661) 
-3.1285 
(2.4961) 
24.1907 
(15.4620) 
-3.5421 
(2.8533) 
23.5689 
(15.6018) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
Obs (num of banks) 3024 (905) 3006 (904) 3006 (904) 3006 (904) 3006 (904) 
R2 0.1158 0.1334 0.1647 0.1366 0.1673 
  
124
Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: gr(loans) 
(East & Central Europe ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
gr(loans)_1 .2555*** (.0400) 
.2584*** 
(.0414) 
.2225*** 
(.0422) 
.2693*** 
(.0408) 
.2334*** 
(.0415) 
gr(loans)_2 .0182 (.0448) 
.0115 
(.0425) 
.0029 
(.0461) 
.0123 
(.0418) 
.0001 
(.0442) 
Δmp -.5272* (.3108) 
-.3393 
(.3357) 
-.5358 
(.4213) 
-2.7817** 
(1.1389) 
-2.9779*** 
(1.1245) 
Δmp_1 -.2337 (.2417) 
-.0512 
(.2461) 
-.1776 
(.2346) 
-1.0851 
(.7263) 
-1.0633 
(.7577) 
foreign 2.2345 (3.1604) 
5.3590* 
(3.0663) 
9.1679** 
(3.6670) 
5.1260* 
(3.0691) 
10.2805*** 
(3.7898) 
state -.4780 (3.1889) 
1.7847 
(2.9882) 
4.8813 
(3.3242) 
-.6587 
(3.4195) 
2.6911 
(3.8010) 
foreign*Δmp .1211 (.5728) 
.3066 
(.6134) 
.0819 
(.5805) 
.3654 
(.5730) 
.1432 
(.5042) 
foreign*Δmp_1 .5560** (.2923) 
.4702 
(.2966) 
.5349* 
(.2894) 
.5390* 
(.3150) 
.6316* 
(.3381) 
state *Δmp 1.1522*** (.3762) 
1.1005*** 
(.3443) 
.7466* 
(.4474) 
.2362 
(.5553) 
-.2914 
(.5773) 
state *Δmp_1 .3932 (.3016) 
.2348 
(.2957) 
.2899 
(.2542) 
.0140 
(.3299) 
.1157 
(.3107) 
liquidity_1  .1957** (.0850) 
.2099** 
(.0903) 
.2662*** 
(.0910) 
.2669*** 
(.0975) 
capitalization_1  .3691* (.2121) 
.3923 
(.2404) 
.5152** 
(.2289) 
.6677** 
(.2655) 
bank size_1  -.2348 (.1039) 
-.1729 
(.1399) 
-.1585 
(.1381) 
-.1997 
(.1706) 
efficiency_1  .6100* (.3680) 
.5974 
(.4151) 
.8623** 
(.4167) 
.8952* 
(.4681) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp    .0186 (.0173) 
.0098 
(.0156) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp_1    .0114 (.0084) 
.0093 
(.0085) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    .0501* (.0271) 
.0703** 
(.0285) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    .0101 (.0146) 
.0136 
(.0144) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    .0241* (.0139) 
-.0002 
(.0164) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    .0128* (.0075) 
.0048 
(.0078) 
efficiency_1*Δmp    .0569 (.0404) 
.0572 
(.0412) 
efficiency_1*Δmp_1    .0243 (.0201) 
.0110 
(.0204) 
gr(gdp) 2.3544*** (.4984) 
2.5724*** 
(.4913) 
2.0207*** 
(.5548) 
2.4572*** 
(.5080) 
2.0827*** 
(.5531) 
inflation -.1089 (.0767) 
-.1187 
(.0775) 
-.0485 
(.1155) 
.0065 
(.1028) 
.2589 
(.1672) 
depreciation -.1901* (.1001) 
-.2065** 
(.0980) 
-.0828 
(.2000) 
-.3018*** 
(.1140) 
-.3734 
(.2388) 
constant 3.1661 (2.8508) 
-14.8040** 
(5.8079) 
2.8600 
(17.4076) 
-22.9205*** 
(6.4791) 
-8.1916 
(18.5836) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
Obs (num of banks) 903 (269) 900 (269) 900 (269) 900 (269) 900 (269) 
R2 0.1636 0.1866 0.2243 0.1994 0.2407 
  
125
Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: gr(loans) 
(Latin America ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
gr(loans)_1 .1255*** (.0458) 
.1353*** 
(.0446) 
.1274*** 
(.0449) 
.1351*** 
(.0445) 
.1277*** 
(.0451) 
gr(loans)_2 .0659 (.0483) 
.0702 
(.0466) 
.0661 
(.0487) 
.0686 
(.0468) 
.0650 
(.0490) 
Δmp -.6274*** (.2345) 
-.5896** 
(.2268) 
-.7185*** 
(.2356) 
-.9838* 
(.5833) 
-1.0560* 
(.5984) 
Δmp_1 -.6822** (.2880) 
-.6743** 
(.2914) 
-.6361* 
(.3419) 
-1.1572 
(.7140) 
-1.1953 
(.7724) 
foreign -6.8364***(2.5247) 
-8.6567*** 
(2.6485) 
-8.7396*** 
(2.7094) 
-9.0445*** 
(2.6405) 
-9.1672*** 
(2.6925) 
state -1.6620 (3.5941) 
-3.2933 
(4.0478) 
-3.3676 
(4.2133) 
-3.5754 
(4.3110) 
-3.7752 
(4.4134) 
foreign*Δmp .5709** (.2528) 
.5484** 
(.2461) 
.5572** 
(.2524) 
.5221* 
(.2797) 
.5020* 
(.2742) 
foreign*Δmp_1 .3445 (.3111) 
.3859 
(.3189) 
.2085 
(.3579) 
.2596 
(.3074) 
.0797 
(.3355) 
state *Δmp 1.5994*** (.3299) 
1.6046*** 
(.2999) 
1.4775*** 
(.3541) 
1.4817*** 
(.3678) 
1.3897*** 
(.4151) 
state *Δmp_1 .2063 (.7506) 
.2064 
(.7071) 
.3401 
(.7379) 
-.0598 
(.7453) 
.0922 
(.7766) 
liquidity_1  .2335** (.0987) 
.2620** 
(.1235) 
.2423** 
(.1005) 
.2614** 
(.1245) 
capitalization_1  .0985 (.1681) 
.0847 
(.1740) 
.1022 
(.1669) 
.0866 
(.1698) 
bank size_1  -.1627 (.2262) 
-.3608* 
(.2151) 
-.0177 
(.2395) 
-.2478 
(.2383) 
efficiency_1  -.1891* (.1105) 
-.1396 
(.1170) 
-.2088* 
(.1186) 
-.1598 
(.1267) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp    .0057 (.0085) 
.0072 
(.0089) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp_1    .0022 (.0110) 
.0066 
(.0114) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    .0091 (.0214) 
.0079 
(.0217) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    .0126 (.0256) 
.0114 
(.0263) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    .0348 (.0312) 
.0264 
(.0325) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    .0805* (.0458) 
.0800* 
(.0470) 
efficiency_1*Δmp    .0019 (.0047) 
-.0001 
(.0051) 
efficiency_1*Δmp_1    .0099 (.0063) 
.0071 
(.0067) 
gr(gdp) .5043 (.3720) 
.3673 
(.3851) 
.1547 
(.5170) 
.4270 
(.3825) 
.3020 
(.5356) 
inflation -.2524 (.1666) 
-.1037 
(.1869) 
-.5504** 
(.2721) 
-.0970 
(.1913) 
-.4890* 
(.2934) 
depreciation .0259 (.0420) 
-.0042 
(.0411) 
.0468 
(.0499) 
-.0034 
(.0398) 
.0383 
(.0481) 
constant 5.1683** (2.1906) 
-1.3402 
(4.7204) 
-3.8301 
(7.5074) 
-1.6452 
(4.7158) 
-3.7183 
(7.4098) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
Obs (num of banks) 1204 (395) 1203 (394) 1203 (394) 1203 (394) 1203 (394) 
R2 0.0726 0.0901 0.1059 0.0947 0.1103 
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Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: gr(loans) 
(Asia ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
gr(loans)_1 .1463*** (.0439) 
.1505*** 
(.0471) 
.1628*** 
(.0486) 
.1592*** 
(.0486) 
.1709*** 
(.0509) 
gr(loans)_2 -.0254 (.0373) 
-.0168 
(.0377) 
-.0421 
(.0374) 
-.0226 
(.0392) 
-.0460 
(.0392) 
Δmp -.8313** (.3638) 
-.8842** 
(.3622) 
-.8644** 
(.4040) 
-.4479 
(.6647) 
-.4014 
(.6776) 
Δmp_1 -1.5859***(.2684) 
-1.4565*** 
(.2648) 
-1.0607*** 
(.4009) 
-1.4352** 
(.6583) 
-1.1432* 
(.6697) 
foreign -7.4528** (2.8650) 
-6.8768** 
(2.8854) 
-4.3326 
(3.0793) 
-6.9709** 
(2.9510) 
-4.5553 
(3.1318) 
state 6.4136** (2.6650) 
3.7261 
(2.6875) 
2.1794 
(2.9499) 
3.1161 
(2.7307) 
1.5983 
(3.0569) 
foreign*Δmp .0020 (.4456) 
-.0953 
(.4286) 
-.1013 
(.4345) 
-.4794 
(.4631) 
-.4419 
(.4578) 
foreign*Δmp_1 -.2854 (.3762) 
-.2823 
(.3728) 
-.2673 
(.3776) 
-.2731 
(.4385) 
-.2750 
(.4359) 
state *Δmp 2.2961** (.9351) 
1.8896** 
(.9487) 
2.4345** 
(1.0047) 
1.5661 
(1.0344) 
1.9172* 
(1.0874) 
state *Δmp_1 3.2436*** (.8584) 
2.7679*** 
(.8579) 
2.6703*** 
(.8750) 
2.6406*** 
(.9504) 
2.6169*** 
(.9737) 
liquidity_1  .1512** (.0673) 
.2118** 
(.1016) 
.1264 
(.0771) 
.1797 
(.1130) 
capitalization_1  -.2402** (.1144) 
-.2266* 
(.1235) 
-.2840** 
(.1260) 
-.2570* 
(.1403) 
bank size_1  -.1890 (.1852) 
-.0762 
(.2252) 
-.0727 
(.2154) 
.0619 
(.2797) 
efficiency_1  -.7248 (.5741) 
-.7401 
(.6207) 
-.1009 
(.6342) 
-.2303 
(.7111) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp    -.0107 (.0102) 
-.0105 
(.0104) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp_1    -.0021 (.0093) 
-.0014 
(.0094) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    -.0256 (.0273) 
-.0213 
(.0277) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    .0050 (.0234) 
.0062 
(.0240) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    .0582 (.0716) 
.1148 
(.0889) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    .0600 (.0649) 
.0391 
(.0584) 
efficiency_1*Δmp    .0755 (.0514) 
.0614 
(.0510) 
efficiency_1*Δmp_1    .0263 (.0402) 
.0268 
(.0407) 
gr(gdp) .0723 (.3673) 
-.0013 
(.3964) 
-.4853 
(.6735) 
.0624 
(.4075) 
-.4544 
(.6934) 
inflation -.0932 (.2908) 
-.2858 
(.3110) 
-2.4130** 
(.9574) 
-.2874 
(.3096) 
-2.2940** 
(.9784) 
depreciation -.5335*** (.1836) 
-.4396** 
(.1943) 
-.4404 
(.3723) 
-.4190** 
(.1979) 
-.4241 
(.3860) 
constant 9.0597*** (2.3806) 
10.0327** 
(4.0497) 
-1.9799 
(7.0064) 
9.1268** 
(4.5568) 
-1.6555 
(7.3841) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
Obs (num of banks) 917 (241) 903 (241) 903 (241) 903 (241) 903 (241) 
R2 0.1756 0.1993 0.2205 0.2061 0.2261 
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Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: gr(deposits) 
(ALL ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
gr(deposits)_1 .0623** (.0271) 
.0720*** 
(.0271) 
.0360 
(.0272) 
.0689** 
(.0271) 
.0340 
(.0271) 
gr(deposits)_2 .0624*** (.0226) 
.0669*** 
(.0227) 
.0336 
(.0229) 
.0673*** 
(.0226) 
.0356 
(.0228) 
Δmp -.4897*** (.1409) 
-.4552*** 
(.1407) 
-.5679*** 
(.1552) 
-.5141* 
(.2629) 
-.6250** 
(.2671) 
Δmp_1 -.4134** (.2058) 
-.4238** 
(.1986) 
-.5062** 
(.2142) 
-.0895 
(.2422) 
-.4044* 
(.2452) 
foreign -4.2409*** (1.4651) 
-3.8374** 
(1.5157) 
-2.9986* 
(1.5895) 
-4.4054*** 
(1.5187) 
-3.5402** 
(1.5831) 
state -2.1101 (1.5745) 
.5366 
(1.6646) 
.7810 
(1.7013) 
.0514 
(1.6427) 
.3403 
(1.7123) 
foreign*Δmp .3679** (.1628) 
.3652** 
(.1610) 
.3862** 
(.1669) 
.2963* 
(.1685) 
.2930* 
(.1704) 
foreign*Δmp_1 .0501 (.2139) 
.0556 
(.2082) 
.0591 
(.2149) 
-.1123 
(.1576) 
-.0614 
(.1624) 
state *Δmp .7392*** (.1809) 
.7561*** 
(.1805) 
.7171*** 
(.1905) 
.6288*** 
(.2040) 
.6270*** 
(.2175) 
state *Δmp_1 .7579*** (.2530) 
.7710*** 
(.2516) 
.8438*** 
(.2481) 
.6621*** 
(.2090) 
.7067*** 
(.2274) 
liquidity_1  -.1018*** (.0388) 
-.1938*** 
(.0499) 
-.0937** 
(.0404) 
-.1787*** 
(.0511) 
capitalization_1  .2945*** (.0975) 
.2547** 
(.1055) 
.2804*** 
(.0991) 
.2421** 
(.1071) 
bank size_1  -.0485 (.0734) 
-.1847** 
(.0920) 
.0554 
(.0832) 
-.1048 
(.1091) 
efficiency_1  -.0445 (.0928) 
-.0680 
(.1009) 
-.0600 
(.0997) 
-.0896 
(.1082) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp    .0049 (.0040) 
.0052 
(.0041) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp_1    .0008 (.0031) 
.0057* 
(.0033) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    -.0120* (.0069) 
-.0119* 
(.0069) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    -.0276*** (.0093) 
-.0262*** 
(.0087) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    .0299** (.0117) 
.0241* 
(.0144) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    .0141* (.0073) 
.0156* 
(.0083) 
efficiency_1*Δmp    .0069 (.0066) 
.0051 
(.0055) 
efficiency_1*Δmp_1    .0149* (.0088) 
.0131 
(.0082) 
gr(gdp) 1.0134*** (.2311) 
1.0739*** 
(.2322) 
.6939** 
(.2870) 
1.1268*** 
(.2249) 
.7150** 
(.2839) 
inflation -.2138*** (.0527) 
-.2206*** 
(.0554) 
-.2406*** 
(.0600) 
-.2267*** 
(.0571) 
-.2641*** 
(.0606) 
depreciation .0926*** (.0303) 
.0840*** 
(.0306) 
.1227*** 
(.0317) 
.0983*** 
(.0314) 
.1434*** 
(.0331) 
constant 8.2289*** (1.3528) 
7.5872*** 
(2.3673) 
28.9164*** 
(7.3212) 
7.4842*** 
(2.4775) 
29.1467*** 
(7.3766) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
Obs (num of banks) 3024 (903) 3006 (902) 3006 (902) 3006 (902) 3006 (902) 
R2 0.0448 0.0555 0.1074 0.0657 0.1165 
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Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: gr(deposits) 
(East & Central Europe ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
gr(deposits)_1 .0899** (.0447) 
.0966** 
(.0457) 
.0676 
(.0491) 
.1023** 
(.0447) 
.0773 
(.0479) 
gr(deposits)_2 .0338 (.0377) 
.0258 
(.0360) 
.0003 
(.0372) 
.0288 
(.0369) 
.0032 
(.0372) 
Δmp -.0594 (.2867) 
.1137 
(.3321) 
.0265 
(.4368) 
-1.6547 
(1.0725) 
-1.7265 
(1.1559) 
Δmp_1 -.6516 (.5983) 
-.4818 
(.5631) 
-.6275 
(.6068) 
.4244 
(.6912) 
.7151 
(.7418) 
foreign -2.2842 (2.9990) 
1.9823 
(3.4463) 
7.1443* 
(3.9945) 
1.2037 
(3.2643) 
7.0488* 
(3.7369) 
state -2.7905 (4.2223) 
.7175 
(4.0914) 
5.1509 
(4.1794) 
.5694 
(3.9328) 
5.8054 
(4.0384) 
foreign*Δmp -.1519 (.4578) 
-.0596 
(.4672) 
-.3017 
(.4644) 
-.1864 
(.5208) 
-.4618 
(.5022) 
foreign*Δmp_1 .7967 (.5957) 
.6300 
(.5524) 
.7365 
(.5831) 
.2425 
(.3365) 
.2910 
(.3481) 
state *Δmp .2683 (.3500) 
.1202 
(.3734) 
-.3885 
(.4702) 
.4359 
(.5683) 
-.2213 
(.5786) 
state *Δmp_1 1.0212* (.6188) 
.7862 
(.5913) 
.8391 
(.6127) 
.5352 
(.3895) 
.5944 
(.3937) 
liquidity_1  -.2251** (.0910) 
-.2451** 
(.1016) 
-.1755* 
(.1007) 
-.2009* 
(.1122) 
capitalization_1  .7532*** (.2188) 
.7235*** 
(.2490) 
.6938*** 
(.2134) 
.7261*** 
(.2461) 
bank size_1  -.3395*** (.1221) 
-.3166* 
(.1777) 
-.3377** 
(.1462) 
-.4512** 
(.1848) 
efficiency_1  -.2157 (.4239) 
-.4112 
(.4863) 
-.0105 
(.4853) 
-.2328 
(.5559) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp    .0298** (.0135) 
.0262* 
(.0137) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp_1    -.0027 (.0079) 
-.0064 
(.0086) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    .0229 (.0305) 
.0386 
(.0353) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    -.0386*** (.0139) 
-.0405*** 
(.0134) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    .0157 (.0174) 
-.0164 
(.0187) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    .0030 (.0096) 
-.0090 
(.0102) 
efficiency_1*Δmp    .0078 (.0505) 
.0124 
(.0459) 
efficiency_1*Δmp_1    .0234 (.0193) 
.0077 
(.0207) 
gr(gdp) 2.2658*** (.5225) 
2.4088*** 
(.5231) 
1.5104** 
(.6014) 
2.6297*** 
(.4924) 
1.7379*** 
(.5617) 
inflation -.4877*** (.0695) 
-.4515*** 
(.0721) 
-.3907*** 
(.1035) 
-.4038*** 
(.0815) 
-.2723* 
(.1635) 
depreciation .2904*** (.0966) 
.2297** 
(.1010) 
.3959** 
(.1961) 
.1828 
(.1127) 
.2749 
(.2428) 
constant 11.6446 (3.0986) 
10.1852 
(7.2164) 
21.0662* 
(11.4920) 
6.9125 
(8.1755) 
16.0184 
(12.1412) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
Obs (num of banks) 905 (269) 902 (269) 902 (269) 902 (269) 902 (269) 
R2 0.0893 0.1344 0.1715 0.1525 0.1916 
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Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: gr(deposits) 
(Latin America ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
gr(deposits)_1 .0069 (.0414) 
.0121 
(.0419) 
-.0024 
(.0420) 
.0072 
(.0420) 
-.0075 
(.0417) 
gr(deposits)_2 .0376 (.0354) 
.0427 
(.0353) 
.0379 
(.0364) 
.0469 
(.0348) 
.0423 
(.0358) 
Δmp -.6849*** (.2067) 
-.7130*** 
(.2083) 
-.8969*** 
(.2170) 
-.7449** 
(.3293) 
-.9311*** 
(.3362) 
Δmp_1 -.4601* (.2745) 
-.5196* 
(.2739) 
-.8662*** 
(.2923) 
-.4185 
(.3857) 
-.8309** 
(.4132) 
foreign -6.2554*** (2.3534) 
-5.6471** 
(2.4532) 
-5.9987** 
(2.5326) 
-6.2955** 
(2.4348) 
-6.6726*** 
(2.5353) 
state -5.1373* (2.8832) 
-2.1359 
(3.0879) 
-1.2667 
(3.2301) 
-2.9327 
(3.0387) 
-2.0005 
(3.0408) 
foreign*Δmp .5659*** (.2150) 
.6046*** 
(.2127) 
.6310*** 
(.2073) 
.4869** 
(.2375) 
.4887** 
(.2293) 
foreign*Δmp_1 .1271 (.2811) 
.1778 
(.2817) 
.2740 
(.2978) 
.0428 
(.2706) 
.1313 
(.2916) 
state *Δmp 1.0879*** (.2297) 
1.1175*** 
(.2313) 
.9465*** 
(.2566) 
.9392*** 
(.2646) 
.7280** 
(.2874) 
state *Δmp_1 .9844 (.6287) 
1.0479 
(.6442) 
.9633 
(.6319) 
.7793 
(.6559) 
.6905 
(.6349) 
liquidity_1  -.1536** (.0666) 
-.1969** 
(.0825) 
-.1524** 
(.0682) 
-.1978** 
(.0854) 
capitalization_1  .1628 (.1423) 
.1298 
(.1456) 
.2020 
(.1493) 
.1661 
(.1533) 
bank size_1  -.1741 (.2015) 
-.2965 
(.1987) 
-.1210 
(.2082) 
-.2554 
(.2145) 
efficiency_1  -.0571 (.1121) 
-.0785 
(.1098) 
-.0757 
(.1254) 
-.0963 
(.1197) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp    .0040 (.0057) 
.0054 
(.0058) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp_1    .0065 (.0083) 
.0102 
(.0088) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    -.0107 (.0083) 
-.0117 
(.0086) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    -.0248** (.0117) 
-.0248** 
(.0121) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    .0246 (.0290) 
.0265 
(.0289) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    .0238 (.0332) 
.0271 
(.0338) 
efficiency_1*Δmp    .0042 (.0058) 
.0034 
(.0050) 
efficiency_1*Δmp_1    .0095 (.0083) 
.0085 
(.0076) 
gr(gdp) -.1147 (.3561) 
-.0908 
(.3644) 
-.1670 
(.4931) 
-.1653 
(.3751) 
-.2817 
(.5135) 
inflation .2018 (.2557) 
.1477 
(.2597) 
-.2561 
(.3522) 
.1447 
(.2688) 
-.3010 
(.3638) 
depreciation .0308 (.0390) 
.0382 
(.0404) 
.0926* 
(.0513) 
.0492 
(.0421) 
.1045 
(.0540) 
constant 5.3013** (2.3216) 
8.2931** 
(3.9082) 
16.1135*** 
(6.1272) 
8.0013* 
(4.0845) 
15.7640** 
(6.2520) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
Obs (num of banks) 1203 (393) 1202 (392) 1202 (392) 1202 (392) 1202 (392) 
R2 0.0269 0.0356 0.0551 0.0428 0.0628 
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Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: gr(deposits) 
(Asia ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
gr(deposits)_1 .0545 (.0466) 
.0586 
(.0488) 
.0593 
(.0509) 
.0696 
(.0439) 
.0693 
(.0463) 
gr(deposits)_2 .0473 (.0438) 
.0438 
(.0447) 
.0266 
(.0455) 
.0428 
(.0439) 
.0254 
(.0446) 
Δmp -.4654** (.2073) 
-.4744** 
(.2101) 
-.5547** 
(.2460) 
.3445 
(.8072) 
.2839 
(.7965) 
Δmp_1 -.2141 (.1737) 
-.2846 
(.1759) 
-.5520* 
(.3346) 
-.5915 
(.4623) 
-.8862* 
(.5226) 
foreign -7.3007***(2.5911) 
-7.7265*** 
(2.6849) 
-6.9285** 
(2.7891) 
-7.1295*** 
(2.6724) 
-6.4801** 
(2.8074) 
state .5925 (1.9826) 
1.8628 
(2.0736) 
-.3966 
(2.2995) 
.8141 
(2.1379) 
-1.0382 
(2.3740) 
foreign*Δmp -.3928 (.3888) 
-.3948 
(.3944) 
-.3254 
(.3957) 
-.4764 
(.5401) 
-.4649 
(.5411) 
foreign*Δmp_1 -.7496*** (.2533) 
-.7557*** 
(.2523) 
-.7131*** 
(.2536) 
-.5855** 
(.2866) 
-.5590* 
(.2867) 
state *Δmp .9841 (.8193) 
1.1972 
(.7927) 
.9632 
(.7962) 
.5941 
(.9092) 
.2942 
(.8896) 
state *Δmp_1 .9785** (.4916) 
1.1226** 
(.4998) 
.9177* 
(.5249) 
1.0105* 
(.5543) 
.9062 
(.5729) 
liquidity_1  -.0591 (.0564) 
-.1443* 
(.0795) 
-.0464 
(.0627) 
-.1320 
(.0850) 
capitalization_1  .0954 (.1328) 
.1740 
(.1423) 
-.1017 
(.1580) 
-.0315 
(.1810) 
bank size_1  -.1876 (.1385) 
.1258 
(.1883) 
-.1418 
(.1441) 
.1614 
(.2407) 
efficiency_1  .1488 (.4178) 
.3696 
(.4319) 
.1690 
(.5412) 
.4241 
(.5573) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp    .0054 (.0108) 
.0026 
(.0110) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp_1    .0044 (.0060) 
.0048 
(.0059) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    -.0886** (.0432) 
-.0839* 
(.0439) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    -.0113 (.0145) 
-.0107 
(.0145) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    .0228 (.0605) 
.0871 
(.0692) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    .0581 (.0448) 
.0223 
(.0463) 
efficiency_1*Δmp    .0061 (.0526) 
.0139 
(.0540) 
efficiency_1*Δmp_1    .0332 (.0401) 
.0348 
(.0406) 
gr(gdp) .6818 (.4247) 
.6550 
(.4234) 
.4788 
(.5894) 
.7064* 
(.4090) 
.5066 
(.5539) 
inflation -.4408* (.2443) 
-.4296 
(.2676) 
-.2856 
(.7680) 
-.5004* 
(.2654) 
-.4065 
(.8061) 
depreciation .1656 (.1416) 
.0938 
(.1464) 
-.0540 
(.3539) 
.1077 
(.1453) 
-.0742 
(.3265) 
constant 7.9562*** (2.6736) 
9.0508** 
(4.0974) 
10.0668* 
(5.5330) 
10.3264** 
(4.5411) 
11.4104* 
(5.8208) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
Obs (num of banks) 916 (241) 902 (241) 902 (241) 902 (241) 902 (241) 
R2 0.0853 0.0883 0.1131 0.1116 0.1347 
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Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: gr(liquidity) 
 (1) 
ALL 
(2) 
ALL 
(3) 
ECE 
(4) 
LA 
(5) 
ASIA 
gr(liquidity)_1 -.0686** (.0323) 
-.0777** 
(.0385) 
-.0637** 
(.0300) 
-.1192* 
(.0707) 
-.0108 
(.0150) 
Δmp .2303 (.9644) 
.3264 
(1.0394) 
.3557 
(1.0261) 
-.0113 
(2.0263) 
.5463 
(1.2417) 
Δmp_1 1.4710 (.9218) 
1.3786 
(.9815) 
1.6702*** 
(.5755) 
1.6222 
(2.1144) 
-1.2110 
(1.6509) 
foreign -3.4182 (7.3826) 
-.9882 
(7.5368) 
5.4543 
(4.7673) 
2.2282 
(14.4028) 
-4.6255 
(4.9625) 
state -.0524 (4.7323) 
3.5754 
(4.6407) 
1.0197 
(4.7276) 
16.4274 
(13.1651) 
7.0073 
(5.8168) 
foreign*Δmp -.1883 (.9076) 
-.0801 
(.9576) 
-.1545 
(.4832) 
-.2554 
(1.5889) 
-.5112 
(.4446) 
foreign*Δmp_1 -1.2224** (.4886) 
-1.0358** 
(.4326) 
-.5229** 
(.2622) 
-2.3805* 
(1.2993) 
-.5665 
(.5499) 
state *Δmp -.0911 (.7704) 
.0222 
(.8010) 
-.1723 
(.3703) 
.5748 
(1.5612) 
-.9223 
(1.0869) 
state *Δmp_1 -.2288 (.6383) 
-.1164 
(.6057) 
-.1194 
(.2662) 
-1.1058 
(1.4619) 
3.3254 
(2.8240) 
liquidity_1 -1.5192*** (.2756) 
-1.7141*** 
(.2777) 
-.8260*** 
(.1178) 
-2.5748*** 
(.5905) 
-.8687*** 
(.1582) 
capitalization_1 1.2125 (.8760) 
1.2743 
(.9543) 
.0487 
(.2016) 
1.5546 
(1.2783) 
.1649 
(.2505) 
bank size_1 -1.4292*** (.4698) 
-1.3193*** 
(.4726) 
-.7592*** 
(.2858) 
-3.6075*** 
(1.3015) 
-.2731 
(.4942) 
efficiency_1 -.3527 (.4977) 
-.8334 
(.6813) 
-1.0049** 
(.4577) 
-1.3247 
(.8064) 
.6379 
(1.5726) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp -.0272 (.0288) 
-.0303 
(.0293) 
.0046 
(.0121) 
-.0539 
(.0703) 
-.0187 
(.0149) 
liquidity_1 * Δmp_1 -.0348** (.0148) 
-.0332** 
(.0134) 
-.0081 
(.0066) 
-.0708 
(.0589) 
-.0249 
(.0152) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp .0828 (.0904) 
.0838 
(.0896) 
-.0126 
(.0187) 
.1627 
(.1509) 
.0242 
(.0369) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1 .0609 (.0642) 
.0603 
(.0628) 
-.0385*** 
(.0085) 
.1664 
(.1438) 
.0532 
(.0408) 
bank size_1 * Δmp -.0411 (.0513) 
-.0506 
(.0511) 
-.0125 
(.0222) 
.0154 
(.0822) 
.0209 
(.1210) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1 -.0559** (.0250) 
-.0556** 
(.0227) 
-.0289*** 
(.0098) 
-.2065 
(.1674) 
.0508 
(.1923) 
efficiency_1*Δmp -.0086 (.0111) 
-.0140 
(.0133) 
-.0197** 
(.0100) 
-.0226 
(.0521) 
-.1131 
(.0954) 
efficiency_1*Δmp_1 .0101 (.0193) 
.0079 
(.0188) 
.0076 
(.0170) 
-.0088 
(.0480) 
-.0794 
(.0723) 
gr(gdp) .5023 (.8471) 
1.3720 
(1.1359) 
1.7225*** 
(.7008) 
2.8919 
(2.8217) 
-.7720 
(1.3460) 
inflation .2233 (.2818) 
-.0220 
(.3310) 
-.5460*** 
(.0961) 
.9319 
(1.3537) 
4.7915** 
(1.9558) 
depreciation .0490 (.1191) 
.0939 
(.1353) 
.3973*** 
(.1474) 
-.0838 
(.3535) 
-1.1607 
(.9515) 
constant 67.9893*** (10.9425) 
118.6203***
(22.2976) 
77.0232*** 
(12.6328) 
131.0896*** 
(40.6271) 
57.3290*** 
(14.24) 
country effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
year effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (num of banks) 3969 (1043) 3969 (1043) 1181 (311) 1644 (463) 1144 (269) 
R2 0.0404 0.0551 0.1594 0.0672 0.1270 
 
Note: Heterogeneity robust standard error in parenthesis, allowing for serial correlation in cluster (bank). 
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Table 2. 7 Long-run Effects of Monetary Policy on Growth of Loans and 
Deposits 
 
Dependent variable: gr(loans) 
 OVERALL OVERALL ECE LA ASIA 
 (4) (5) (5) (5) (5) 
(Long-run multiplier)      
ΔMPjt -1.7375*** 
(0.3967) 
-1.7497*** 
(0.4168) 
-2.0536** 
(0.8113) 
-1.4946** 
(0.6272) 
-1.7427** 
(0.8182) 
foreign*ΔMPjt 1.0793** 
(0.4992) 
0.8368* 
(0.4691) 
1.0112 
(0.8624) 
0.7209 
(0.6390) 
-0.8193 
(0.9359) 
ΔMPjt on foreign banks -0.6582** 
(0.3120) 
-0.9129** 
(0.3240) 
-1.0424 
(0.6649) 
-0.7737 
(0.5460) 
-2.5620*** 
(0.9655) 
Country effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Dependent variable: gr(deposits) 
 OVERALL OVERALL ECE LA ASIA 
 (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
(Long-run multiplier)      
ΔMPjt -1.0210*** 
(0.3367) 
-1.1547*** 
(0.3464) 
-0.6448 
(0.9703) 
-1.8281*** 
(0.4475) 
-1.2109** 
(0.5205) 
foreign*ΔMPjt 0.4889 
(0.3627) 
0.4787 
(0.3495) 
0.4664 
(0.8817) 
0.9384** 
(0.4396) 
-1.1363* 
(0.5877) 
ΔMPjt on foreign banks -0.5321** 
(0.2154) 
-0.6760*** 
(0.2295) 
-0.1784 
(0.4696) 
-0.8897*** 
(0.3258) 
-2.3472*** 
(0.6940) 
Country effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: gr(loans) 
 OVERALL OVERALL ECE LA ASIA 
 (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
(Long-run multiplier)      
ΔMPjt -1.6333*** 
(0.3286) 
-1.5977*** 
(0.3366) 
-.9214 
(0.7229) 
-1.6799*** 
(0.5894) 
-2.1894** 
(0.8727) 
foreign*ΔMPjt 1.0092** 
(0.4297) 
0.7653* 
(0.4691) 
0.7965 
(0.9241) 
0.9496 
(0.6328) 
-0.4192 
(0.8876) 
ΔMPjt on foreign banks -0.6241* 
(0.3356) 
-0.8324** 
(0.3508) 
-0.1249 
(0.7232) 
-0.7303* 
(0.4197) 
-2.6086*** 
(0.8884) 
Country effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.7 (Continued) 
Dependent variable: gr(deposits) 
 OVERALL OVERALL ECE LA ASIA 
 (4) (5) (5) (5) (5) 
(Long-run multiplier)      
ΔMPjt -0.7867** 
(0.2677) 
-1.0051*** 
(0.2792) 
-0.2103 
(0.6449) 
-1.6829*** 
(0.4678) 
-1.0447 
(0.6575) 
foreign*ΔMPjt 0.2130 
(0.3127) 
0.2489 
(0.2993) 
-0.1857 
(0.6431) 
0.6423 
(0.4563) 
-1.1310 
(0.7357) 
ΔMPjt on foreign banks -0.5737*** 
(0.2197) 
-0.7562*** 
(0.2267) 
-0.3960 
(0.4839) 
-1.0406*** 
(0.3883) 
-2.1757*** 
(0.7958) 
Country effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: ECE represents “Eastern & Central Europe”, LA “Latin America” and ASIA “Asia”. Standard errors 
that are calculated by delta method are in parenthesis. The number in the second row indicates the specification in 
Table 2.6. 
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Table 2. 8 The Impact and Long-run Effects of Monetary Policy on Banks in Asia 
(without Indonesia) 
Dependent variable: gr(loans)  
(Asian countries without Indonesia) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δmp -1.3813 
(1.1114) 
-1.8511 
(1.2148) 
-1.3428 
(1.0437) 
-.4153 
(1.8708) 
.4132 
(1.9840) 
Δmp_1 -.5063 
(.4425) 
-.6495 
.4209 
-.4252 
(.6280) 
-1.7624 
(1.2956) 
-1.2133 
(1.3190) 
foreign*Δmp 2.9811* 
(1.5859) 
3.1301** 
(1.5631) 
2.7257 * 
(1.4775) 
3.0684** 
(1.4507) 
2.5548** 
(1.2662) 
foreign*Δmp_1 -1.0614 
(1.1670) 
.0802 
(.9297) 
-.1485 
(.9332) 
-.0602 
(.8838) 
-.4105 
(.9685) 
obs (banks) 766 (194) 754 (194) 754 (194) 754 (194) 754 (194) 
R2 0.0637 0.0836 0.1069 0.1058 0.1283 
 
Note: Based on specification (4) and (5), the calculated impact effects, -1.7378 and -1.5367, are very 
similar to that based on specification (1)-(3). 
 
Dependent variable: gr(loans) 
Asian countries without Indonesia 
 (3) (5) 
(long-run multiplier)   
ΔMP -1.9901* 
(1.2034) 
-2.1212 
(1.3703) 
foreign*ΔMP 2.9008 
(2.1532) 
2.3960 
(1.8016) 
ΔMP on foreign banks 0.9106 
(1.5011) 
0.2748 
(1.4259) 
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Table 2.8 (Continued) 
Dependent variable: gr(deposits)  
(Asian countries without Indonesia) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δmp -.9834 
(.8416) 
-.7216 
(.8755) 
-.9030 
(.9002) 
2.1479 
(1.7758) 
1.2950 
(1.7855) 
Δmp_1 .3124 
(.4127) 
.3829 
(.4474) 
-.1640 
(.4983) 
.2022 
(1.2642) 
-.5325 
(1.2458) 
foreign*Δmp .4195 
(1.3824) 
.3274 
(1.3946) 
.6816 
(1.3398) 
1.0335 
(1.2059) 
1.4877 
(1.1838) 
foreign*Δmp_1 -.0228 
(.8339) 
-.2049 
(.9581) 
-.0145 
(.9558) 
-.8363 
(.9202) 
-.6596 
(.9519) 
obs (banks) 765 (194) 753 (194) 753 (194) 753 (194) 753 (194) 
R2 0.0812 0.1171 0.0629 0.1196 0.1511 
 
Notes: Based on specification (4) and (5), the calculated impact effects of ΔMP are -.4377 and -.6142, 
similar to that based on specification (1)-(3). 
 
Dependent variable: gr(deposits) 
Asian countries without Indonesia 
 (3) (5) 
(long-run multiplier)   
ΔMP -1.1896 
(1.1847) 
-1.0285 
(1.1977) 
foreign*ΔMP 0.7436 
(1.7740) 
0.9168 
(1.7506) 
ΔMP on foreign banks -0.4460 
(1.3704) 
-0.1117 
(1.2300) 
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Table 2. 9 Effects of Monetary Policy on Interest Rates 
Dependent Variable: d(loan rate)  
(ALL) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δmp .3409*** (.0435) 
.3773*** 
(.0489) 
.4404*** 
(.0525) 
.9316*** 
(.2475) 
.9484*** 
(.2457) 
Δmp_1  .0839** (.0348) 
.1115*** 
(.0368) 
.1718*** 
(.0576) 
.5884*** 
(.1835) 
.5122*** 
(.1622) 
foreign * Δmp 1.1784*** (.2184) 
1.1424*** 
(.2167) 
1.0046*** 
(.1826) 
1.0049*** 
(.2122) 
.8978*** 
(.1849) 
foreign * Δmp_1 .1250 (.0992) 
.1089 
(.0987) 
.0039 
(.0949) 
.1312 
(.0845) 
.0515 
(.0883) 
other bank characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
other bank characteristics 
* monetary policy No No No Yes Yes 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
observations (num of 
banks) 3964 (1040) 3942 (1039) 3942 (1039) 3942 (1039) 3942 (1039) 
R2 0.3997 0.4046 0.4816 0.4357 0.5026 
 
Dependent Variable: d(loan rate) 
(Eastern & Central Europe) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δmp .2432*** (.0410) 
.2251*** 
(.0525) 
.1757** 
(.0714) 
.3269*** 
(.1109) 
.2075* 
(.1180) 
Δmp_1  .0570* (.0298) 
.0463 
(.0311) 
.0372 
(.0349) 
-.0148 
(.0678) 
-.0173 
(.0688) 
foreign * Δmp -.0036 (.0800) 
.0088 
(.0849) 
.0259 
(.0937) 
.0348 
(.0892) 
.0331 
(.0999) 
foreign * Δmp_1 -.0348 (.0380) 
-.0284 
(.0380) 
-.0231 
(.0387) 
-.0332 
(.0433) 
-.0309 
(.0450) 
other bank characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
other bank characteristics 
* monetary policy No No No Yes Yes 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
observations (num of 
banks) 1182 (311) 1173 (310) 1173 (310) 1173 (310) 1173 (310) 
R2 0.2397 0.2516 0.3144 0.2863 0.3399 
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Table 2.9 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: d(loan rate)  
(Latin America) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δmp .6056*** (.1273) 
.6291*** 
(.1222) 
.8260*** 
(.1618) 
.9674** 
(.4102) 
1.0458** 
(.4256) 
Δmp_1  .2848* (.1604) 
.3180** 
(.1565) 
.3348 
(.2561) 
.9272** 
(.3785) 
.7264* 
(.3775) 
foreign * Δmp 1.5338*** (.2536) 
1.5056*** 
(.2534) 
1.2697*** 
(.2264) 
1.3729*** 
(.2899) 
1.1819*** 
(.2594) 
foreign * Δmp_1 .4570** (.2275) 
.4712** 
(.2192) 
.3633 
(.2680) 
.4696** 
(.2345) 
.3770 
(.2666) 
other bank characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
other bank characteristics 
* monetary policy No No No Yes Yes 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
observations (num of 
banks) 1638 (461) 1637 (461) 1637 (461) 1637 (461) 1637 (461) 
R2 0.4670 0.4752 0.5512 0.4923 0.5607 
 
Dependent Variable: d(loan rate)  
(Asia) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δmp .4959*** (.0484) 
.4797*** 
(.0440) 
.5056*** 
(.0458) 
.2133*** 
(.0660) 
.2372*** 
(.0745) 
Δmp_1 .1224*** (.0364) 
.1247*** 
(.0355) 
.1864*** 
(.0349) 
.1959*** 
(.0543) 
.2469*** 
(.0585) 
foreign * Δmp -.2603*** (.0612) 
-.2703*** 
(.0612) 
-.2718*** 
(.0619) 
-.2614*** 
(.0518) 
-.2627*** 
(.0528) 
foreign * Δmp_1 -.0123 (.0268) 
-.0179 
(.0266) 
-.0193 
(.0266) 
.0032 
(.0280) 
.0025 
(.0277) 
other bank characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
other bank characteristics 
* monetary policy No No No Yes Yes 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
observations (num of 
banks) 1144 (268) 1132 (268) 1132 (268) 1132 (268) 1132 (268) 
R2 0.7071 0.7181 0.7309 0.7514 0.7651 
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Table 2.9 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: d(deposit rate)  
(ALL) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δmp .3024*** (.0372) 
.3357*** 
(.0360) 
.3949*** 
(.0429) 
.9220*** 
(.2827) 
.9291*** 
(.2786) 
Δmp_1 .1233*** (.0312) 
.1490*** 
(.0324) 
.2216*** 
(.0451) 
.7307*** 
(.1770) 
.6389*** 
(.1807) 
foreign * Δmp 1.2380*** (.2257) 
1.2064*** 
(.2251) 
1.0919*** 
(.1889) 
1.1148*** 
(.2285) 
1.0264*** 
(.1950) 
foreign * Δmp_1 .2217* (.1151) 
.1962* 
(.1130) 
.0193 
(.0922) 
.2091** 
(.1031) 
.0615 
(.0842) 
other bank characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
other bank characteristics 
* monetary policy No No No Yes Yes 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
observations (num of 
banks) 3935 (1033) 3914 (1032) 3914 (1032) 3914 (1032) 3914 (1032) 
R2 0.3859 0.3898 0.4401 0.4125 0.4560 
 
Dependent Variable: d(deposit rate)  
(Eastern & Central Europe) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δmp .1894*** (.0419) 
.2059*** 
(.0419) 
.1807*** 
(.0454) 
.3129** 
(.1574) 
.2772* 
(.1604) 
Δmp_1  .1331*** (.0351) 
.1347*** 
(.0348) 
.1462*** 
(.0381) 
.1703 
(.1234) 
.2280 
(.1406) 
foreign * Δmp .1002 (.1052) 
.0708 
(.1042) 
.0721 
(.1015) 
.1257 
(.1040) 
.1122 
(.1083) 
foreign * Δmp_1 -.0303 (.0496) 
-.0394 
(.0486) 
-.0421 
(.0465) 
-.0397 
(.0533) 
-.0452 
(.0499) 
other bank characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
other bank characteristics 
* monetary policy No No No Yes Yes 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
observations (num of 
banks) 1171 (309) 1163 (308) 1163 (308) 1163 (308) 1163 (308) 
R2 0.4031 0.3977 0.4093 0.4052 0.4165 
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Table 2.9 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: d(deposit rate)  
(Latin America) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δmp .6109*** (.1004) 
.6030*** 
(.0929) 
.7437*** 
(.1214) 
1.1374** 
(.4453) 
1.1676*** 
(.4442) 
Δmp_1  .4219*** (.1154) 
.4394*** 
(.1115) 
.5070*** 
(.1909) 
1.2846*** 
(.3634) 
1.1168*** 
(.3933) 
foreign * Δmp 1.6181*** (.2577) 
1.6156*** 
(.2615) 
1.4226*** 
(.2254) 
1.6209*** 
(.3136) 
1.4656*** 
(.2726) 
foreign * Δmp_1 .6076*** (.2253) 
.5913*** 
(.2115) 
.3214 
(.2194) 
.6515** 
(.2540) 
.3970* 
(.2373) 
other bank characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
other bank characteristics 
* monetary policy No No No Yes Yes 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
observations (num of 
banks) 1625 (459) 1624 (459) 1624 (459) 1624 (459) 1624 (459) 
R2 0.4525 0.4571 0.5008 0.4705 0.5085 
 
Dependent Variable: d(deposit rate)  
(Asia) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δmp .4637*** (.0223) 
.4475*** 
(.0241) 
.4312*** 
(.0304) 
.3933*** 
(.1098) 
.3991*** 
(.1110) 
Δmp_1 .0295 (.0953) 
.0392 
(.0937) 
.0290 
(.1003) 
.1604 
(.1126) 
.1756 
(.1210) 
foreign * Δmp -.1774*** (.0520) 
-.1902*** 
(.0522) 
-.1909*** 
(.0529) 
-.1311* 
(.0779) 
-.1307* 
(.0791) 
foreign * Δmp_1 -.0064 (.0458) 
-.0217 
(.0458) 
-.0253 
(.0467) 
-.0389 
(.0519) 
-.0488 
(.0520) 
other bank characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
other bank characteristics 
* monetary policy No No No Yes Yes 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
observations (num of 
banks) 1139 (265) 1127 (265) 1127 (265) 1127 (265) 1127 (265) 
R2 0.2340 0.2485 0.2721 0.2573 0.2830 
 
 
Note: Heterogeneity robust standard error in parenthesis, allowing serial correlation within clusters (banks). 
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Table 2. 10 Effects of Monetary Policy on Interest Rates without Extreme Values 
Dependent Variable: d(loan rate)  
(ALL observations after removing extreme interest rates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
d(loan rate)_1 -.3294*** (.0346) 
-.3276*** 
(.0347) 
-.3557*** 
(.0326) 
-.3262*** 
(.0350) 
-.3551*** 
(.0327) 
Δmp .3578*** (.0286) 
.3439*** 
(.0297) 
.3268*** 
(.0301) 
.3821*** 
(.0550) 
.3846*** 
(.0582) 
Δmp_1 .1144*** (.0235) 
.1125*** 
(.0234) 
.1274*** 
(.0230) 
.2374*** 
(.0508) 
.2071*** 
(.0531) 
foreign .6028** (.2533) 
.5297** 
(.2546) 
.4793** 
(.2328) 
.3937 
(.2543) 
.3240 
(.2310) 
state .1387 (.2381) 
-.4193* 
(.2386) 
-.2461 
(.2339) 
-.4574** 
(.2335) 
-.0817 
(.2184) 
foreign * Δmp -.0596 (.0554) 
-.0528 
(.0554) 
-.0395 
(.0538) 
-.0636 
(.0533) 
-.0561 
(.0516) 
foreign * Δmp_1 .0014 (.0306) 
.0016 
(.0302) 
-.0185 
(.0298) 
-.0141 
(.0284) 
-.0308 
(.0284) 
state * Δmp -.1546*** (.0602) 
-.1541*** 
(.0590) 
-.1255** 
(.0566) 
-.1363** 
(.0588) 
-.1004* 
(.0595) 
state * Δmp_1 -.1242*** (.0354) 
-.1231*** 
(.0340) 
-.1113*** 
(.0315) 
-.1240*** 
(.0374) 
-.1115*** 
(.0350) 
liquidity_1  .0129** (.0055) 
.0103 
(.0067) 
.0072 
(.0061) 
.0029 
(.0069) 
capitalization_1  -.0652*** (.0132) 
-.0662*** 
(.0138) 
-.0568*** 
(.0132) 
-.0585*** 
(.0138) 
bank size _1  .0305 (.0232) 
.0041 
(.0241) 
.0180 
(.0279) 
-.0188 
(.0255) 
efficiency_1  -.0102 (.0204) 
-.0168 
(.0217) 
-.0990*** 
(.0251) 
-.1400*** 
(.0257) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp    -.0004 (.0010) 
-.0005 
(.0010) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp_1    -.0002 (.0007) 
.0000 
(.0007) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    -.0020 (.0013) 
-.0017 
(.0013) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    -.0036*** (.0013) 
-.0026** 
(.0012) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    -.0028 (.0038) 
-.0044 
(.0037) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    -.0005 (.0017) 
-.0006 
(.0018) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp    .0004 (.0007) 
-.0007 
(.0007) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp_1    -.0043*** (.0014) 
-.0027** 
(.0013) 
gr(gdp) -.0903*** (.0306) 
-.1027*** 
(.0300) 
.0091 
(.0427) 
-.0967*** 
(.0310) 
.0287 
(.0433) 
inflation -.0150 (.0135) 
-.0128 
(.0134) 
-.0023 
(.0229) 
-.0125 
(.0140) 
-.0035 
(.0237) 
depreciation .0218*** (.0065) 
.0256*** 
(.0066) 
.0275*** 
(.0072) 
.0297*** 
(.0065) 
.0310*** 
(.0072) 
constant -.2178 (.1761) 
.3088 
(.3426) 
-.4192 
(.6491) 
1.0651*** 
(.3673) 
.7466 
(.6498) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
obs (num of banks) 3880 (1023) 3858 (1022) 3858 (1022) 3858 (1022) 3858 (1022) 
R2 0.2677 0.2783 0.3484 0.2877 0.3573 
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Table 2.10 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: d(loan rate)  
(Eastern & Central Europe after removing extreme interest rates ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
d(loan rate)_1 -.2056*** 
(.0336) 
-.1991*** 
(.0358) 
-.2027*** 
(.0403) 
-.2016*** 
(.0387) 
-.2001*** 
(.0418) 
Δmp .2432*** 
(.0410) 
.2251*** 
(.0525) 
.1757** 
(.0714) 
.3269*** 
(.1109) 
.2075* 
(.1180) 
Δmp_1  .0570* 
(.0298) 
.0463 
(.0311) 
.0372 
(.0349) 
-.0148 
(.0678) 
-.0173 
(.0688) 
foreign -.3475 
(.3055) 
-.5716* 
(.3191) 
-.1815 
(.3614) 
-.5773* 
(.3254) 
-.1102 
(.3747) 
state -.0334 
(.3383) 
-.2587 
(.3403) 
-.1906 
(.3543) 
-.1524 
(.3567) 
.0289 
(.3834) 
foreign * Δmp -.0036 
(.0800) 
.0088 
(.0849) 
.0259 
(.0937) 
.0348 
(.0892) 
.0331 
(.0999) 
foreign * Δmp_1 -.0348 
(.0380) 
-.0284 
(.0380) 
-.0231 
(.0387) 
-.0332 
(.0433) 
-.0309 
(.0450) 
state * Δmp -.0743 
(.0796) 
-.0610 
(.0849) 
-.0106 
(.0923) 
-.0445 
(.0748) 
-.0036 
(.0841) 
state * Δmp_1 -.0815* 
(.0474) 
-.0706 
(.0473) 
-.0601 
(.0488) 
-.0617 
(.0480) 
-.0581 
(.0526) 
liquidity_1   .0012 (.0057) 
.0008 
(.0056) 
-.0047 
(.0070) 
.0001 
(.0068) 
capitalization_1  -.0378*** (.0142) 
-.0327** 
(.0150) 
-.0242* 
(.0138) 
-.0248 
(.0156) 
bank size _1   .0201 (.0156) 
.0187 
(.0195) 
-.0014 
(.0139) 
-.0103 
(.0147) 
efficiency_1  -.0101 (.0071) 
-.0182** 
(.0092) 
-.0581 
(.0430) 
-.0543 
(.0473) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp    -.0028* (.0015) 
-.0014 
(.0015) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp_1    .0014 (.0009) 
.0015* 
(.0009) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    .0038 (.0029) 
.0041 
(.0030) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    -.0015 (.0011) 
-.0019 
(.0011) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    -.0042* (.0024) 
-.0049** 
(.0022) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    .0003 (.0010) 
-.0001 
(.0010) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp    -.0019** (.0008) 
-.0015* 
(.0007) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp_1    .0027* (.0016) 
.0020 
(.0016) 
gr(gdp) -.1878*** 
(.0358) 
-.205*** 
(.0382) 
-.1146** 
(.0490) 
-.2098*** 
(.0391) 
-.1340*** 
(.0500) 
inflation .0375** 
(.0189) 
.0377*** 
(.0191) 
.0530** 
(.0230) 
.0394** 
(.0190) 
.0557** 
(.0232) 
depreciation -.0405*** 
(.0109) 
-.0390*** 
(.0123) 
-.0423** 
(.0174) 
-.0423*** 
(.0117) 
-.0476*** 
(.0151) 
constant .0740 
(.2431) 
.7337* 
(.4278) 
.3284 
(.6058) 
1.2216** 
(.5071) 
.4541 
(.6926) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
obs (num of banks) 1182 (311) 1173 (310) 1173 (310) 1173 (310) 1173 (310) 
R2 0.2397 0.2516 0.3144 0.2863 0.3399 
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Table 2.10 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: d(loan rate)  
(Latin America after removing extreme interest rates ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
d(loan rate)_1 -.3513*** (.0419) 
-.3533*** 
(.0414) 
-.3772*** 
(.0383) 
-.3517*** 
(.0420) 
-.3748*** 
(.0384) 
Δmp .3722*** (.0455) 
.3475*** 
(.0449) 
.3788*** 
(.0531) 
.4217*** 
(.1046) 
.4237*** 
(.1201) 
Δmp_1  .1351** (.0585) 
.1825*** 
(.0553) 
.1844*** 
(.0678) 
.3424*** 
(.1132) 
.2657** 
(.1256) 
foreign 1.5994*** (.5117) 
1.3100** 
(.5152) 
.6729 
(.4137) 
1.2101** 
(.5153) 
.5395 
(.4132) 
state .2909 (.8638) 
-.4687 
(.6853) 
-.0350 
(.6623) 
-.8762 
(.7048) 
-.4403 
(.6481) 
foreign * Δmp -.0070 (.0837) 
.0016 
(.0837) 
.0091 
(.0769) 
-.0123 
(.0801) 
-.0098 
(.0735) 
foreign * Δmp_1 .0368 (.0749) 
-.0108 
(.0718) 
-.0321 
(.0738) 
-.0448 
(.0716) 
-.0676 
(.0741) 
state * Δmp .0014 (.0955) 
-.0144 
(.0845) 
.0337 
(.0745) 
-.0449 
(.0865) 
-.0027 
(.0765) 
state * Δmp_1 .0097 (.1236) 
-.0892 
(.1206) 
-.0656 
(.1254) 
-.1643 
(.1337) 
-.1491 
(.1332) 
liquidity_1   .0188 (.0139) 
.0130 
(.0149) 
.0191 
(.0146) 
.0136 
(.0156) 
capitalization_1  -.0793*** (.0209) 
-.0741*** 
(.0199) 
-.0674*** 
(.0216) 
-.0647*** 
(.0205) 
bank size _1   .1418 (.0973) 
-.0222 
(.0899) 
.1727 
(.1132) 
.0146 
(.0979) 
efficiency_1  -.1377*** (.0334) 
-.1429*** 
(.0317) 
-.1339*** 
(.0358) 
-.1436*** 
(.0326) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp    .0001 (.0019) 
.0003 
(.0020) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp_1    -.0003 (.0023) 
.0004 
(.0024) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    -.0033* (.0017) 
-.0019 
(.0016) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    -.0052* (.0029) 
-.0027 
(.0026) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    .0005 (.0109) 
.0031 
(.0109) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    .0197* (.0103) 
.0263** 
(.0115) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp    -.0023 (.0032) 
-.0029 
(.0031) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp_1    -.0089* (.0050) 
-.0091** 
(.0044) 
gr(gdp) .0719 (.0650) 
.0815 
(.0620) 
.3584 
(.1001) 
.0824 
(.0655) 
.3603*** 
(.1036) 
inflation -.0340 (.0617) 
-.0047 
(.0614) 
.1883* 
(.1047) 
-.0086 
(.0597) 
.1808* 
(.1035) 
depreciation .0336*** (.0091) 
.0351*** 
(.0090) 
.0181 
(.0135) 
.0404*** 
(.0091) 
.0233* 
(.0128) 
constant -.7272 (.4818) 
.8536 
(.9401) 
-2.5410** 
(1.2010) 
.6253 
(1.0015) 
-2.3579** 
(1.1929) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
obs (num of banks) 1554 (444) 1553 (444) 1553 (444) 1553 (444) 1553 (444) 
R2 0.2548 0.2758 0.3727 0.2819 0.3775 
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Table 2.10 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: d(loan rate)  
(Asia after removing extreme interest rates ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
d(loan rate)_1 -.3004*** 
(.0612) 
-.2942*** 
(.0583) 
-.2944*** 
(.0554) 
-.2637*** 
(.0577) 
-.2426*** 
(.0527) 
Δmp .4959*** 
(.0484) 
.4797*** 
(.0440) 
.5056*** 
(.0458) 
.2133*** 
(.0660) 
.2372*** 
(.0745) 
Δmp_1  .1224*** 
(.0364) 
.1247*** 
(.0355) 
.1864*** 
(.0349) 
.1959*** 
(.0543) 
.2469*** 
(.0585) 
foreign -.3832*** 
(.1316) 
-.2311 
(.1431) 
-.0425 
(.1589) 
-.1208 
(.1363) 
-.0972 
(.1580) 
state -.0129 
(.1097) 
-.1651 
(.1452) 
-.1858 
(.1186) 
-.2411 
(.1552) 
-.1489 
(.1147) 
foreign * Δmp -.2603*** 
(.0612) 
-.2703*** 
(.0612) 
-.2718*** 
(.0619) 
-.2614*** 
(.0518) 
-.2627*** 
(.0528) 
foreign * Δmp_1 -.0123 
(.0268) 
-.0179 
(.0266) 
-.0193 
(.0266) 
.0032 
(.0280) 
.0025 
(.0277) 
state * Δmp -.2531*** 
(.0709) 
-.2654*** 
(.0696) 
-.2844*** 
(.0674) 
-.1733*** 
(.0628) 
-.1530*** 
(.0580) 
state * Δmp_1 -.1410*** 
(.0394) 
-.1525*** 
(.0415) 
-.1869*** 
(.0391) 
-.1662*** 
(.0394) 
-.1809*** 
(.0378) 
liquidity_1   -.0039 (.0039) 
-.0000 
(.0050) 
.0075** 
(.0034) 
.0117** 
(.0048) 
capitalization_1  -.0378** (.0150) 
-.0434** 
(.0201) 
-.0394** 
(.0166) 
-.0505** 
(.0225) 
bank size _1   -.0011 (.0057) 
-.0016 
(.0110) 
.0019 
(.0072) 
-.0197 
(.0130) 
efficiency_1  -.1098*** (.0382) 
-.1262*** 
(.0415) 
-.0426 
(.0320) 
-.0469 
(.0323) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp    .0042*** (.0009) 
.0043*** 
(.0010) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp_1    -.0002 (.0006) 
-.0006 
(.0006) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    -.0008 (.0029) 
-.0012 
(.0029) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    -.0020 (.0015) 
-.0020 
(.0015) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    -.0063 (.0083) 
-.0176* 
(.0095) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    -.0043 (.0046) 
-.0036 
(.0042) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp    .0108** (.0054) 
.0101* 
(.0056) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp_1    -.0033 (.0039) 
-.0038 
(.0040) 
gr(gdp) -.0585** 
(.0240) 
-.0622*** 
(.0215) 
-.0350 
(.0238) 
-.0885*** 
(.0250) 
-.0650** 
(.0286) 
inflation .0626*** 
(.0120) 
.0677*** 
(.0131) 
-.0422 
(.0382) 
.0979*** 
(.0160) 
.0488 
(.0512) 
depreciation -.0442*** 
(.0086) 
-.0371*** 
(.0085) 
-.0152 
(.0138) 
-.0136 
(.0128) 
-.0099 
(.0151) 
constant -.2316* 
(.1358) 
.6523** 
(.2684) 
-.1426 
(.3683) 
-.0180 
(.2284) 
-.0384 
(.3720) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
obs (num of banks) 1144 (268) 1132 (268) 1132 (268) 1132 (268) 1132 (268) 
R2 0.7071 0.7181 0.7309 0.7514 0.7651 
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Table 2.10 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: d(deposit rate)  
(ALL observations after removing extreme interest rates ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
d(deposit rate)_1 -.3436*** (.0406) 
-.3347*** 
(.0421) 
-.3856*** 
(.0401) 
-.3349*** 
(.0420) 
-.3850*** 
(.0402) 
Δmp .2989*** (.0255) 
.3108*** 
(.0239) 
.2924*** 
(.0245) 
.2781*** 
(.0627) 
.2791*** 
(.0645) 
Δmp_1  .1133*** (.0271) 
.1202*** 
(.0263) 
.1485*** 
(.0288) 
.2070*** 
(.0564) 
.2096*** 
(.0580) 
foreign .7840*** (.2874) 
.7437** 
(.2910) 
.7351*** 
(.2704) 
.7904*** 
(.2987) 
.6942** 
(.2766) 
state .0355 (.3525) 
-.3687 
(.4126) 
.0131 
(.4278) 
-.3059 
(.4126) 
.1647 
(.4391) 
foreign * Δmp .0069 (.0524) 
-.0026 
(.0513) 
.0097 
(.0499) 
.0191 
(.0510) 
.0259 
(.0493) 
foreign * Δmp_1 -.0378 (.0342) 
-.0461 
(.0336) 
-.0669* 
(.0356) 
-.0550* 
(.0314) 
-.0795** 
(.0327) 
state * Δmp -.1089* (.0611) 
-.1201** 
(.0601) 
-.0906 
(.0574) 
-.0904 
(.0566) 
-.0507 
(.0563) 
state * Δmp_1 -.1004** (.0418) 
-.1117*** 
(.0401) 
-.1025** 
(.0408) 
-.1044*** 
(.0335) 
-.0950*** 
(.0360) 
liquidity_1   .0151** (.0066) 
.0180* 
(.0094) 
.0151** 
(.0071) 
.0148 
(.0094) 
capitalization_1  -.0566** (.0248) 
-.0606** 
(.0262) 
-.0538* 
(.0275) 
-.0521* 
(.0284) 
bank size _1   .0404* (.0232) 
-.0016 
(.0232) 
.0295 
(.0266) 
-.0239 
(.0241) 
efficiency_1  .0324*** (.0083) 
.0133 
(.0092) 
.0511 
(.0329) 
-.0353 
(.0361) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp    -.0004 (.0010) 
-.0006 
(.0010) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp_1    -.0002 (.0007) 
-.0002 
(.0007) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    .0019 (.0020) 
.0026 
(.0020) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    -.0032** (.0014) 
-.0028** 
(.0014) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    -.0030 (.0031) 
-.0052* 
(.0030) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    -.0009 (.0015) 
-.0015 
(.0016) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp    .0008 (.0011) 
-.0011 
(.0011) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp_1    -.0011 (.0019) 
.0007 
(.0019) 
gr(gdp) -.0716** (.0340) 
-.0690** 
(.0334) 
.0635 
(.0476) 
-.0554 
(.0346) 
.0862* 
(.0491) 
inflation -.0205* (.0119) 
-.0217* 
(.0120) 
-.0279 
(.0231) 
-.0237* 
(.0125) 
-.0236 
(.0229) 
depreciation .0395*** (.0060) 
.0419*** 
(.0061) 
.0443*** 
(.0065) 
.0418*** 
(.0063) 
.0441*** 
(.0066) 
constant -.1011 (.1912) 
-.1072 
(.4537) 
-1.4492 
(.8846) 
-.2736 
(.4843) 
-1.1080 
(.8772) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
obs (num of banks) 3851 (1013) 3830 (1012) 3830 (1012) 3830 (1012) 3830 (1012) 
R2 0.2495 0.2536 0.3323 0.2570 0.3365 
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Table 2.10 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: d(deposit rate)  
(Eastern & Central Europe after removing extreme interest rates ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
d(deposit rate)_1 -.2974*** (.0480) 
-.1936*** 
(.0661) 
-.2006*** 
(.0692) 
-.1888*** 
(.0667) 
-.1969*** 
(.0703) 
Δmp .1808*** (.0463) 
.1943*** 
(.0540) 
.1705*** 
(.0652) 
.3088** 
(.1185) 
.2455** 
(.1127) 
Δmp_1  .0932** (.0357) 
.0807** 
(.0370) 
.0813** 
(.0384) 
.0438 
(.0743) 
.0742 
(.0757) 
foreign -.5063* (.2978) 
-.9628** 
(.2790) 
-.4173 
(.3231) 
-.8689*** 
(.3121) 
-.2976 
(.3743) 
state -1.0014 (.6981) 
-1.1331*** 
(.3740) 
-.8434* 
(.4373) 
-1.0494*** 
(.3955) 
-.6848 
(.4623) 
foreign * Δmp .0471 (.0828) 
.0157 
(.0811) 
.0236 
(.0848) 
.0547 
(.0867) 
.0466 
(.0940) 
foreign * Δmp_1 -.0457 (.0414) 
-.0517 
(.0397) 
-.0477 
(.0380) 
-.0686 
(.0491) 
-.0673 
(.0488) 
state * Δmp .0091 (.0882) 
-.0058 
(.0884) 
.0367 
(.0947) 
.0185 
(.0771) 
.0520 
(.0819) 
state * Δmp_1 -.1122* (.0580) 
-.1210** 
(.0607) 
-.1146* 
(.0607) 
-.1159** 
(.0495) 
-.1124** 
(.0509) 
liquidity_1   .0002 (.0065) 
.0027 
(.0068) 
-.0033 
(.0079) 
.0013 
(.0078) 
capitalization_1  -.0626*** (.0202) 
-.0653*** 
(.0199) 
-.0607** 
(.0243) 
-.0635*** 
(.0231) 
bank size _1   .0174 (.0111) 
.0176 
(.0143) 
-.0049 
(.0124) 
-.0092 
(.0130) 
efficiency_1  .0103* (.0054) 
.0038 
(.0071) 
.0406 
(.0366) 
.0212 
(.0423) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp    -.0033** (.0016) 
-.0025* 
(.0014) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp_1    .0015 (.0011) 
.0014 
(.0010) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    .0039 (.0036) 
.0042 
(.0034) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    -.0022* (.0012) 
-.0026** 
(.0011) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    -.0049** (.0019) 
-.0054*** 
(.0019) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    -.0010 (.0010) 
-.0017* 
(.0009) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp    -.0006 (.0008) 
-.0003 
(.0008) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp_1    .0023 (.0014) 
.0013 
(.0014) 
gr(gdp) -.0208 (.0362) 
-.0275 
(.0317) 
.0189 
(.0413) 
-.0357 
(.0318) 
.0067 
(.0438) 
inflation .0396*** (.0126) 
.0412*** 
(.0120) 
.0522*** 
(.0142) 
.0429*** 
(.0127) 
.0557*** 
(.0136) 
depreciation -.0278*** (.0065) 
-.0270*** 
(.0070) 
-.0403*** 
(.0115) 
-.0340*** 
(.0078) 
-.0511*** 
(.0105) 
constant -.2068 (.2891) 
.8620* 
(.4429) 
-.1042 
(.5477) 
.9139 
(.5051) 
-.2564 
(.6111) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
obs (num of banks) 1168 (309) 1160 (307) 1160 (307) 1160 (307) 1160 (307) 
R2 0.2582 0.2336 0.2915 0.2811 0.3332 
  
146
Table 2.10 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: d(deposit rate)  
(Latin America after removing extreme interest rates ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
d(deposit rate)_1 -.3595*** (.0508) 
-.3654*** 
(.0502) 
-.4166*** 
(.0479) 
-.3606*** 
(.0506) 
-.4150*** 
(.0478) 
Δmp .2889*** (.0429) 
.3005*** 
(.0437) 
.2599*** 
(.0523) 
.3321*** 
(.1018) 
.3192*** 
(.1160) 
Δmp_1  .1088 (.0700) 
.1269* 
(.0694) 
.1153 
(.1014) 
.4133*** 
(.1265) 
.3356** 
(.1423) 
foreign 2.4081*** (.6042) 
2.3950*** 
(.6217) 
1.5916*** 
(.5223) 
2.2524*** 
(.6174) 
1.3821*** 
(.5248) 
state 1.8158 (1.5190) 
.6564 
(1.5987) 
2.0833 
(1.5955) 
.0256 
(1.6022) 
1.4972 
(1.5422) 
foreign * Δmp .0335 (.0771) 
.0246 
(.0773) 
.0527 
(.0744) 
.0466 
(.0766) 
.0630 
(.0764) 
foreign * Δmp_1 -.0815 (.0867) 
-.0977 
(.0867) 
-.0947 
(.0980) 
-.1593** 
(.0803) 
-.1514* 
(.0891) 
state * Δmp -.0251 (.1046) 
-.0430 
(.1078) 
-.0467 
(.0837) 
-.0525 
(.1234) 
-.0404 
(.1013) 
state * Δmp_1 -.0508 (.1514) 
-.0466 
(.1507) 
-.0060 
(.1601) 
-.1624 
(.1490) 
-.1049 
(.1482) 
liquidity_1   .0392** (.0154) 
.0314 
(.0192) 
.0431*** 
(.0160) 
.0346* 
(.0199) 
capitalization_1  -.0493 (.0431) 
-.0437 
(.0404) 
-.0292 
(.0457) 
-.0242 
(.0423) 
bank size _1   .2015** (.0941) 
-.0543 
(.0865) 
.2763** 
(.1157) 
.0109 
(.1005) 
efficiency_1  .0588 (.0446) 
-.0062 
(.0430) 
.0446 
(.0475) 
-.0369 
(.0443) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp    -.0003 (.0020) 
-.0002 
(.0021) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp_1    -.0048* (.0025) 
-.0039 
(.0027) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    .0015 (.0027) 
.0026 
(.0027) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    -.0043 (.0036) 
-.0026 
(.0033) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    .0035 (.0102) 
-.0005 
(.0099) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    .0357** (.0139) 
.0385*** 
(.0135) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp    -.0078** (.0034) 
-.0112*** 
(.0035) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp_1    -.0127** (.0054) 
-.0139** 
(.0055) 
gr(gdp) .0142 (.0662) 
.0214 
(.0635) 
.2123* 
(.1150) 
.0557 
(.0676) 
.2663** 
(.1212) 
inflation -.0735* (.0404) 
-.0565 
(.0430) 
-.1118 
(.0725) 
-.0697 
(.0436) 
-.1211* 
(.0733) 
depreciation .0562 (.0087) 
.0554 
(.0091) 
.0637*** 
(.0105) 
.0650*** 
(.0099) 
.0738*** 
(.0107) 
constant -.4539 (.4057) 
-1.9213* 
(1.0395) 
-2.5024* 
(1.4924) 
-2.3046** 
(1.1377) 
-2.0845 
(1.4481) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
obs (num of banks) 1546 (440) 1545 (440) 1545 (440) 1545 (440) 1545 (440) 
R2 0.2522 0.2603 0.3553 0.2725 0.3679 
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Table 2.10 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: d(deposit rate)  
(Asia after removing extreme interest rates ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
d(deposit rate)_1 -.3119*** 
(.1196) 
-.3047*** 
(.1106) 
-.3023*** 
(.1080) 
-.3009*** 
(.1078) 
-.2981*** 
(.1053) 
Δmp .4639*** 
(.0217) 
.4417*** 
(.0226) 
.4561*** 
(.0290) 
.3772*** 
(.1008) 
.4449*** 
(.0949) 
Δmp_1  .1196* 
(.0651) 
.1247* 
(.0637) 
.1463** 
(.0602) 
.2461*** 
(.0863) 
.3056*** 
(.0858) 
foreign -.8392*** 
(.2102) 
-.4869* 
(.2490) 
-.2991 
(.2850) 
-.5718** 
(.2436) 
-.3625 
(.2931) 
state -.0769 
(.1813) 
-.3826 
(.3075) 
-.3444** 
(.1649) 
-.2951 
(.3349) 
-.2295 
(.1837) 
foreign * Δmp -.1874*** 
(.0468) 
-.1984*** 
(.0471) 
-.2011*** 
(.0473) 
-.1449** 
(.0682) 
-.1496** 
(.0678) 
foreign * Δmp_1 -.0472 
(.0393) 
-.0639 
(.0390) 
-.0673* 
(.0395) 
-.0794* 
(.0463) 
-.0883* 
(.0466) 
state * Δmp -.1186 
(.0957) 
-.1165 
(.0936) 
-.2141** 
(.0914) 
-.0203 
(.1141) 
-.0705 
(.1084) 
state * Δmp_1 .0494 
(.0584) 
.0492 
(.0573) 
-.0301 
(.0584) 
.0153 
(.0622) 
-.0734 
(.0642) 
liquidity_1   -.0132 (.0083) 
-.0067 
(.0119) 
-.0137 
(.0095) 
-.0090 
(.0132) 
capitalization_1  -.0946** (.0389) 
-.1140** 
(.0514) 
-.0858** 
(.0426) 
-.1070* 
(.0573) 
bank size _1   -.0210* (.0115) 
-.0365 
(.0286) 
-.0327** 
(.0165) 
-.0626** 
(.0355) 
efficiency_1  -.1118*** (.0427) 
-.1247*** 
(.0429) 
-.1395** 
(.0689) 
-.1567** 
(.0713) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp    .0001 (.0011) 
-.0004 
(.0012) 
liquidty_1 * Δmp_1    -.0010* (.0006) 
-.0015** 
(.0006) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp    .0075 (.0074) 
.0069 
(.0073) 
capitalization_1 * Δmp_1    -.0043* (.0025) 
-.0042 
(.0026) 
bank size_1 * Δmp    -.0107 (.0080) 
-.0307*** 
(.0110) 
bank size_1 * Δmp_1    -.0026 (.0050) 
-.0038 
(.0052) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp    -.0058 (.0072) 
-.0077 
(.0074) 
efficiency_1 * Δmp_1    -.0034 (.0045) 
-.0037 
(.0044) 
gr(gdp) -.0331 
(.0584) 
-.0451 
(.0530) 
.0172 
(.0611) 
-.0397 
(.0569) 
.0304 
(.0657) 
inflation .0394* 
(.0223) 
.0362 
(.0234) 
.0145 
(.0815) 
.0247 
(.0250) 
-.0203 
(.0936) 
depreciation -.0387*** 
(.0126) 
-.0243** 
(.0117) 
-.0453* 
(.0256) 
-.0330** 
(.0130) 
-.0541** 
(.0257) 
constant -.1151 
(.2512) 
1.7806*** 
(.5374) 
.9530 
(.7820) 
1.8562*** 
(.6471) 
1.0111 
(.8713) 
country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
obs (num of banks) 1137 (265) 1125 (265) 1125 (265) 1125 (265) 1125 (265) 
R2 0.3838 0.4065 0.4342 0.4154 0.4455 
 
Note: Heterogeneity robust standard error in parenthesis, allowing serial correlation within clusters (banks). 
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Table 2. 11 Results of Panel VAR 
Domestic private banks 
Response of: 
Response to: 
Δmp(t) grdeposits(t) grlq(t) grloans(t) 
Δmp(t-1) .1123** 
(.0435) 
-.2410** 
(.1099) 
-.0204 
(.2309) 
-.6145*** 
(.0898) 
grdeposits(t-1) -.0183** 
(.0068) 
-.0036 
(.0377) 
-.6545 
(.6650) 
.1172** 
(.0496) 
grlq(t-1) -.0013 
(.0035) 
.0049 
(.0039) 
-.0382* 
(.0213) 
.0069 
(.0049) 
grloans(t-1) .0331*** 
(.0070) 
.0551* 
(.0331) 
.1167 
(.2322) 
.0175 
(.0454) 
obs 1287 
  
Foreign banks 
Response of: 
Response to: 
Δmp(t) grdeposits(t) grlq(t) grloans(t) 
Δmp(t-1) .1213*** 
(.0286) 
-.1469** 
(.0620) 
-.0454 
(.0978) 
-.3294*** 
(.0797) 
grdeposits(t-1) -.0065 
(.0062) 
-.0181 
(.0341) 
.0724 
(.0784) 
.0201 
(.0293) 
grlq(t-1) .0023 
(.0021) 
.0108* 
(.0062) 
-.0127 
(.0177) 
.0143* 
(.0079) 
grloans(t-1) .0331*** 
(.0075) 
.0302 
(.0291) 
.0685 
(.1017) 
.0653* 
(.0344) 
obs 1151 
 
Notes: Robust standard error in parenthesis. 
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Table 2. 12 Impulse Responses of Growth of Loans and Deposits to Monetary 
Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Domestic private banks Foreign banks 
 year  [ 5% 95% ]  [ 5% 95% ] 
Loans 0 -2.9343 -4.5094 -1.4775 -1.0435 -2.8077 0.8216 
 1 -6.2240 -7.5882 -4.7823 -4.7305 -6.7315 -2.9183 
 2 -1.0182 -1.7240 -0.4010 -0.9137 -1.4446 -0.4876 
 3 -0.0506 -0.2495 0.0619 -0.0940 -0.2064 -0.0186 
 4 0.0144 -0.0219 0.0345 -0.0008 -0.0195 0.0152 
 5 0.0038 -0.0008 0.0094 0.0017 -0.0010 0.0053 
 6 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0018 0.0004 -0.0000 0.0012 
        
Deposits 0 -2.5207 -4.0000 -1.0346 -1.1104 -3.0793 0.9328 
 1 -2.4423 -4.0683 -0.6533 -2.0862 -3.5130 -0.4861 
 2 -0.5769 -1.0601 -0.1498 -0.3596 -0.6539 -0.0902 
 3 -0.0385 -0.1515 0.0243 -0.0356 -0.0901 0.0089 
 4 0.0056 -0.0142 0.0148 0.0001 -0.0087 0.0080 
 5 0.0019 -0.0005 0.0047 0.0007 -0.0005 0.0022 
 6 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0010 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0005 
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Table 2. 13 Distribution of Foreign Banks by Home Country 
 Number of Banks from the Home Country  
Home Country ALL ECE LA ASIA 
U.S. 89 (462) 17 (73) 56 (305) 16 (84) 
Germany  60 (284) 41 (183) 14 (80) 5 (21) 
France 43 (191) 20 (96) 15 (68) 8 (27) 
Netherland 43 (191) 9 (44) 25 (107) 9 (40) 
Spain 35 (169) 0 (0) 34 (164) 1 (5) 
U.K. 34 (146) 3 (6) 17 (88) 14 (52) 
Austria 33 (147) 33 (147) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Italy  32 (143) 19 (67) 13 (76) 0 (0) 
Japan 22 (108) 3 (5) 7 (41) 12 (62) 
Singapore 17 (85) 0 (0) 0 (0) 17 (85) 
Brazil 15 (78) 0 (0) 15 (78) 0 (0) 
Greek 12 (45) 12 (45) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Sweden 10 (41) 9 (39) 1 (2) 0 (0) 
Argentina 9 (45) 0 (0) 9 (45) 0 (0) 
Belgium 9 (46) 8 (38) 0 (0)  1 (8) 
Russia 9 (35) 9 (35) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
China 8 (47) 0 (0) 0 (0) 8 (47) 
Canada 7 (43) 0 (0) 4 (20) 3 (23) 
Korea 7 (36) 4 (21) 0 (0) 3 (15) 
Malaysia 7 (29) 0 (0) 0 (0) 7 (29) 
Portugal 5 (18) 1 (4) 4 (14) 0 (0) 
Turkey 4 (12) 4 (12) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Uruguay 4 (18) 0 (0) 4 (18) 0 (0) 
Australia 3 (14) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (14) 
Ireland 3 (16) 3 (16) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Others 55 (263) 22 (81) 22 (108) 11 (74) 
Total 549 (2712) 202 (912) 233 (1214) 114 (586) 
 
Note: Inside parenthesis is the number of observations. ECE represents “Eastern & Central Europe”, LA 
“Latin America”, and ASIA “Asia”. 
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Table 2. 14 Effects of Monetary Policy with Home Country Conditions 
Dependent Variable: gr(loans) 
(All)      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
gr(loans)_1 .1943*** (.0261) 
.1573*** 
(.0265) 
.1935*** 
(.0262) 
.1576*** 
(.0267) 
.1458*** 
(.0272) 
gr(loans)_2 .0448* (.0260) 
.0256 
(.0281) 
.0469* 
(.0263) 
.0268 
(.0284) 
.0199 
(.0282) 
Δmp -.5326*** (.1556) 
-.5600*** 
(.1643) 
-.8577* 
(.4644) 
-.8989* 
(.4785) 
-.7975* 
(.4827) 
Δmp_1 -.7332*** (.1390) 
-.7751*** 
(.1479) 
-.9366** 
(.4227) 
-1.1200** 
(.4605) 
-1.0930** 
(.4661) 
foreign*Δmp .4159** (.1947) 
.3561* 
(.1950) 
.4707** 
(.2385) 
.3947* 
(.2344) 
.3774 
(.2384) 
foreign*Δmp_1 .2148 (.1867) 
.0947 
(.1988) 
.2056 
(.2093) 
.1154 
(.2153) 
.1033 
(.2183) 
foreign * homeΔmp  .0508 (.1993) 
.1141 
(.1950) 
-.0271 
(.2519) 
.0271 
(.2521) 
.0306 
(.2606) 
foreign * homeΔmp_1 .3450 (.2472) 
.4269* 
(.2399) 
.3514 
(.2427) 
.4253* 
(.2367) 
.4502* 
(.2480) 
foreign * home gr(gdp) .0514 (.3032) 
.2353 
(.3063) 
.0616 
(.3041) 
.2445 
(.3075) 
-.1088 
(.4962) 
foreign * home inflation .0737 (.3548) 
.1740 
(.3367) 
.0576 
(.3542) 
.1454 
(.3407) 
-.0792 
(.5414) 
host macro variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
bank characteristic 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
bank characteristic 
variables * host monetary 
policy 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
home country effect No No No No Yes 
host country effect No Yes No Yes Yes 
year effect No Yes No Yes Yes 
Obs (num of banks) 2945 (903) 2945 (903) 2945 (903) 2945 (903) 2945 (903) 
R2 0.1363 0.1688 0.1396 0.1711 0.1942 
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Table 2. 15 Distribution of Foreign Banks by Entry Mode 
 Number of Banks  
Entry Mode ALL ECE LA ASIA 
Greenfield 306 (1598) 87 (434) 143 (759) 76 (405) 
Takeover 243 (1114) 115 (478) 90 (455) 38 (181) 
 
Note: Inside parenthesis is the number of observations. ECE represents “Eastern & Central Europe”, LA 
“Latin America”, and ASIA “Asia”. 
 
  
153 
Table 2. 16 Descriptive Statistics: Greenfield Foreign Banks vs. Takeover Foreign Banks 
 Greenfield Established Takeover Established 
 obs Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max obs Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max 
 OVERALL 
Loans/Total Assets 1598 47.98 24.11 47.18 0 99.98 1114 49.28 18.97 50.42 0 96.06 
Liquid Assets/ Total Assets 1596 38.64 21.96 37.41 0 98.32 1114 35.31 18.88 32.21 0.34 100 
Total Earning Assets/ Total Assets 1598 86.08 14.04 91.10 0.20 100 1114 87.05 8.81 89.26 36.82 100 
Total Non Earning Assets/ Total Assets 1598 11.43 13.02 6.44 0 98.69 1114 9.62 8.12 7.33 0 62.36 
Deposit/Total Assets 1598 61.17 26.93 70.64 0 98.87 1114 71.03 19.53 77.81 0 96.08 
Equity/Total Assets 1589 18.81 17.55 12.80 1.00 99.68 1114 13.73 10.95 10.76 2.35 90.34 
Non Interest Expenses/Average Assets 1583 6.38 8.35 4.46 -15.82 123.53 1111 6.84 5.80 5.38 -21.25 51.66 
Interest Rate of Loans 1585 21.16 38.57 10.84 0 500 1112 14.96 17.32 10.53 0.57 261.34 
Interest Rate of Deposits 1576 19.41 40.54 7.86 0 461.31 1109 12.13 25.38 6.31 0.52 330.35 
Interest Rate Spread 1576 1.81 22.93 2.60 -368.13 260 1109 2.80 17.51 3.52 -307.95 71.62 
Growth Rate of Total Assets 1285 11.24 38.84 6.74 -87.09 195.49 989 10.46 29.84 7.29 -92.25 195.51 
Growth Rate of Loans 1279 13.11 54.97 4.38 -100 298.85 987 12.99 40.76 8.52 -100 244.92 
Growth Rate of Deposits 1279 12.87 53.09 6.90 -100 281.48 988 12.62 40.93 6.77 -100 295.97 
Growth Rate of Loan Interest Rate 1273 16.71 87.89 -3.24 -97.98 1148.99 986 1.24 49.91 -8.41 -96.85 449.17 
Growth Rate of Deposit Interest Rate 1260 30.53 197.03 -4.23 -100 5590.63 982 9.94 108.11 -12.52 -88.09 1494.67 
Net Interest Margin 1585 5.91 6.83 4.19 -8.3 127.34 1112 6.06 5.68 4.68 -34.54 50.61 
Return on Average Assets 1592 0.92 5.03 1.09 -53.1 68.6 1112 0.51 5.72 0.92 -111.13 65.62 
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Table 2.16 (Continued)  
 Descriptive Statistics: t-test 
Variable Greenfield ≠ Takeover Greenfield < Takeover Greenfield > Takeover 
Loans/Total Assets 0.1319 0.0660 0.9340 
Liquid Assets/ Total Assets 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Total Earning Assets/ Total Assets 0.0411 0.0206 0.9794 
Total Non Earning Assets/ Total Assets 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Deposit/Total Assets 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Equity/Total Assets 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Non Interest Expenses/Average Assets 0.1098 0.0549 0.9451 
Interest Rate of Loans 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Interest Rate of Deposits 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Interest Rate Spread 0.2260 0.1130 0.8870 
Growth Rate of Total Assets 0.5982 0.7009 0.2991 
Growth Rate of Loans 0.9539 0.5231 0.4769 
Growth Rate of Deposits 0.9011 0.5494 0.4506 
Growth Rate of Loan Interest Rate 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Growth Rate of Deposit Interest Rate 0.0033 0.9984 0.0016 
Net Interest Margin 0.5515 0.2758 0.7242 
Return on Average Assets 0.0484 0.9758 0.0242 
 
Notes: Greenfield≠ Takeover: p-value of two-sided t-test on equality of mean. H1: μ(greenfield foreign banks) ≠ μ(takeover foreign banks). 
                 Greenfield < (>) Takeover: p-value of one-sided t-test on equality of mean. H1: μ(greenfield foreign banks) < (>) μ(takeover foreign banks). 
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Table 2. 17 Effects of Monetary Policy with Entry Mode 
Dependent Variable: gr(loans) 
(All)      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
gr(loans)_1 .1847*** (.0258) 
.1952*** 
(.0259) 
.1609*** 
(.0262) 
.1941*** 
(.0260) 
.1609*** 
(.0265) 
gr(loans)_2 .0436* (.0264) 
.0466* 
(.0258) 
.0289 
(.0278) 
.0483* 
(.0261) 
.0294 
(.0281) 
Δmp -.5840*** (.1563) 
-.5217*** 
(.1548) 
-.5478*** 
(.1630) 
-.9027** 
(.4345) 
-.9675** 
(.4483) 
Δmp_1 -.7809*** (.1411) 
-.7262*** 
(.1388) 
-.7583*** 
(.1472) 
-.9814** 
(.3983) 
-1.1878*** 
(.4384) 
greenfield -5.5358*** (2.0223) 
-7.7241*** 
(2.1125) 
-6.8108*** 
(2.2964) 
-7.9977*** 
(2.1340) 
-7.0795*** 
(2.2728) 
takeover 1.1424 (1.7681) 
.5375 
(1.7639) 
.3865 
(1.7976) 
.5176 
(1.7946) 
.4573 
(1.8237) 
greenfield *Δmp .3959 (.2455) 
.3399 
(.2426) 
.2599 
(.2380) 
.3727 
(.2677) 
.2677 
(.2591) 
greenfield *Δmp_1 .1178 (.2406) 
.1388 
(.2441) 
-.0565 
(.2513) 
.1176 
(.2590) 
-.0492 
(.2572) 
takeover *Δmp .5839*** (.2196) 
.5433** 
(.2129) 
.4796** 
(.2153) 
.6173** 
(.2456) 
.5515** 
(.2435) 
takeover *Δmp_1 .5568*** (.1950) 
.5885*** 
(.1924) 
.5635*** 
(.2104) 
.6071*** 
(.1977) 
.6006*** 
(.2130) 
host macro variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
bank characteristic 
variables 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
bank characteristic 
variables * host monetary 
policy 
No No No Yes Yes 
host country effect No No Yes No Yes 
year effect No No Yes No Yes 
Obs (num of banks) 3024 (905) 3006 (904) 3006 (904) 3006 (904) 3006 (904) 
R2 0.1197 0.1388 0.1698 0.1424 0.1728 
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Table 2. 18 Foreign Bank Penetration Level, Credit and Monetary Policy 
Dependent variable:  gr (loans) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
gr(loans)_1 .1749 (.1463) .2502 .1864 (.0911)** .1892 (.0870)** .1929 (.0909)** 
Δmp -2.5305 (1.2403) -4.0258 -3.0139 -3.7685 -3.8190 (1.6755)**
Δmp_1 -2.0763 (1.1619) -1.7618 -.9769 (.8890) -2.2964 (1.5577) -2.3375 (1.5685) 
peneta .0895 (.1126) .0249 (.0906) .0333 (.0971) .0181 (.0969) .0243 (.0975) 
peneta*Δmp .0278 (.0126) ** .0388 .0422 .0420 .0424 (.0139)*** 
peneta*Δmp_1 -.0007 (.0098) -.0047 (.0074) .0001 (.0083) -.0000 (.0080) -.0000 (.0080) 
sbsta -.0020 (.1259) -.0163 (.1184) -.0272 (.1179) -.0430 (.1183) -.0375 (.1202) 
sbsta *Δmp .0158 (.0091) * .0334 (.0159)** .0310 (.0164)* .0279 (.0168) .0288 (.0179) 
sbsta * Δmp_1 -.0057 (.0058) -.0033 (.0104) -.0007 (.0108) -.0025 (.0097) -.0024 (.0098) 
concenta .0226 (.1047) -.1124 (.1047) -.1376 (.1006) -.1424 (.1051) -.1348 (.1158) 
concenta*Δmp .0176 (.0155) -.0114 (.0179) -.0058 (.0189) -.0019 (.0182) -.0023 (.0185) 
concenta*Δmp_1 .0305 (.0150) ** .0103 (.0187) .0058 (.0184) .0099 (.0178) .0105 (.0178) 
lqta_1  .2636 (.1270)** .2221 (.1362) .1975 (.1320) .1953 (.1346) 
lqta_1 * Δmp  -.0227 (.0145) -.0550 (.0238)** -.0536 (.0229)** -.0537 (.0234)** 
lqta_1 * Δmp_1  .0048 (.0139) -.0077 (.0142) -.0037 (.0153) -.0037 (.0156) 
equityta_1  1.7883 1.9240 1.8877 1.8885 (.4628)***
equityta_1* Δmp  .2732 (.1025)** .2601 .2736 .2755 (.0935)** 
equityta_1 *Δmp_1  .0662 (.0510) .0799 (.0485) .1102 (.0521)** .1100 (.0522)** 
niraaall_1  -1.7455 -1.3830 (.7371)* -1.6768 (.8545)* -1.6123 (.8416)* 
niraaall_1*Δmp  -.1224 (.0798) -.1560 (.0896)* -.1525 (.0916) -.1506 (.0914) 
niraaall_1*Δmp_1  -.0171 (.0756) -.0684 (.0854) -.0486 (.0905) -.0488 (.0917) 
niraadom_1      
niraadom_1*Δmp      
niraadom_1*Δmp_1      
nieaaall_1      
nieaaall_1*Δmp      
nieaaall_1*Δmp_1      
nieaadom_1      
nieaadom_1*Δmp      
nieaadom_1*Δmp_1      
domcredit    -.0222 (.0407) -.0233 (.0419) 
domcredit*Δmp    .0102 (.0085) .0103 (.0086) 
domcredit*Δmp_1    .0142 (.0102) .0142 (.0103) 
crrgdp_1   .4007 (.4045) .2314 (.4265) .2294 (.4295) 
peneta*crrgdp_1   .0027 (.0083) .0053 (.0091) .0051 (.0093) 
inflation_1   -.0339 (.1215) -.0367 (.1252) -.0324 (.1250) 
peneta* inflation_1   -.0041 (.0070) -.0050 (.0072) -.0051 (.0073) 
llploans_1   -.6121 -.6476 -.6607 (.1973)***
peneta*llploans_1   -.0076 (.0072) -.0082 (.0075) -.0080 (.0075) 
crisis     1.1574(4.5194) 
obs 182 (35) 182 (35) 182 (35) 182 (35) 182 (35) 
R2 0.1920 0.3737 0.4309 0.4435 0.4440 
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Table 2.18 (Continued) 
Dependent variable:  gr (loans) 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
gr(loans)_1 .1227 (.0794) .1624 (.0725)** .1196 (.0863) .1684 (.0763)** .1528 (.0736)** 
Δmp -2.8989 -1.9495 (1.5980) -3.5281 -3.3028 -2.8079 (1.6707)*
Δmp_1 -2.2606 (1.3727) -1.6084 (1.1015) -2.7151 -2.2953 -2.2279 (1.2658)*
peneta .0332 (.0954) .0115 (.1019) .0538 (.0954) .0608 (.0989) .0538 (.0897) 
peneta*Δmp .0432 .0373 (.0145)** .0412 .0378 .0425 (.0133)*** 
peneta*Δmp_1 .0020 (.0074) -.0047 (.0070) .0038 (.0079) -.0015 (.0079) .0002 (.0066) 
sbsta -.0371 (.1120) -.0657 (.1108) -.0190 (.1239) .0053 (.1204) -.0396 (.1112) 
sbsta *Δmp .0282 (.0168)* .0292 (.0175) .0291 (.0151)* .0376 (.0159)** .0296 (.0168)* 
sbsta * Δmp_1 .0009 (.0094) -.0058 (.0108) .0045 (.0089) .0036 (.0105) -.0004 (.0095) 
concenta -.2547 (.1057)** -.2657 (.1024)** -.2765 -.2634 -.2396 (.1074)** 
concenta*Δmp -.0131 (.0186) -.0201 (.0191) -.0129 (.0178) -.0222 (.0177) -.0155 (.0182) 
concenta*Δmp_1 .0106 (.0157) .0168 (.0180) .0131 (.0179) .0161 (.0222) .0118 (.0158) 
lqta_1 .1639 (.1332) .1112 (.1324) .1698 (.1310) .1403 (.1362) .1410 (.1316) 
lqta_1 * Δmp -.0550 (.0221)** -.0716 -.0385 (.0188)** -.0514 (.0203)** -.0560 (.0227)** 
lqta_1 * Δmp_1 -.0091 (.0138) -.0159 (.0121) -.0001 (.0084) -.0039 (.0090) -.0106 (.0134) 
equityta_1 1.9722 1.9830 1.6987 1.5840 1.9764 (.4984)***
equityta_1* Δmp .2907 .3293 .2103 .2500 .2954 (.0824)*** 
equityta_1 *Δmp_1 .1186 (.0482)** .1364 .0783 (.0506) .0722 (.0564) .1254 (.0464)** 
niraaall_1 -1.8217 (.9258)*    -1.8585 (.9362)* 
niraaall_1*Δmp -.1923 (.0920)**    -.1925 (.0931)** 
niraaall_1*Δmp_1 -.0803 (.0852)    -.0944 (.0796) 
niraadom_1  -1.8819    
niraadom_1*Δmp  -.2510    
niraadom_1*Δmp_1  -.1604 (.0799)*    
nieaaall_1   -1.4137   
nieaaall_1*Δmp   -.0191 (.0410)   
nieaaall_1*Δmp_1   -.0098 (.0384)   
nieaadom_1    -.6741  
nieaadom_1*Δmp    -.0208 (.0518)  
nieaadom_1*Δmp_1    -.0282 (.0514)  
domcredit -.0027 (.0432) -.0240 (.0401) -.0254 (.0452) -.0037 (.0395) -.0035 (.0428) 
domcredit*Δmp .0061 (.0099) .0000 (.0090) .0083 (.0088) .0079 (.0098) .0059 (.0087) 
domcredit*Δmp_1 .0134 (.0100) .0071 (.0101) .0106 (.0085) .0107 (.0084) .0140 (.0098) 
crrgdp_1 .0595 (.4931) .0761 (.5286) .1427 (.4846) .1493 (.5428)  
peneta*crrgdp_1 .0077 (.0101) .0075 (.0123) .0048 (.0093) .0047 (.0115)  
inflation_1 -.0356 (.1240) -.0304 (.1271) .0092 (.1059) -.0052 (.1166) -.0241 (.1249) 
peneta* inflation_1 -.0050 (.0074) -.0070 (.0075) -.0065 (.0062) -.0065 (.0066) -.0057 (.0074) 
llploans_1 -.5628 -.6039 -.4330 -.5630 -.5722 (.1599)***
peneta*llploans_1 -.0074 (.0074) -.0070 (.0069) -.0007 (.0046) -.0019 (.0044) -.0073 (.0077) 
argcrisis -7.0989 -8.7383(2.5405) -6.8323 -8.1173(2.6953) -7.6547(2.6235)**
asiacrisis -11.5236 -10.2366 -8.8716 (6.9588) -8.9852 (6.8360) -12.8935(5.6015)*
ruscrisis 13.144(4.4029)* 12.288(4.3290)* 14.971(4.7542)* 12.880(4.2237)* 11.967(4.4355)***
bracrisis 1.9302 (3.4172) 3.1955 (3.3134) 1.7069 (3.1031) 1.1295 (3.1273) .8512(3.3918) 
obs 182 (35) 179 (34) 182 (35) 179 (34) 182 (35) 
R2 0.4760 0.4987 0.4907 0.5007 0.4700 
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Table 2.18 (Continued) 
Dependent variable:  gr (loans) 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
gr(loans)_1 .1278 (.0783) .1256 (.0847) .0857 (.0826) .1254 (.0826) .0976 (.0869) 
Δmp -2.8663 -3.7190 -1.9917 (1.6441) -4.1770(1.4521) -3.8609 
Δmp_1 -1.8399 (1.1995) -2.3940 -1.6751 (1.1760) -1.7568 (1.5194) -3.6038 (1.4573)**
peneta .0723 (.0910) .0985 (.0945) .0330 (.0981) .0078 (.0910) .0429 (.1082) 
peneta*Δmp .0442 .0427 .0401 .0395 .0428 (.0138)*** 
peneta*Δmp_1 .0032 (.0070) .0063 (.0070) .0020 (.0090) .0036 (.0077) .0026 (.0103) 
sbsta -.0373 (.1032) -.0136 (.1170) -.0116 (.1197) -.0252 (.1089) -.0539 (.1131) 
sbsta * Δmp .0259 (.0148)* .0291 (.0138)** .0243 (.0187) .0328 (.0168)* .0342 (.0174)* 
sbsta * Δmp_1 .0049 (.0100) .0087 (.0094) .0020 (.0120) .0088 (.0085) .0011 (.0104) 
concenta -.2684 -.3050 -.3018 (.1634)* -.2467 (.1048)** -.2562 (.1047)** 
concenta*Δmp -.0105 (.0182) -.0123 (.0177) -.0176 (.0204) -.0124 (.0192) -.0135 (.0192) 
concenta*Δmp_1 -.0010 (.0124) -.0008 (.0125) .0043 (.0138) .0016 (.0167) .0193 (.0242) 
lqta_1 .1219 (.1281) .1203 (.1239) .1379 (.1531) .1877 (.1366) .1919 (.1272) 
lqta_1 * Δmp -.0590 -.0418 (.0172)** -.0367 (.0251) -.0413 (.0198)** -.0383 (.0208)* 
lqta_1 * Δmp_1 -.0076 (.0134) .0025 (.0092) -.0110 (.0140) -.0099 (.0085) -.0019 (.0101) 
equityta_1 1.9803 1.7395 1.9943 2.1896 2.0884 (.4824)***
equityta_1*Δmp .2951 .2162 .2378 (.0933)** .2451 .2274 (.0903)** 
equityta_1 *Δmp_1 .1191 .0845 (.0467)* .1130 (.0624)* .1039 (.0503)** .0687 (.0779) 
niraaall_1 -1.8205 (.9040)*  -1.8661 (1.1664) -1.1281 (.6053)*  
niraaall_1*Δmp -.1972 (.0863)**  -.1724 (.1059) -.0141 (.0599)  
niraaall_1*Δmp_1 -.0697 (.0869)  -.0751 (.0773) -.0449 (.0456)  
niraadom_1      
niraadom_1*Δmp      
niraadom_1*Δmp_1      
nieaaall_1  -1.4258   -1.8501 (.6524)***
nieaaall_1*Δmp  -.0024 (.0426)   -.0359 (.0648) 
nieaaall_1*Δmp_1  .0055 (.0442)   .0655 (.1102) 
domcredit -.0066 (.0411) -.0309 (.0434) .0010 (.0518) .0127 (.0423) -.0138 (.0521) 
domcredit*Δmp .0048 (.0098) .0070 (.0089) .0014 (.0102) .0150 (.0097) .0140 (.0085) 
domcredit*Δmp_1 .0135 (.0095) .0105 (.0082) .0110 (.0112) .0097 (.0105) .0176 (.0089)* 
crrgdp_1 .1679 (.4942) .2656 (.4735) -.1019 (.5619) -.0591 (.4934) -.1515 (.4699) 
peneta*crrgdp_1 .0054 (.0098) .0024 (.0090) .0090 (.0119) .0074 (.0105) .0058 (.0106) 
inflation_1 .0059 (.1382) .0667 (.1136) -.0242 (.1506) -.0604 (.1197) -.0208 (.1176) 
peneta* inflation_1 -.0072 (.0082) -.0093 (.0070) -.0026 (.0084) -.0030 (.0072) -.0047 (.0068) 
llploans_1 -.5916 -.4655 -.5415 (.2140)** -.5787 -.5689 (.2077)***
peneta*llploans_1 -.0077 (.0078) -.0006 (.0049) -.0059 (.0145) -.0078 (.0070) -.0084 (.0060) 
argcrisis -6.9036(2.7334) -6.6639(2.8308) -8.1415(3.9870) -6.9294(3.1113) -6.5303(2.7055)**
asiacrisis -11.8829(6.1885 -9.1687 (6.6999) -13.1144 -11.8067(6.8572 -11.3718 (7.2904)
ruscrisis 13.9387(4.6379) 15.955(4.9392)* 12.819(4.0674)* 10.978(4.6376)* 12.834(4.3696)***
bracrisis 1.9093(3.4099) 1.8819(3.1452) 1.2307 (4.1105) 2.4189 (3.4185) .7524 (3.1506) 
obs 182 (35) 182 (35) 148 (35) 182 (35) 180 (35) 
R2 0.4801 0.4974 0.5029 0.4967 0.5098 
Notes: In specification (11) and (12), the penetration level, state bank’s market share and concentration 
level are measured in loans. In (13), the penetration series is from Micco et al (2004). In (14) and (15), niraaall_1 
and nieaaall_1 are respectively replaced by the data from Beck et al (2000), nirteabeck_1 and octabeck_1. 
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Table 3. 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
Growth rate of real GDP per capita 69 2.503 3.3282 2.3117 -5.4804 10.3432
Growth rate of fixed capital 
formation 
67 4.3027 10.1696 3.8656 -22.6970 39.2716
Growth rate of employed labor 67 .9758 2.4748 .9090 -5.0504 14.0466
Inflation 67 9.9840 12.6025 7.0794 -2.7519 75.1725
Depreciation 67 10.5903 16.3928 6.3772 -8.4507 84.1147
Domestic credit / GDP 69 54.9675 41.1922 46.186 13.4752 207.3569
Stock market turnover rate 65 56.282 92.9597 29.5534 .6308 492.9437
Net interest revenue/average assets 
(all banks) 
69 4.7078 2.7112 4.1801 -1.0504 14.4795
Net interest revenue/average assets 
(domestic banks only) 
68 4.6892 2.9847 4.4549 -2.5953 14.7016
Non-interest expenses/average 
assets (all banks) 
69 6.9293 4.0045 5.7178 1.0165 21.4147
Non-interest expenses/average 
assets (domestic banks only) 
68 7.6266 5.5096 6.6671 1.0783 37.5532
Concentration level 69 56.3631 15.7974 52.765 32.2775 97.875 
Penetration Level (in terms of total 
assets) 
69 36.9159 29.2143 34.1425 0 100 
Penetration Level (in terms of 
loans) 
69 37.5554 30.1087 34.48 0 100 
State-owned banks market share 69 21.7094 22.0364 13.5837 0 91.2425
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Table 3. 2 Correlation 
 Growth rate 
of GDP per 
capita 
Growth rate 
of fixed 
capital 
formation 
Growth rate 
of labor 
Inflation Depreciation Domestic 
credit / GDP 
Stock market 
turnover rate 
Net interest 
revenue / 
average 
assets 
Foreign bank 
penetration 
level 
State-owned 
banks share 
Growth rate of GDP 
per capita 
1.0000          
Growth rate of fixed 
capital formation 
0.7087*** 1.0000         
Growth rate of labor -0.1494 -0.0046 1.0000        
Inflation -0.0861 0.0336 -0.2246* 1.0000       
Depreciation -0.2011* -0.1412 -0.2185 0.9153*** 1.0000      
Domestic credit / 
GDP 
-0.1521 -0.3153*** 0.1753 -0.1868 -0.1363 1.0000     
Stock market 
turnover rate 
0.0428 -0.0578 -0.0928 -0.1170 -0.1014 0.0450 1.0000    
Net interest revenue 
/ average assets 
-0.2248* 0.1025 -0.0482 0.2051* 0.2322* -0.5045*** -0.0965 1.0000   
Foreign bank 
penetration level 
0.0515 0.0090 -0.0173 -0.2066* -0.2818** -0.0633 -0.0904 -0.0325 1.0000  
State-owned banks 
share 
-0.0010 0.0061 -0.1917 0.2368* 0.2215* 0.0558 0.1238 -0.3240*** -0.5403*** 1.0000 
 
Notes: *** represents 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level and * 10% significance level.
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Table 3. 3 Foreign Bank Penetration and Resource Allocation 
Dependent variable: gr( GDP per capita)i,t 
 Pooled OLS Fixed-effect Estimation 
 (1) (2) 
gr(fixed capital)i,t .2439*** 
(.0331) 
.1659** 
(.0739) 
gr(labor)i,t -.1520 
(.2166) 
-.9442*** 
(.3357) 
inidevelopmenti  -.2685* 
(.1417) 
 
inflationi,t -.0198 
(.0345) 
-.0883 
(.0922) 
depreciationi,t -.0758*** 
(.0224) 
-.0362 
(.0322) 
domcrediti,t -.0049 
(.0047) 
-.0337 
(.0351) 
stturnoveri,t -.0009 
(.0018) 
.0247* 
(.0141) 
niraaalli,t -.3095** 
(.1268) 
-.6546*** 
(.2073) 
penetai,t -.0109 
(.0106) 
-.0142 
(.0260) 
sbstai,t -.0076 
(.0168) 
-.0024 
(.0511) 
penetai,t * gr(fixed capital)i,t .0010** 
(.0004) 
.0020* 
(.0011) 
penetai,t * gr(labor)i,t -.0034 
(.0027) 
.0009 
(.0079) 
niraaalli,t * gr(fixed capital)i,t -.0191*** 
(.0048) 
-.0129* 
(.0075) 
niraaalli,t * gr(labor)i,t -.0134 
(.0399) 
.2034*** 
(.0578) 
Obs  60 (32) 58 (31) 
R2 0.8107 0.3366 
 
Notes: Robust standard deviation in parenthesis. *** represents 1% significance level, ** 5% significance 
level and * 10% significance level. 
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Table 3. 4 Robust Test I 
Dependent variable: gr( GDP per capita)i,t 
 Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Estimation 
 (3) (4) (5) (6) 
gr(fixed capital)i,t .2409*** 
(.0330) 
.2371*** 
(.0349) 
.1659** 
(.0739) 
.2202*** 
(.0580) 
gr(labor)i,t -.1596 
(.2169) 
-.1921 
(.2850) 
-.9442*** 
(.3357) 
-.6678 
(.4115) 
inidevelopmenti  -.2917** 
(.1406) 
-.5025*** 
(.1783) 
  
inflationi,t -.0179 
(.0332) 
-.0065 
(.0286) 
-.0883 
(.0922) 
-.0028 
(.0879) 
depreciationi,t -.0748*** 
(.0212) 
-.0846*** 
(.0181) 
-.0362 
(.0322) 
-.0745*** 
(.0277) 
domcrediti,t -.0042 
(.0048) 
-.0045 
(.0055) 
-.0337 
(.0351) 
.0025 
(.0209) 
stturnoveri,t -.0009 
(.0019) 
.0035** 
(.0016) 
.0247* 
(.0141) 
.0122 
(.0114) 
niraaalli,t -.3095** 
(.1332) 
-.3336*** 
(.1154) 
-.6546*** 
(.2073) 
-.8538*** 
(.2159) 
penetai,t -.0082 
(.0104) 
.0000 
(.0148) 
-.0142 
(.0260) 
.0169 
(.0232) 
sbstai,t -.0056 
(.0175) 
-.0050 
(.0167) 
-.0024 
(.0511) 
.0410 
(.0361) 
penetai,t * gr(fixed capital)i,t .0011** 
(.0004) 
.0009 
(.0005) 
.0020* 
(.0011) 
.0023** 
(.0011) 
penetai,t * gr(labor)i,t -.0030 
(.0030) 
-.0005 
(.0039) 
.0009 
(.0079) 
-.0016 
(.0058) 
niraaalli,t * gr(fixed capital)i,t -.0188*** 
(.0051) 
-.0167*** 
(.0047) 
-.0129* 
(.0075) 
-.0181** 
(.0073) 
niraaalli,t * gr(labor)i,t -.0134 
(.0389) 
-.0199 
(.0408) 
.2034*** 
(.0578) 
.1139** 
(.0510) 
Obs  60 (32) 58 (31) 58 (31) 58 (31) 
R2 0.8099 0.8396 0.3366 0.5677 
 
Notes: In specification (3) and (5), foreign bank penetration level, penetai,t, is measured in terms of total 
loans. In (4) and (6), foreign bank penetration level series is borrowed from Micco et al (2004). Robust standard 
deviation in parenthesis. *** represents 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level and * 10% significance 
level. 
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Table 3. 5 Robust Test II 
Dependent variable: gr( GDP per capita)i,t 
 Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Estimation 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
gr(fixed capital)i,t .1841*** 
(.0522) 
.2292*** 
(.0310) 
.1923*** 
(.0373) 
.1349*** 
(.0430) 
.1557*** 
(.0800) 
.1675*** 
(.0531) 
gr(labor)i,t -.2808 
(.2026) 
-.1060 
(.2212) 
-.1705 
(.2430) 
-.6884*** 
(.1646) 
-.4901 
(.3859) 
-.5928***
(.1445) 
inidevelopmenti  -.4066 
(.2412) 
-.2758* 
(.1457) 
-.3886* 
(.2215) 
   
inflationi,t -.0439 
(.0378) 
-.0222 
(.0339) 
-.0529 
(.0405) 
-.1185* 
(.0639) 
-.0990 
(.0909) 
-.0937* 
(.0483) 
depreciationi,t -.0674** 
(.0266) 
-.0768***
(.0232) 
-.0827***
(.0260) 
-.0054 
(.0216) 
-.0605* 
(.0327) 
-.0283 
(.0201) 
domcrediti,t -.0086 
(.0070) 
-.0056 
(.0048) 
-.0047 
(.0056) 
-.0176 
(.0244) 
-.0200 
(.0371) 
-.0072 
(.0234) 
stturnoveri,t -.0007 
(.0020) 
-.0010 
(.0019) 
-.0015 
(.0022) 
.0043 
(.0101) 
.0128 
(.0143) 
-.0003 
(.0088) 
competitioni,t -.2804***
(.1383) 
-.2870** 
(.1187) 
-.1355 
(.1001) 
-.3881** 
(.1579) 
-.5215** 
(.1962) 
-.3945***
(.0801) 
penetai,t -.0109 
(.0130) 
-.0081 
(.0113) 
-.0005 
(.0137) 
.0089 
(.0244) 
-.0257 
(.0298) 
.0187 
(.0223) 
sbstai,t -.0043 
(.0204) 
-.0076 
(.0168) 
.0065 
(.0191) 
.0278 
(.0422) 
-.0080 
(.0572) 
.0465 
(.0423) 
penetai,t * gr(fixed capital)i,t .0004 
(.0007) 
.0009** 
(.0004) 
.0000 
(.0009) 
.0002 
(.0008) 
.0022* 
(.0012) 
-.0004 
(.0009) 
penetai,t * gr(labor)i,t -.0057 
(.0046) 
-.0043 
(.0030) 
-.0067 
(.0059) 
.0004 
(.0062) 
-.0044 
(.0083) 
-.0024 
(.0052) 
competitioni,t * gr(fixed 
capital)i,t 
-.0050 
(.0056) 
-.0163***
(.0041) 
-.0050 
(.0043) 
.0006 
(.0047) 
-.0144** 
(.0068) 
-.0034 
(.0041) 
competitioni,t * gr(labor)i,t .0190 
(.0320) 
-.0177 
(.0399) 
.0021 
(.0393) 
.1596*** 
(.0285) 
.1238* 
(.0639) 
.1403*** 
(.0247) 
Obs  59 (32) 60 (32) 58 (32) 59 (32) 60 (32) 58 (32) 
R2 0.7540  0.8086 0.7245 0.3986 0.5054 0.3197 
 
Notes: In specification (7) and (10), the competition level of banking sector is measured by the net interest 
revenue over average assets for only domestic banks; in (8) and (11), measured by the non-interest expenses over 
average assets for all banks; in (9) and (12), measured by non-interest expenses over average assets for only 
domestic banks. *** represents 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level and * 10% significance level. 
 
 
 
  
164
Table 3. 6 Robust Test III 
Dependent variable: gr( GDP per capita)i,t 
 Pooled OLS Fixed-effect Estimation 
 (13) (14) 
gr(fixed capital)i,t .2641*** 
(.0579) 
.1249 
(.1004) 
gr(labor)i,t -.6042* 
(.3340) 
-1.2854** 
(.6161) 
inidevelopmenti  .0359 
(.2403) 
 
inflationi,t -.0117 
(.0351) 
-.0875 
(.1014) 
depreciationi,t -.0776*** 
(.0258) 
-.0435 
(.0337) 
credittoprivatei,t -.0202* 
(.0110) 
-.0377 
(.0306) 
stturnoveri,t -.0005 
(.0021) 
.0262* 
(.0135) 
competitioni,t -.4092*** 
(.1434) 
-.7405*** 
(.2714) 
penetai,t -.0130 
(.0099) 
-.0261 
(.0304) 
sbstai,t -.0096 
(.0163) 
-.0085 
(.0525) 
penetai,t * gr(fixed capital)i,t .0009 
(.0005) 
.0023** 
(.0011) 
penetai,t * gr(labor)i,t -.0009 
(.0033) 
.0020 
(.0085) 
competitioni,t * gr(fixed capital)i,t -.0197*** 
(.0067) 
-.0103 
(.0098) 
competitioni,t * gr(labor)i,t .0177 
(.0388) 
.2325*** 
(.0661) 
credittoprivatei,t * gr(fixed capital)i,t -.0005 
(.0004) 
.0000 
(.0007) 
credittoprivatei,t * gr(labor)i,t .0061 
(.0037) 
.0045 
(.0067) 
Obs  60 (32) 60 (32) 
R2 0.8182 0.3292 
 
Notes: *** represents 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level and * 10% significance level. 
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Appendix of Figures 
Figure 1. 1 Share of Foreign Bank Assets to Banking Sector Total Assets (Central 
and Eastern Europe) 
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Figure 1. 2 Share of Foreign Bank Assets to Banking Sector Total Assets 
(Latin America) 
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Figure 1. 3 Share of Foreign Bank Assets to Banking Sector Total Assets (Asia) 
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Figure 1. 4 International Interest Rate Shock 
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Figure 1.4 (Continued) 
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Figure 1.4 (Continued) 
 
Note: The dashed line represents the variable of interest in domestic bank dominance economy. The values for the variables in domestic bank dominance economy are recorded on the 
left axis, while the values of variables in foreign bank dominance economy on the right axis. 
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Figure 1. 5 Monetary Policy Shock 
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Figure 1.5 (Continued) 
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Figure 1.5 (Continued) 
 
Note: The dashed line represents the variable of interest in domestic bank dominance economy. The values for the variables in domestic bank dominance economy are recorded 
on the left axis, while the values of variables in foreign bank dominance economy on the right axis. 
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Figure 1. 6 Monetary Policy Adjustments to Stabilize Output 
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Figure 1.6 (Continued) 
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Figure 1.6 (Continued) 
 
Note: The dashed line represents the variable of interest in domestic bank dominance economy. The values for the variables in domestic bank dominance economy are recorded 
on the left axis, while the values of variables in foreign bank dominance economy on the right axis. 
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Figure 1. 7 Exchange Rate Policy Shock 
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Figure 1.7 (Continued) 
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Figure 1.7 (Continued) 
 
Note: The dashed line represents the variable of interest in domestic bank dominance economy. The values for the variables in domestic bank dominance economy are recorded 
on the left axis, while the values of variables in foreign bank dominance economy on the right axis. 
  
180
 (Domestic private banks) 
Impulse-responses for 1 lag VAR of deltamp grdeposits grlq grloans
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps
response of deltamp to deltamp shock
s
 (p 5) deltamp  deltamp
 (p 95) deltamp
0 6
-0.1691
9.9466
response of deltamp to grdeposits shock
s
 (p 5) grdeposits  grdeposits
 (p 95) grdeposits
0 6
-0.4486
0.3249
response of deltamp to grlq shock
s
 (p 5) grlq  grlq
 (p 95) grlq
0 6
-1.5461
0.6443
response of deltamp to grloans shock
s
 (p 5) grloans  grloans
 (p 95) grloans
0 6
-0.0207
1.3657
response of grdeposits to deltamp shock
s
 (p 5) deltamp  deltamp
 (p 95) deltamp
0 6
-4.0683
0.0243
response of grdeposits to grdeposits shock
s
 (p 5) grdeposits  grdeposits
 (p 95) grdeposits
0 6
-1.1120
32.4925
response of grdeposits to grlq shock
s
 (p 5) grlq  grlq
 (p 95) grlq
0 6
-0.6501
2.0917
response of grdeposits to grloans shock
s
 (p 5) grloans  grloans
 (p 95) grloans
0 6
-0.4888
3.2851
response of grlq to deltamp shock
s
 (p 5) deltamp  deltamp
 (p 95) deltamp
0 6
-3.2189
16.5710
response of grlq to grdeposits shock
s
 (p 5) grdeposits  grdeposits
 (p 95) grdeposits
0 6
-50.2400
13.0323
response of grlq to grlq shock
s
 (p 5) grlq  grlq
 (p 95) grlq
0 6
-14.8822
217.3315
response of grlq to grloans shock
s
 (p 5) grloans  grloans
 (p 95) grloans
0 6
-8.1589
15.8448
response of grloans to deltamp shock
s
 (p 5) deltamp  deltamp
 (p 95) deltamp
0 6
-7.5882
0.0619
response of grloans to grdeposits shock
s
 (p 5) grdeposits  grdeposits
 (p 95) grdeposits
0 6
-0.3542
14.8120
response of grloans to grlq shock
s
 (p 5) grlq  grlq
 (p 95) grlq
0 6
-6.5099
3.1295
response of grloans to grloans shock
s
 (p 5) grloans  grloans
 (p 95) grloans
0 6
-1.8168
31.2759
 
 
(Foreign Banks) 
Impulse-responses for 1 lag VAR of deltamp grdeposits grlq grloans
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps
response of deltamp to deltamp shock
s
 (p 5) deltamp  deltamp
 (p 95) deltamp
0 6
-0.0788
14.5023
response of deltamp to grdeposits shock
s
 (p 5) grdeposits  grdeposits
 (p 95) grdeposits
0 6
-0.0457
0.7763
response of deltamp to grlq shock
s
 (p 5) grlq  grlq
 (p 95) grlq
0 6
-0.3109
0.5331
response of deltamp to grloans shock
s
 (p 5) grloans  grloans
 (p 95) grloans
0 6
-0.0036
1.5383
response of grdeposits to deltamp shock
s
 (p 5) deltamp  deltamp
 (p 95) deltamp
0 6
-3.5130
0.9328
response of grdeposits to grdeposits shock
s
 (p 5) grdeposits  grdeposits
 (p 95) grdeposits
0 6
-1.7321
41.1097
response of grdeposits to grlq shock
s
 (p 5) grlq  grlq
 (p 95) grlq
0 6
-0.1534
2.4005
response of grdeposits to grloans shock
s
 (p 5) grloans  grloans
 (p 95) grloans
0 6
-0.5454
2.6671
response of grlq to deltamp shock
s
 (p 5) deltamp  deltamp
 (p 95) deltamp
0 6
-7.2561
5.0050
response of grlq to grdeposits shock
s
 (p 5) grdeposits  grdeposits
 (p 95) grdeposits
0 6
-0.3855
39.6667
response of grlq to grlq shock
s
 (p 5) grlq  grlq
 (p 95) grlq
0 6
-5.5311
123.8569
response of grlq to grloans shock
s
 (p 5) grloans  grloans
 (p 95) grloans
0 6
-3.2219
8.1720
response of grloans to deltamp shock
s
 (p 5) deltamp  deltamp
 (p 95) deltamp
0 6
-6.7315
0.8216
response of grloans to grdeposits shock
s
 (p 5) grdeposits  grdeposits
 (p 95) grdeposits
0 6
-0.1274
17.2698
response of grloans to grlq shock
s
 (p 5) grlq  grlq
 (p 95) grlq
0 6
-6.4323
2.9623
response of grloans to grloans shock
s
 (p 5) grloans  grloans
 (p 95) grloans
0 6
-0.4957
34.9383
 
Figure 2. 1 Impulse Responses I 
 
Note: Deltamp represents “the change in the domestic monetary policy indicator”, grdeposits “the growth 
rate of deposits”, grlq “the growth rate of liquidity”, and grloans “the growth rate of loans”. 
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Figure 2. 2 Difference in Impulse Responses (Domestic - Foreign) 
 
Notes: Deltamp represents “the change in the domestic monetary policy indicator”, grloans “the growth 
rate of loans”, and grdeposits “the growth rate of deposits”. 
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 (Foreign Banks) 
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Figure 2. 3 Impulse Responses II 
 
Notes: Homedeltamp represents “the change in the home country monetary policy indicator”, deltamp “the 
change in the domestic monetary policy indicator”, grloans “the growth rate of loans”. 
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(Greenfield foreign banks) 
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(Takeover foreign banks) 
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Figure 2. 4 Impulse Responses III 
 
Note: Deltamp represents “the change in the domestic monetary policy indicator”, grdeposits “the growth 
rate of deposits”, grlq “the growth rate of liquidity”, and grloans“the growth rate of loans” 
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